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CH1Security Policies
Software Vulnerability Fundamentals_Introduction : The Art of Software Security
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| What can attackers do by exploiting a vulnerability? | Violate the security of a system. |
| What defines the "security of a system"? | A security policy. |
| How is the "security of a system" conceptualized in relation to its rules, and what constitutes a security violation? | Concept: System security is defined by a security policy. Violation: A security breach occurs when that policy is violated. |
| What is a security policy in a system of software, users, and resources? | A simple list of what is allowed and what is forbidden. |
| What is an example of a security policy violation regarding a calendar service on a staging machine? | When unauthenticated users gain access to the calendar service, which violates the policy rule that forbids them from using it. |
| What can every software system be considered to have, even if it is not formally written down? | A security policy. |
| What constitutes a software system's security policy | Either a formal policy (written documents) Or an informal policy (loose expectations of reasonable behavior) |
| What does the term "security policy" often mean in most software systems, even if it is not explicitly stated? | The user community’s consensus on what system behavior is allowed and what system behavior is forbidden. |
| What are the three forms a security policy can take, ranging from most formal to least formal? | Mathematical Specification, Formal Written Document, Informal Expectations |
| describe the form of security policy that uses mathematical specification | Formal constraints. Verified via proof. Very expensive. Used for safety-critical systems. |
| describe the form of security policy that uses formal written documentation | Structured legal/technical clauses. Explicit rules (e.g., encryption). Covers software, sites, or databases. |
| describe the form of security policy that uses informal expectations | Unwritten, ambiguous assumptions. Based on common sense. Lacks strict technical definitions. |
| What is a formal specification security policy, and what are its limitations? | Def:Math proof verifying program code against security constraints. Use case:Highly sensitive, tightly scoped systems. Limitations:Prohibitively expensive and unwieldy. Reality:Rarely used, even n critical infrastructure like medical devices/airplanes |
| What is a security policy, what is an example of a specific rule it might contain, and where do these rules come from? | Def:formal/written doc outlines security rules4sys/org. Ex Rule: cc data mustnever b shared with 3rd parties/sent across networks without strong encryption Where Rules Come From:Software dev policies Site security policies OS policies DBsecurity policies |
| What is an example of an informal security policy? | A collection of people's expectations regarding reasonable program security behavior. Example: "Yeah, giving a criminal organization access to our credit card database is probably bad." Characteristics: Informal, slightly ambiguous, and unwritten. |
| What is Code Access Security (CAS) in JVM/.NET CLR? | Def&Purpose: Validates packages at load/runtime. Checks bytecode integrity. Verifies software originator. Applies code access restrictions. Enables sandbox environments (Java applets). |
| What is Code Access Security (CAS) two major limitations in JVM/.NET CLR | Two Major Caveats: Lack of understanding: Most developers do not understand CAS, so it is rarely used in commercial software. Underlying vulnerability dependence: If the JVM or CLR has bugs, malware can escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code. |
| What constitutes a software system's security policy in practice, and what is its ultimate foundation? | It is mostly informal, built on people's expectations. It borrows from formal development documents. It references site and resource security policies. Security ultimately depends on end users' requirements and expectations. |