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Security Models
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Bell-LaPadula Model | Enforces the confidentiality aspects of access control Simple security rule - "No read up" Star Property Rule - "No write down" Strong Star Rule - "No read up or write down" Tranquility rule- labels cannot be arbitrarily changed |
| Biba Model | Star integrity axiom - "No write up" Simple integrity axiom - "No read down" Invocation property - "Cannot request service at a higher integrity" |
| Clark-Wilson Model | Focuses on well formed transactions and separation of duties. Subject can only access objects through authorized programs. Separation of duties is enforced. Auditing is required |
| Noninterference Model | Ensures any action that takes place at a higher security level does not affect or interfere with actions that take place at a lower level |
| Covert Channels | A way for an entity to receive information in an unauthorized manner |
| Brewer and Nash Model (Chinese Wall) | Subject can write to an object if, and only if, the subject cannot read another object that is in a different dataset |
| Graham-Denning Model | Shows how subjects and objects should be created and deleted. Also addresses how to assign specific rights. |
| Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman Model | Shows how a finite set of procedures can be available to edit the access rights of a subject. |
| Machine State Model | If a machine(system) boots in a secure state, and every transaction that occurs is secure, it must always be in a secure state and not fail open. |
| Information Flow Model | Information flowing across boundaries need to be controlled. prevents unauthorized, insecure information flow in any direction. |
| Lattice Model | Subjects are allowed to access an object only if the security level of the subject is equal to or greater than that of the object. Every subset has a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound. |