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CrimLaw CheneyJoe
Fall 2010
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Coker v. GA (1977), story | P breaks out; breaks into Carvar home; robbed, f’bly R’d her, stole car & kidn’d her; jury found aggr’vg factors for DP (a) simult cap’l felony and (b) prev conviction for a cap’l felony); electro’n |
| Coker v. GA (1977), issue | does the sentence of death for rape of an adult woman violate the 8th Amendment? Coker is challenging that his execution is barred by the 8th Amendment as it is -- disproportionate for his crime. court says no |
| Coker v. GA (1977), court's interpretation | the court looks to the “evolving standard of decency” used to apply the 8th Amendment; this standard is problematic |
| Coker v. GA (1977), criticisms of case | How do you determine the standard of decency? Is there a nation wide standard of decency or is it regional? How do we define who is an adult? The dissent criticizes the majority because Coker was already serving life sentences |
| Utah v. Holm (2006), story | D lawfully M’d S; then marries W and R, ceremon’l Ms not intended to be recog’d M; D is prosecuted under UT bigamy statute for purporting to marry/cohabiting with another and under the UT sexual misconduct statute: guilty both counts; |
| Utah v. Holm (2006), Does Lawrence prohibit UT from proscribing bigamy? | D argues that 14th + Lawrence allows bigamy bc a prohibition is a violation of his liberty |
| Utah v. Holm (2006), How did they "purport to marry"? | the trappings of marriage: Ruth wore a white dress she considered a wedding dress; they exchanged vows |
| Utah v. Holm (2006), what defines marriage? | worthy of regulation: 1) marriage is a public institution, 2) protection of minors |
| Utah v. Holm (2006), dissent | dissent criticizes the majority for penalizing the actual relationship; La. statute uses the term “habitual cohabitation” in its bigamy statute; under the logic of this opinion, are statutes that proscribe adultery valid? |
| Chicago v. Morales (1999), background | Chicago ordinance prohibiting criminal street gang members from loitering with one another or other persons in public |
| Chicago v. Morales (1999), US SupCt holds | US Sup. Ct. held the statute to be invalid bc it failed to meet the standard of definiteness and clarity by failing to sufficiently define the proscribed conduct and bc it failed to adequately establish minimum guidelines for law enforcement |
| Chicago v. Morales (1999), Issue | fair notice of proscribed conduct and minimum guidelines to law enforcement; sufficient precision that a reasonable person should be able to know what the law proscribes |
| LA v. Muschkat (1998), background | D charged with violation of La. R.S. 40:981.4 (drug-traffic loitering statute); D moved to quash the indictment on Constitutional grounds (vagueness and overbroad) |
| LA v. Muschkat (1998), holding | the Court holds that the statute is vague as there is no notice of what the proscribed conduct is nor are there any minimum guidelines for law enforcement and it is overbroad bc it attempts to criminalize constitutionally protected conduct. |
| LA v. Muschkat (1998), background | D charged with violation of La. R.S. 40:981.4 (drug-traffic loitering statute); D moved to quash the indictment on Constitutional grounds (vagueness and overbroad) |
| LA v. Muschkat (1998), holding | the Court holds that the statute is vague as there is no notice of what the proscribed conduct is nor are there any minimum guidelines for law enforcement and it is overbroad bc it attempts to criminalize constitutionally protected conduct. |
| LA v. Muschkat (1998), vagueness doctrine | should give person of reasonable intelligence adequate notice that certain conduct is proscribed and is punishable by law + provide sufficient standards to the trier of fact by which guilt or innocence can be determined |
| Manuel v. LA (1996), class action suit about? | class action suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement of La. 1995 Acts 639 which imposed penalties for selling alcoholic beverages to persons under the age of 21 |
| Manuel v. LA (1996), holding? | 1995 Acts 639 constitutional bc furthered the legitimate govt interest of improving highway safety; common sense+stats: increasing the drinking age in the group most likely to be involved in alcohol related traffic accidents would decrease said accidents |
| Manuel v. LA (1996), Kimball's criticism of majority | ignored the record evidence before it to rely on “common sense and logic”; stretching the Constitution to allow the statute instead of allowing the Constitutional Amendment to go to the people; allowed the Court to take the decision away from the people |
| La. Const. Art. I § 3 | equal protection: no law shall arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably discriminate against a person bc of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas of affiliations |
| Manuel v. LA (1996), reason for denying equal protection? | Classif’n needs to substantially further an approp govt purpose; Ps argue too many excep’ns to justify a legit govt interest (i.e. relig purposes, w/parent/spouse over 21; in private residences); court said not a temperance statute so ok |
| LA v. Ferris (2000), background | 18yr D charged with violation of R.S. 14:98.1 when he was arrested with a BAC of 0.07% (statute sets maximum at 0.02% when under 21); D challenges the statute as unconstitutional under La. Const. Art. 1 § 3 (age discrimination) |
| LA v. Ferris (2000), holding | same as Manuel; majority finds that the zero tolerance is reasonable for the particular age group bc of the highway safety justification |
| Manuel v. LA (1996), sage advice from police office? | Minors not only inexperienced at driving, but inexperienced at drinking, too |
| LA v. Gyles (1975), background | D struck woman in the stomach ultimately resulting in her giving birth to a dead 8 month old fetus; prosecuted for second degree murder, and he moved to quash his indictment arguing that the statute does not proscribe his conduct |
| LA v. Gyles (1975), holding | court holds that under La. law, the crime of murder does not include the killing of an unborn fetus bc the source of our criminal law, English common law, did not proscribe the conduct, and our legislature merely codified the English common law |
| LA v. Gyles (1975), note about incorp common law into LA law | When a term of art of the common law has been used by the legislature, courts assume that they incorporated the “cluster of ideas” associated with that term |
| LA v. Gyles (1975), issue | under La. law, is the 8 month old child a human being under the murder statute? |
| LA v. Gyles (1975), what is a human being? | (1) born alive, (2) independent existence from mother |
| LA v. Carr (2000), background | D was arrested for being intoxicated while operating a bicycle and is charged with violating La. R.S. 14:98 (DWI statute) |
| LA v. Carr (2000), holding | Court holds ambiguous whether RS14:98 includes op’g a bike bc after extensive review of stat and legisl hist, it’s unclear whether/not legisl intended to include bikes in stat, and those ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the D |
| LA v. Carr (2000), issue | what is the definition of “other means of conveyance” in RS14:98? |
| RS 14:98 | Operating a vehicle while intoxicated is the operating of any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, vessel, or other means of conveyance |
| LA v. Carr (2000), grammatical construction? | Does "motor" modify all the other nouns? |
| LA v. Carr (2000), statutory construction? | ambiguous term: two stats originally (Original DWI and Highway DWI); original, no bikes; Highway, does include bikes; significant ambiguity resolved using the principle of lenity (in favor of D) |
| LA v. Interiano (2004), background | D charged with violating LaRS14:81(A) (lewd behavior in the presence of minors) based on his admission of masturbating in the presence of his 10 month old daughter; D argues stat is unconstit’ly vague and overbroad; moves to quash |
| LA v. Interiano (2004), holding | LaRS14:81(A) constitutional and sensory awareness of lewd behavior is requir’d + physical prox bc the rules of statutory interpret’n allow narrow construction of the stat if fits within the original legislative intent |
| LA v. Interiano (2004), issue | what is the definition of “in the presence of” |
| LA v. Interiano (2004), "in the presence"? | there is a component of physical presence and sensory awareness; the D must be aware he is in the presence of the minor and the minor must be sensorially aware of the conduct; the child does not have to understand what the conduct is |
| LA v. Interiano (2004), "lewd and lascivious"? | act that is lustful, obscene, indecent, tending to deprave morals in respect to sexual relations, relat’g to sexual impurity or incontinence carried out in a wanton manner; D was sufficiently put on notice what behavior is proscribed |
| LA v. Interiano (2004), justice knoll's concurrence | nexus btw child+gratification; she criticizes that the majority’s narrowing construction could allow a lewd act to be perpetrated in a child’s presence if they were blindfolded or sensorially deprived and that is not what the legislature intended |
| LA v. Fluker (1975), background | D charged with violation of a concealed weapon statute; facts presented to the trial court reflected that the gun was in a holster on the D’s belt, and he was wearing no clothing which obscured the view of the gun |
| LA v. Fluker (1975), holding | D’s conviction in error bc stat was a material change from past stats when the legislature intro’d element of specific intent to conceal the weapon, so old rule of being in full view applied by TC was determined to be obsolete |
| LA v. Fluker (1975), issue | what is the definition of intentional concealment under La.R.S. 14:95? |
| LA v. Fluker (1975), "concealment"? | 1813 statute said the weapon must be in full open view 1942 instant statute enacted and defines the crime as intentionally concealing, therefore the court found that full open view definition was obsolete |
| LA v. Fluker (1975), "on one's person"? | some relationship between the individual and a thing; distinction between constructive and actual possession; physical connection btw person and object and object moves with person; on carries a more narrow construction |
| Lewis v. US (1998), background | SupCt analyze Fed Assim/Crimes Act to determine if LA 1st degree murder stats assim’d into fed law on fed enclaves; P gets 1st degree murder for beating and killing her husb’s 4yr daughter; gets life by LA stat |
| Lewis v. US (1998), "any enactment" | court reasons Congress didn’t intend “any enactment” language to be construed literally (i.e. that assault law would punish someone who murdered someone else) nor did Congress intend for ACA to assimilate virtually all state law |
| Lewis v. US (1998), test for determining whether or not to apply state law | (1) are D’s actions covered by fed law; if Y, (2) court must ask if fed stat intend to punish virtually the same behavior as the state statute; if Y, state law not assim’d; so LA law not assim’d into fed enclave law bc there’s comparable fed statute. |
| Muscarello v. US (1998), background | Ps carrying guns during drug trafficking crime (18 USC § 924 (c)(1)): one’s gun in locked glove compart., other’s in bag in trunk of his car; Ps challenge that term “carry” doesn’t include having gun in car in locked glove compartment or trunk |
| Muscarello v. US (1998), holding | “carry” does include transporting gun in car regardless of in locked glove box or trunk bc Congress’ intent was to deter use of guns in drug related crimes and interpreting “carry” otherwise would create unintended gap in coverage |
| Muscarello v. US (1998), issue | what does the phrase “carry a firearm” mean; does it have to be on the person? |
| Muscarello v. US (1998), discussion | stat criminalizes carrying or using firearm during and in connection with a drug offense; use means actively employed; court looked to Congressional record and common usage of “carry” to interpret by intent of Congress |
| LA v. Blanchard (2001), background | D charged possess of firearm + possess of marijuana, LaRS14:95(E); convicted and sentenced to 7 years hard labor; D challenges stat as uncon vague and violative of right to bear arms under the U.S. and La. Constitutions |
| LA v. Blanchard (2001), holding | “possession” in stat includes constructive possession and court implements a narrowing interpretation holding that the state must prove a nexus between the firearm and the drug offense if the possession was constructive |
| LA v. Blanchard (2001), "constructive possession" means ... | having dominion and control; in this instance, the court concluded that the state must show a nexus between the drugs and the gun |
| when legally dead in LA? | A person is considered legally dead when he has sustained irreversible cessation of brain function OR irreversible cessation of respiratory/circulatory systems. See La. R.S. 9:111 |
| LaRS 14:2(7) | a person is defined as a human being from the moment of fertilization and implantation and the body of persons whether incorporated or not |
| LaRS 14:2(11) | an unborn child is any human individual from fertilization and implantation until birth |
| LaRS 14:3 | INTERPRETATION: the code articles cannot be extended by analogy to create crimes not provided for by the code; provisions shall be given a genuine construction according to a fair import of the words in their usual sense |
| LaRS 14:10 | CRIMINAL INTENT |
| Specific Intent | specific intent exists when circumstances indicate that offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences |
| General Intent | general intent is circumstances indicate that in the ordinary course of human experience a person must have adverted as reasonably certain criminal consequences would occur as a result of his act |
| LaRS 14:12 | Criminal Negligence |
| Criminal Negligence | no intent, but there is such disregard for the interest of others that the conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful person under like circumstances |
| LaRS 14:29 | Homicide |
| Homicide | killing of h-being by act/omission of another w/5 grades: 1) 1st degree m, 2) 2nd degree m, 3) manslaughter, 4) negli homicide, 5) vehicular homicide; LA specifically rejected year and a day rule with the current revision of the Crim Code |
| LaRS 14:30 | 1st degree murder |
| 1st degree murder, LaRS 14:30, #1 | specific intent to kill OR inflict great bodily harm (1) AND is engaged in the perpetration/attempted perpetration of certain felonies |
| LaRS 14:30.1 | 2nd degree murder |
| 2nd degree murder, LaRS 14:30.1 | (1) specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm or (2) the perpetrator is in the process of committing certain felonies and kills another without intent; (3) to juveniles; 4) while dealing drugs |
| Feticide, 14:32.5 | the killing of an unborn child by an act or omission of a person other than the mother of the child; abortion is exempted |
| Depraved Indifference | also known as “depraved mind” or “depraved heart”; the actor acts with complete indifference to human life; there is considerable question as to a specific definition of “depraved heart” but courts have upheld it |
| LA v. Stuart (1984), background | D and wife Ruby in a fight, gun v. meat cleaver; D kills R's son, in neck; D then shoots R's sister, Franklin, in chest, lives; D charged w/1st degree murder RS14:30A3 under theory that he intended to kill or inflict great bodily harm on >1 person |
| LA v. Stuart (1984), is there actually a requirement that two people be killed for first degree murder? | NO. You only have to intend to kill more than on person. The issue in this case is whether the second shooting was inseparable from the first one. Single Act Theory – the acts have to happen in a single act or in inseparable acts. |
| Single Act Theory | from LA v. Stuart; the acts have to happen in a single act or in inseparable acts |
| LA v. Williams (1985), background | D went into neighb’d bar and after exchange of words, pulled out pistol, shot one man and fired at others, wounding some; first degree murder under LaRS14:30A3 |
| LA v. Williams (1985), holding | the court held that the evidence supported his conviction bc the D’s actions were in a continuous course of conduct; the court rejected the argument that the statute requires a single act to threaten to kill or inflict harm on multiple people |
| LA v. Williams (1985), evolution of single act theory | the court reasons that the D knowingly created a risk of death to more than one person (this idea comes from the penalty phase statute); the meaning is construed to be a “single consecutive course of conduct” |
| LA v. Keller (1996), background | D is charged with first degree murder for killing a pregnant woman; D moves to quash the indictment as a fetus is not considered a “human being” as defined by the Criminal Code |
| LA v. Keller (1996), holding | The appellate court affirms the trial court’s denial of the motion to quash bc although the fetus is not a human being for the purposes of murder, it is a “person” as defined by the statutes and clearly falls within R.S. 14:30(A)(3) |
| LA v. Keller (1996), issue | the word person was amended to define a person as a human being, fetus, or corporations; human being was not redefined as including a fetus |
| LA v. Anthony (1983), background | D breaks into apt (agg’d burglary), purse snatch and back to apt, arms himself with knife, then kills victim when she sees him escaping from apt; 1st DM R.S. 14:30(1); D: killing occurred outside the res gestae of the agg’d burglary |
| LA v. Anthony (1983), holding | LaSupCt reverses bc fleeing scene of burglary is part of the res gestae; whether murder occurred during perpetration is matter of fact for jury to determine; D’s admissions prove he was escaping from scene of burglary |
| LA v. Anthony (1983), issue | was the murder within the res gestae (“perpetration zone”)of the aggravated burglary? |
| LA v. Anthony (1983), rule | res gestae is one continuous transaction without a significant break in the chain of events; it begins when a person has engaged in sufficient conduct to be charged with an attempt to commit a crime |
| LA v. Anthony (1983), discussion | just bc there are intervening crimes between the aggravated felonies does not interrupt the perpetration zone; why didn’t they charge the D with the provision of 14:30 for a victim being over the age of 65? it didn’t exist |
| Donahue v. Cain (2000), background | seeks fed'l habeas relief from his conv'n/attempted 1stD murder, LaRS14:27 and 30A2; charged w/attempting to murder a peace off., but issue is sheriff did not id himself until after P shot at him; upon so id'ing himself, P dropped weapon and surrendered |
| Donahue v. Cain (2000), holding | actual or implied knowledge that he was a peace officer is an essential element of first degree murder under La. R.S. 14:27 and 30(A)(2) |
| Donahue v. Cain (2000), Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings? | a prisoner can make a collateral attack on a state court conviction when there has been some deprivation of due process rights by the state court (i.e. there was a problem with the sufficiency of the evidence) |
| Donahue v. Cain (2000), specific intent is different from knowledge, how? | knowledge is degree of awareness of the likelihood that a consequence will occur and the degree of risk |
| Holloway v. US (1999), background | P convicted of carjacking under 18 USC §2119; challenge: gov't must prove unconditional intent to seriously harm the driver of the car in contrast to a conditional intent to seriously harm the driver if don't surrender car |
| Holloway v. US (1999), holding | even if a threat of death or GBH is conditional on the victim giving the car over, the element if intent to kill or cause GBH is satisfied. To construe the statute otherwise would defeat Congress’ purpose for enacting the statute |
| Lawrence v. TX (2003), issue | does substantive DP preclude the state from proscribing homosexual sex between consenting adults in private? Ruling: Yes |
| Lawrence v. TX (2003), prosecuted under TX statute proscribing ...? | deviant sexual intercourse with a member of the same sex; the term deviant is defined by the statute; the opinion leaves open many questions relating to substantive due process (like the definitions of adult and private) |
| Lawrence v. TX (2003), When does conduct become private or public? Hypos | What if the Ds were in a hotel? Car parked in a state park? In a tent in a state park? The law continues to evolve based on the ambiguities in the definitions of the words in the opinion |
| Lawrence v. TX (2003), background | Ds were only fined $100; 14th amendment, DP; court says TX statute violates liberty concept of DP; no challenge of the entry of the police into the apt; LaRS 14:89 +14:89.1 (crime against nature) |
| State ex rel Cortez (1975), summary | D’s taking out a knife during a confrontation with school principal and threatening to kill him constituted an assault under LaRS 14:37 bc valid basis for reasonable apprehension that victim would be subjected to battery |
| State v. Bowie (La. 2002), summary | state attempted to establish that a murder was committed during a second degree kidnapping in order to convict for first degree murder |
| State v. Bowie (La. 2002), state's theory | when the D ordered the victims to move from one room to another in a house at gunpoint, that constituted kidnapping under La. R.S. 14:44.1(A)(5) |
| State v. Bowie (La. 2002), how does court reject state's theory? | holding that the state failed to establish second degree kidnapping bc under State v. Davillier (La. 1999) there must be evidence that the offender relocated the victim from one physical setting or environment to another |
| State v. Alexander (La. 1977), summary | D convicted of simple burglary (RS 14:62) for unauthorized entry into a fenced yard; Court holds that a fenced yard does not fit into definition of what legislature intended for a structure or building; conviction was reversed |
| State v. Arnold (La. 1989), background | D convicted of aggrav’d kidnapping (LaRS14:44): when he kidnapped the victim and forced her to perform oral sex on him @knifept, victim inferred she had to comply with demands and give up something to be safely released |
| State v. Arnold (La. 1989), difference in types of kidnapping? | critical diff b/w aggrav’d and simple kidnapping is the kidnapper’s intent to extort; the Court holds that it is clear that the D’s behavior implied to victim that the only way she would be released safely was by assenting to his sexual demands |
| State v. Arnold (La. 1989), Manifestation of Intent to Extort? | can be by D’s words/actions OR by analyzing whether reasonable person in victim’s place would believe that he/she would not be safely released unless he/she complied with kidnapper’s demands given totality of circumstances |
| State v. Arnold (La. 1989), special factor? | Extortion Factor--basically is some kind of ransom for release |
| State v. Baggett (La. 1974), summary | Unauthorized entry into an open carport that was fenced off met the requirement of dwelling or structure for a conviction of R.S. 14:62 bc it was part of the home and bc it was not open to the public |
| State v. Baggett (La. 1974), What if the carport was not fenced, is it still burglary? | Yes bc he is still unauthorized to enter the carport which is part of the structure of the home |
| State v. Boyd (La. 1998), D's argument | unconstit’ly vague: LaRS14:34.2B3, enhances penalties 4 battery/ PO when injuries inflicted require med attn; D: could include something as insignif as PO needing a band aid + public not suff’ly informed/proscribed conduct |
| State v. Boyd (La. 1998), holding | statute is constitutional and construes the phrase “injury which requires medical treatment” to mean a battery requiring the attention of a medical professional (a nurse, paramedic, doctor) |
| People v. Brown (CNY Cr. 2000), background | D charged w/criminal mischief for intentionally wrecking a car which be believed he had a right of use over with his ex girlfriend and her father; the car was legally titled in the ex girlfriend and her father’s name |
| People v. Brown (CNY Cr. 2000), outcome | Court convicted him of criminal mischief under the statute bc under the statute, it didn’t matter whether he was a co-owner of the car or not, he intentionally destroyed the property of another which satisfied the elements of the crime |
| People v. Brown (CNY Cr. 2000), how did the Court distinguish Brown from the troublesome Person case? | on two grounds: (1) the D and girlfriend were never married and (2) it was easy to determine that D didn’t have title on the wrecked car |
| State v. Calvin (La. 1945), summary | D convicted of aggrav’d battery (LaRS14:34) for biting victim; Court reversed the conviction and held that teeth and bare hands are not considered deadly weapons to elevate a battery charge to aggravated battery |
| State v. Calvin (La. 1945), What is the reasoning that teeth are not a deadly weapon which would elevate the offense to aggravated battery? | deadly weapon must be an inanimate instrumentality, therefore the body of the offender cannot be a deadly weapon; this conclusion is reached bc everything listed in the statute is an inanimate object therefore, the statute excludes animate objects |
| State v. Calvin (La. 1945), Would the Court’s interpretation exclude an animal like an attack dog? | This is problematic; it probably would not under this interpretation |
| State v. Copes (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990), background | D charged with violation of LaRS14:32.1 in connection with hitting a bicyclist in middle of road @night when driver had no headlights on; D’s BAC was .166 2 hrs after accident; convicted of the violation |
| State v. Copes (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990), D's argument and COA's decision? | evidence did not support conviction under State v. Taylor as state failed to prove causal connection between D’s BAC and victim’s death; COA disagreed noting that a jury could have reasonably inferred a causal relationship between BAC and death |
| State v. Copes (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990), did the state prove a causal nexus between the alcohol influenced condition of the D and the killing? | the jury made a reasonable inference from Dr. McCormick’s testimony that alcohol influenced the accident bc: it impairs your judgment, vision, reaction time, etc.; This was a close case |
| La. R.S. 14:60-62.6 | burglary; initially the courts determined unauthorized entry meant breaking, and then they began to interpret it as a constructive breaking |
| State v. Dunn (La. 1972) (per curiam), background | D broke into a school and washateria and stole money out of the vending machines; he was charged with and convicted of simple burglary (R.S. 14:62) |
| State v. Dunn (La. 1972) (per curiam), holding | SupCt defined unauthorized entry: entry w/o consent of owner, express or implied; entry into building open to public at designated hours and w/in designated confines isnt unauthorized entry REGARDLESS of intent (to commit a felony) |
| State v. Lozier (La. 1983), background | D obtained entry into victims house by misrepresenting himself as PO looking for counterfeit money; he was convicted of aggravated burglary (R.S. 14:60) and challenged his conviction on the ground that he had the victim’s consent to enter |
| State v. Lozier (La. 1983), issue/holding | issue of whether entry by misrepresentation constituted an unauthorized entry under statute; Court held that D’s entry was unauthorized bc victim’s capacity to consent was vitiated by D’s misrepresentation/fraud as to their identity and purpose |
| State v. Lockhart (La. 1983), background | D convicted of aggravated burglary (14:60) for entering his distant cousin’s home to supposedly use the bathroom and then attempting to rape her |
| State v. Lockhart (La. 1983), #1: was entry unauthorized? | bc the victim clearly consented to D entering her house bc she knew/was related to the D, the Court held that the element of unauthorized entry was not satisfied |
| State v. Lockhart (La. 1983), #2: did he enter with the intent to commit a felony? | was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support that element, namely that D attempted to rape the victim shortly after entering her home |
| State ex rel R.E.B. (La. App. 2 Cir. 1994), background | D, juvenile delinquent for violation of unauthorized entry of inhabited dwelling (RS 14:62.3); 15yr-old attempts to enter g'daughter's window while she's sleeping, had earlier given permission; g'mother shoots boy in arm as he's escaping |
| State ex rel R.E.B. (La. App. 2 Cir. 1994), element of entry? | proven by the testimony, noting that entry is accomplished when any part of the D’s person passes the line of the threshold, even momentarily, into the structure |
| State ex rel R.E.B. (La. App. 2 Cir. 1994), element unauthorized? | the Court also held that unauthorized entry had been proven by the state bc the D knew that the owner’s 14 year old daughter did not have the authority to authorize his entry into the home through a window after dark |
| State ex rel R.E.B., Does state have to prove that granddaughter did not have authority to authorize boy’s entry or does state have to prove that boy knew that he didn’t have authorization despite being told he could come in by granddaughter? | both? |
| State v. Fuller (La. 1982), background | D punched victim in the face knocking him across a pool table; victim sustained permanent damage to his vision due to the blow; D convicted of 2nd degree battery (La. R.S. 14:34.1) |
| State v. Fuller (La. 1982), holding | D’s conviction/2nd degree battery affirmed (14:34) bc he had specific intent to cause either unconsciousness or extreme physical pain; specific intent inferred: D much larger and older than victim and hit him w/such force as to knock him across pool table |
| State v. Helou (La. 2003), background | D beat up victim in a parking lot causing him to have a bloody nose but no other injuries; D convicted of second degree battery, LaR.S. 14:34.1; D argued that state did not prove the element of severe bodily injury |
| State v. Helou (La. 2003), holding | the mere presence of a large quantity of blood was not sufficient to draw the inference of SBI nor is it sufficient to draw an inference of extreme physical pain to support a conviction of 2nd degree battery |
| State v. Helou (La. 2003), What is extreme physical pain? | The problem with this is that it is a purely subjective thing that only the victim can know; dissent: due to the amount of blood loss, that by inference, the victim obviously suffered extreme physical pain |
| State v. Helou (La. 2003), What are the differences in the consent requirements between simple, 2nd degree and aggravated battery? | no lack of consent issue with aggravated battery; a victim cannot consent to an aggravated battery |
| State v. Howard (La. App. 5 Cir. 1983), background | D charged with battery of PO, 14:34.2, when he punched a deputy sheriff in the chest after he got out of a vehicle he had wrecked due to his intoxication |
| State v. Howard (La. App. 5 Cir. 1983), defense and outcome | D challenged conviction on grounds that RS 14:34.2 is specific intent crime and his intoxication served as a defense to forming the required specific criminal intent; his conviction for violating R.S. 14:34.2 was reversed |
| State v. Legendre (La. 1978), background | D was charged with aggravated assault, RS14:34, and the alleged deadly weapon was a concrete parking lot |
| State v. Legendre (La. 1978), holding | the Sup.Ct. granted certiorari and reversed holding that a concrete parking lot does not fit within the genuine construction of the definition of a deadly weapon in the Code bc it is not being used by the D |
| State v. Legendre (La. 1978), Why is the parking lot not a dangerous weapon in this case? | It is not something within the D’s control; not actively using the parking lot; the Court does not want the ground to be a weapon |
| State v. Legendre (La. 1978), test? | Wielding Test – the court seems to say that the D must wield the weapon and use it against the victim to constitute aggravated battery |
| State v. Legendre (La. 1978), gave rise to what? | This case gave rise to the legislation that enacted La. R.S. 14:34.1 (second degree battery) that criminalizes a battery done with the intent to inflict serious bodily injury |
| State v. Legendre (La. 1978), important note | there is no requirement for injury for simple battery (La. R.S. 14:35) or aggravated battery (R.S. 14:34) |
| State v. Taylor (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986), background | aggrav’d battery 14:34 kicking victim in head repeat’ly while held down by accomplice; defense: no deadly weapon used |
| State v. Taylor (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986), holding | COA holds D’s tennis shoe was deadly weapon based on manner it was used to inflict great bodily harm (to kick in the face of the victim); the conviction and sentence were affirmed |
| State v. Taylor (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986), What is the dangerous weapon in this case? | The shoe on D’s foot; in the manner in which it was used to cushion D’s foot so he could more effectively batter the victim made it a dangerous weapon |
| State v. Lachney (La. App. 5 Cir. 1993), background | question presented to court in this case was whether spitting in someone’s face constituted criminal battery; D argues that it does not rise to use of force or violence to constitute a criminal battery |
| State v. Lachney (La. App. 5 Cir. 1993), holding | Court holds that offensive touching can constitute a criminal violence (such as spitting or touching/kissing someone against his/her will) |
| State v. Lachney (La. App. 5 Cir. 1993), Why is spitting on someone a battery? | This was a res nova issue before the court; Why does it fit within the definition of force or violence? The court holds that offensive touching fits within criminal violence |
| State v. Lachney (La. App. 5 Cir. 1993), Would flipping the cigarette butt on a person constitute a criminal battery under La. R.S. 14:33 and 14:35? | Y, batt doesnt have to cause actual phys harm; offens touching gener's danger that harm may result, provoke fight; same analysis as 14:2(3) dangerous weapon has possib'y of gener'g danger/ retaliat'n from vict; analysis all about risk gener'd by behavior |
| U.S. v. McKinney (CA 10 2001), background | D verbally threatened to kill the victim and drove off; based on prev altercation w/D, victim believed that D would ram her vehicle |
| U.S. v. McKinney (CA 10 2001), holding | Court notes that under common law, assault is defined as (1) attempted battery or (2) placing another in reasonable apprehension of battery; court holds that based on verbal threat + victim’s prior experience w/D, her fear of a battery was reasonable |
| U.S. v. McKinney (CA 10 2001), Why does Congress not have to define assault in the statute bc of the predication of the common law? | Courts assume that when a legislative body uses a common law term, the common law concepts are incorporated into the statutes; they anticipate that people understand the common law |
| U.S. v. McKinney (CA 10 2001), rule | threat alone not sufficient to constitute assault; there must be additional circumstances in addition to the threat to constitute an assault that would reasonably put the victim in apprehension of immediate bodily harm |
| Battery, definition | Battery is the unlawful application of force to the person of another |
| Assault, definition | Assault is either defined as (1) a failed battery (specific intent) or (2) the creation of apprehension of a battery in another (general intent) |
| State v. Verret (La. 1932), holding | property that is not actually in the possession of a person but is under his control is sufficient for purposes of robbery |
| State v. Meyers (La. 1993), court's reasoning | use of force/intimidat’n after taking/ prop’ty/ V is w/in res gestae of crime + there4 satisfies robbery elements; force req’t differentiates robbery + larceny bc of increased danger to V + danger same whether force/intimid’n during the taking or escape |
| State v. Meyers (La. 1993), common law difference | under the traditional common law definition of robbery, the use of force must occur contemporaneously with the taking of the property; using force to escape is not part of the robbery |
| State v. Meyers (La. 1993), facilitating the escape | if D uses force to facilitate the escape with the property, then it is probably a robbery; if D is no longer in possession of the property, then it is probably not robbery |
| State v. Thomas (La. 1984), background | D convicted of simple robbery (14:65) for impersonating PO, pulling over victims, and stealing from them while ostensibly carrying out a drug search of victim’s vehicle; D challenges the “force or intimidation” element of his conviction |
| State v. Thomas (La. 1984), holding | holds that the jury reasonably concluded that D stopped the victims, searched his car and stole the money through intimidation bc the victims were intimidated by D’s (1) use of a badge; (2) threat of trouble and (3) general demeanor and aura of authority |
| State v. Thomas (La. 1984), intimidation | causing the victim to have fear of physical harm to the person; does it include property? |
| U.S. v. Edwards (CA5 2000), background | D convicted for carjacking 18 USC § 2119 in connexn with holding V at gunpoint 15’ from V’s car in parking lot, demanding keys + wallet and then hitting V in back of head and driving off with his car; D argues: V’s car wasnt taken from V’s person/presence |
| U.S. v. Edwards (CA5 2000), holding | if victim is sufficiently near vehicle to be w/in reach, inspection, or control, and absent intimidation, to be able to maintain control/ it, … then in V’s presence |
| U.S. v. Edwards (CA5 2000), presence | proximity is a relevant factor; the actual quantifiable distance is more difficult to establish; it is more broad than immediate control |
| State v. Pierre (La. 1977), background | D charged with simple burglary (R.S. 14:62) for stealing a battery out of a parked car |
| State v. Pierre (La. 1977), holding | if entered vehicle—not just in places designed to accommodate person--sufficient for simple burglary; deviation from the traditional common law notion that the unauthorized entry must be into a structure which people could occupy |
| State v. Sophophone (Ks. 2001), background | D+3 others were committing aggravated burglary; the police arrived and the perpetrators fled; D apprehended and placed in police car; one of other perps fired a gun at PO, who returned fire and killed him |
| State v. Sophophone (Ks. 2001), holding | D charged and convicted of felony murder; the court holds that D cant be held responsible for a killing caused by someone other than D or one of his accomplices; the court adopts the agency theory approach; see discussion supra |
| State v. Sophophone (Ks. 2001), Provocative Act Theory | when D does something provocative and the victim responds, the co-conspirators are responsible for any deaths that occur |
| State v. Williams (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986), background | negligent homicide for the death of D’s 1yr old after scalded to death, left in bathtub while shopping |
| State v. Williams (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986), holding | D’s actions satisfied the requirements for gross negligence under Restatmts, there4 crim negli 14:12; court noted that La. SupCt analyzes cases of negli homicide by a close scrutiny of the facts and § 500 of the Restatement of Torts |
| State v. Williams (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986), test for negligent homicide? | 1) D owed duty 2) acts fell below duty/care 3) knew/shouldve known that harm probable result though expected/hoped conduct harmless 4) conscious course/ action w/ knowledge of serious danger when knowledge shouldve disclosed danger to reasonable person |
| State v. Williams (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986), court's analysis | look at the nature of the danger and why the risk was taken: the court finds troubling that D left the house locked; there was no one else supervising the child, and most of all, the child was left alone from 45 minutes to an hour ... to go shopping |
| State v. Jones (La. 1974), background | negli homicide 14:32 in connexn w/a vehicular accident; SupCt reversed his conviction bc test for negligent homicide, Williams 86, not satisfied by ord negli, and although his conduct was unquestionably negligent, it was not criminally negligent |
| State v. Jones (La. 1974), Presumption of Negligence | violation of stat/ordinance not evidence of negli per se, creates rebutable presumption of crim negli; still has to pass the gross negligence test (see Williams 86); bc legislature wants to distinguish between offense based and negligence based offenses |
| State v. Williams (La. 1978), background | negli homi in connexn w/ head on collisn w/biker @night; BAL 0.16 @time/accident; convicted in violation of 14:98, there4 crim negl; SupCt reversed: violatn of stat presumptive evidence thats rebutable but doesnt constitute crim negli per se |
| State v. Williams (La. 1978), rule | Violation of a statute is evidence that can be considered by the trier of fact, but it is not evidence of criminal negligence per se |
| State v. Martin (La. 1989), background | convicted of 2 counts of negl homicide in connexn with street race; Court affirmed: his conduct met test for him to be held liable as a principal to negligent homicide and there was a sufficient nexus between his conduct and 2 deaths |
| State v. Martin (La. 1989), holding | no stat requirmt principal to negli homi have intent (reject’g D’s argu: impossib to charge as princpl to negli homi) + Ds conduct doesn’t need to be sole or prox cause of deaths; appropr test: did conduct play subst’l role in bringing abt forbidn result |
| State v. Martin (La. 1989), principal theory? | Principal Theory of Responsibility applies here; since he was a principal to the crime being committed (i.e. drag racing), then both are responsible for the death |
| State v. Martin (La. 1989), how D found guilty as a principal to negligent homicide? | D was clearly engaged in criminally negligent behavior while drag racing; even though he did not impact the victim’s car, his conduct still contributed to the victims deaths |
| State v. Ritchie (La. 1991), background | D convicted of 3 counts of negli homi RS34:851.6; on writ/certiorari, D argues that Courts below erred in instructing jury that ord negli was standard of proof under stat (“operation of any water craft…in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner”) |
| State v. Ritchie (La. 1991) (On Rehearing), court reversed previous judgment, how? | found jury improperly instructed by TC bc 14:11 specified that where no crim intent present, must be crim negligence; lang/stat uses phrases, “careless, reckless or negligent manner” --legis adoption/ standard in LA v. Jones |
| State v. Ritchie (La. 1991) (On Rehearing), struck out a part of a statute ...? | court also struck out part of stat that proscribed op’g a boat at “immoderate rate of speed” as unconstitutionally vague |
| State v. Ritchie (La. 1991) (On Rehearing), theory? | Parallel Construction Theory – Justice Lemmon argues that all three of the terms used by the Legislature construed together mean criminally negligent |
| State v. Ritchie (La. 1991) (On Rehearing),appropriateness? | the question is one of legislative policy; whether it is appropriate to criminalize behavior that involves only ordinary negligence and not criminal negligence |
| La. R.S. 14:32.1 | Vehicular Homicide |
| State v. Taylor (La. 1985), background | D charged w/vehicular homicide in connexn w/14:32.1 due to a fatal collision wherein his BAL was greater than the proscribed max |
| State v. Taylor (La. 1985), SupCt holding | SupCt reversed holding that BAL creates no presumption against D, it’s an element of crime which must be proved by prosecution; it must also be proved that alcohol content combined with operation of vehicle to cause death of a human being |
| State v. Taylor (La. 1985), does the statute create an unconstitutional burden of proof for the D? | Constitutionality of the statute: There is no unconstitutional burden on D bc the state must prove a nexus between the alcohol influenced condition of the D and the killing |
| Misdemeanor Manslaughter | similar to felony murder rule except intentional commission of misdemeanor will infer criminal intent for manslaughter; some jurisdictions only punish misdemeanor manslaughter if the misdemeanor is malum in se |
| State v. Yarborough (N.M. 1996), background | car accident on interstate, several cars pulled over rendering assistance to 2 cars involved when D crashed into rear of one of cars @approx 60mph, resulted in death of 4yr old; D failed a field sobriety test + unconsumed alcohol in car |
| State v. Yarborough (N.M. 1996), charged with and why? | involuntary manslaughter: killed another while in commission of misdemeanor crime of careless driving |
| State v. Yarborough (N.M. 1996), SupCt holding | state must show @least crim negli to convict D of invol mansl’r; based on lack of a specific requirmnt of crim state of mind + maj/jurisdictions requiring that there be @least crim negli or recklsns; showing of ordinary or civil negligence is insufficient |
| State v. Yarborough (N.M. 1996), language of statute | “killing of a human being without malice…in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in commission of lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution or circumspection” |
| State v. Yarborough (N.M. 1996), dissent of chief justice? | when there is a link between the unlawful act and the death, criminal culpability is already present; he also points out that the form or substance of culpability for an offense is solely within province of the legislature to define |
| State v. Statum (La. 1980), background and holding | D in car w/wife’s 13yr sister w/whom he intended to have sex; sister jumped out of car @50-55 mph and subsequently died; D appealed conviction/ felony mansl’r, court affirmed: all elements present; D attempting to commit carnal knowledge of juvenile |
| State v. Statum (La. 1980), why was the girl jumping out of the car sufficient to meet the test of reasonable forseeability? | ct silent on issue/ forseeab’ty/ manner/ death; ct: bc V was aware of attmp’d perpetr’n/ felony/ carnal knowl/ juvenile, theres sufficnt nexus btw crime and death; sidesteps issue/ forseeability bc not gonna say V shouldve chosen rape over possib death |
| State v. Statum (La. 1980), why does attempting to commit a felony fits within the statute | the court does not discuss the philosophy behind finding that D’s conduct was in the perpetration zone (res gestae) of crime; there is a nexus between the attempted felony and death, therefore it fits within the felony manslaughter |
| State v. Statum (La. 1980), Issue of forseeability | Legislature has clearly mandated that the conduct at issue in felony manslaughter is so serious that the issue of forseeability is not usually relevant |
| State v. Statum (La. 1980), Justice Lemmon’s Concurrence | he suggests that action that caused girl to jump out of car was that she must have been assaulted by the D (as inferred from the evidence); he wants there to be a tighter nexus between the felony and the death |
| State v. Myers (La. 2000), background | D convicted/ 2 counts of felony manslaughter which occurred during the exec’n of a search warrant for drug offenses; D’s co-conspirator was killed by a police officer and one of the police officers was killed by the co-conspirator |
| State v. Myers (La. 2000), holding | SupCt reinstatd conviction for death/ PO bc a) D engaged in perpetr’n of felony (CDS violatn) + b) D’s coconspirator killed PO, there4 D culpable for crime; D not guilty for manslaughter/ his co-conspirator bc PO who shot co-conspirator wasnt a co-felon |
| State v. Myers (La. 2000), theory of liability? | Agency Theory of Liability – one is not culpable of felony murder or manslaughter if the killing is not directly attributable to himself or one of his co-felons |
| State v. Myers (La. 2000), criticism of Agency Theory? | “human shield cases” but courts usually say that D put the D in the line of fire that directly caused the death of the victim |
| State v. Myers (La. 2000), cause theory? | Proximate Cause Theory – this says “if but for the commission of the crime, the death would not occur”; was the death foreseeable |
| State v. Myers (La. 2000), discussion agency vs. causation | Ct adopts agency theory in this case; causatn in crim differ’t than in tort; causation narrower in crim; if LA wants to adopt a prox cause theory, legislature must amend stat to make Ds liable for “any death proximately resulting from unlawful activity” |
| State v. Kalathakis (La. 1990), background | D suspectd/ manufacturg meth along w/several co-conspirators; 2 teams/ POs raided mobile home D was operating out of; a co-conspirator ran from and began shooting @POs; POs returned fire and he was killed; D clearly attempting to manufacture meth |
| State v. Kalathakis (La. 1990), holding | she was convicted of felony manslaughter of her co-conspirator, but the court reversed the conviction holding that D’s conduct in manufacturing methamphetamines was hardly responsible for the death of her coconspirator |
| State v. Kalathakis (La. 1990), was the co-conspirator shot by the police in furtherance of the commission of the felony manufacturing CDS? | Rule – if the killing is not reasonably foreseeable based on the collateral crime, then it is not included within the agency theory; the court utilizes the agency theory of felony murder as opposed to the proximate cause |
| State v. Lombard (La. 1986), background | D,V @HS f-ball game; D nasty remarks to V’s gf; V/bf told D if said more, would kill him; D remarked wouldn’t be much/ fight bc had knife; @end/ game, altercatn heatd agn, D+V into phys confrontn w/V putting D in choke hold; D stabbed V w/knife 2x, V died |
| State v. Lombard (La. 1986), holding | 2nd degree M, but argues manslter; ct holds convictn shouldve been manslaughter bc actual offense occurred during sudden passion or heat/blood caused by provocation which deprived him/ self control, reason; knife not out until punched/pinned by V |
| State v. Lombard (La. 1986), who bears the burden of establishing the factors of establishing the mitigating factors? | D must prove the mitigating factors by preponderance of the evidence |
| State v. Lombard (La. 1986), why does the court reverse the conviction and remand for resentencing? | Ct finds that a reasonable jury should have found that D proved by a preponderance of the evidence the mitigating factors were present to reduce the conviction to manslaughter |
| State v. Lombard (La. 1986), words alone doctrine | great difficulty to apply words alone doctrine bc sometimes words are sufficient to cause degree of provocation necessary to constitute manslaughter; LA doesnt adopt words alone doctrine and provocation is a question of fact for the jury |
| La. R.S. 14:31 connection between heat of blood (HOB) and provocation (Pr)? | tight temporal connexn btw HOB + Pr (suffnt to deprive avg person/ self control+cool reflexn); only diff btw M/manslghter: mitigat’g factrs/ HOB immed’ly caused byPr; certain circum’s avg person could be driven to kill + less culpable than cold blood |
| 1st degree murder, LaRS 14:30, #2-4 | 2) upon fireman, peace officer, or crime lab employee OR the intent to kill or inflict bodily harm is related to their status; 3) more than one person; 4) has offered, been offered, has given or has received anything of value for the killing |
| 1st degree murder, LaRS 14:30, #5-8 | 5) victim <12 or >65; 6) while engaged in transactions involving CDS; 7) while engaged in ritualistic mutilation, dismemberment or torture; 8) when perpetrator subject of order prohibiting contact between he and victim |
| 1st degree murder, LaRS 14:30, #9 | (9) when victim was witness to crime or immediate family member of witness to a crime and the killing was to prevent witness’ testimony or to exact retribution; 1st degree murder is punishable by death or life imprisonment without parole |
| If someone shoots at a peace officer and misses and hits someone else, is that 1st degree murder? | Yes, it would be. D acted with specific intent to kill a police officer, and a human being was killed |
| How define death penalty eligibility? | Various jurisdictns have diff ways/defining death-eligible M; some states have specially defined stats of what constitutes death eligible M, some states have a stat scheme requiring jury to find certain aggrav’g factors present to make D death eligible |
| State v. Johnson (La. 1944), background | while intox D enterd V’s home unexpectedly and threatnd to kill occupants while pointing gun @them +pulling trigger; challenged aggrav’d assault 14:37-- 1) not deadly weapon bc not loaded; 2) too intoxicated to form criminal intent requird |
| State v. Johnson (La. 1944), holding | under circum’s where gun looked in working order and Vs previously heard shots fired, Vs believed likely to produce at least GBH to them and since assault is general intent crime not specific, intoxication is not available as a defense |
| State v. Johnson (La. 1944), two rules | 1) defense of intox not available to crimes that only require a general criminal intent not specific; 2) weapon=dangerous if perceptn/it generates rxn in V likelihood/death or GBH; look at actual instrumentality, circumstance, likelihood/V reacting neg’ly |
| Toy Pistol Hypo – what if someone runs into a party with a realist looking plastic toy weapon? Is it aggravated assault? Is the toy gun considered a dangerous weapon under La. R.S. 14:2(3)? | from State v. Johnson; statute looks at whether (1) the weapon is likely to cause death or great bodily harm in the manner used OR (2) the weapon is calculated to cause death or great bodily harm in the matter used |
| Jeffries v. State, factors | 1. Social utility, 2. Magnitude of risk, 3. Knowledge of risk, 4. Any precautions |
| Jeffries v. State, background | drunk-driver takes too slow turn, and passenger is killed by oncoming car; Question is whether the degree of recklessness reflected in his behavior fit within 2nd degree murder statute of Alaska |
| Roper v. Simmons, background | Simmons conspires aggravated robbery; did Roper know her? Yes, involved in traffic accident, but didn't realize this until crime; Kidnap and throw off bridge; Roper was prime mover: told the other kids "don't worry about it" bc you're minors--wrong! |
| Roper v. Simmons, What's Justice Kennedy's basis for determining that 8th deprives state of seeking death penalty? | Differences between youth and adults (4 reasons, p69); Equal Protection; Substantive due process case (how Kennedy brings in 8th) |
| State v. Jones, background | Guy tried to pass but car was coming, so slowed down to get back in slot; Hit back of car he was trying to pass on way back in; Knocks them off the road, person dies (Dyess) |
| State v. Jones, holding | applies Jeffries' factors to determine whether gross or ordinary deviation of standard of care; social utility? no, not rushing someone to hospital, for instance |
| State v. Jones, what is "recklessness"? | recklssnss & crim negli equated; recklss miscond is crim reckless bc gross deviatn, knows or should know act "creates a strong probability that harm may result"; "negli misconduct," however, not criminal, just (clumsy) merely inadvertent or incompetent |
| State v. Jones, parallel use? | "parallel use of the three adjectives" (careless, reckless, or negligent manner) seemed to indicate an intention to "proscribe conduct more offensive than mere inadvertence"; therefore, calling for criminal negligence, not just ordinary |
| La. R.S. 14:67-69 | Wrongful acquisition |
| State v. McIntyre (La. 1972), summary | D attempted to use LSU student’s borrowed ID to enter f-ball game, denied entry; charged w/theft 14:67; Ct granted motion to quash on grounds that only taking was from student who consented and nothing was taken from University |
| State v. Victor (La. 1986), background | D put TV set in aquarium box; sent daughters to register to check out where he was caught; convicted of theft R.S. 14:67 |
| State v. Victor (La. 1986), holding | requird for theft: a taking, even momentary; no requir/ asportation under 14:67; theft is misappropn (wrongful dominion) or a taking (unauthor’d control) of prop/ another; either personally or accomp’d thru agency/ another; Conceal’g goods evid/ a taking |
| State v. Gisclair (La. 1980), what does “anything of value” mean under R.S. 14:67? | Ct concl: services are included w/in “anything of value” in stat, however, owners of services are people who provide them and not employer; employees consented, so no theft; can’t be convixn for theft of services of employees in La. since no specific stat |
| State v. Gisclair (La. 1980), background | D charged w/2 counts of theft under 14:67 for using state/parish employees to renovate his camp while they were on “state time;” ct found D guilty of a 14:68 (unauthorized use of movables) as a responsive verdict to 14:67 |
| State v. Morales (La. 1970), what is the definition of “another” in the theft statute (14:67)? | Use civil not common to interp status of persons: p’ship: entity w/distinct personlty from members; 14:2 another: any other person or legal entity, ie p’ship; assets owned by p’ship, not indivdl p’ners, so assets/ p’ship can be subject of theft by p’ners |
| State v. Morales (La. 1970), background | Ds were convicted of theft of $9600 from a partnership in which they were partners. Ds filed a motion to quash on the basis that a partnership is not “another” under the statute, and the state appealed |
| US v. Jane Does (RSW), background | Lighting paper towels on fire by young Native American girl; smoking in ladies' restroom, throw cig butts in trash can |
| US v. Jane Does (RSW), Guilty of arson for burning papers? | not active desire to cause fire to spread, but exists strong probab that burning this particular object would lead to burning that part obj; burning papers qualifies as arson whereas tossing cig doesnt; causing spreading/ fire elevates object of offense |
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