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Midterm Review
Review of Chapters 1-6
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| criminal liability | conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests |
| torts | private wrongs for which you can sue the party who wronged you and recover money |
| crimes of moral turpitude | criminal behavior that needs no law to tell us it’s criminal because it’s inherently wrong or evil, |
| felonies | serious crimes that are generally punishable by one year or more in prison |
| misdemeanors | minor crimes for which the penalty is usually less than one year in jail or a fine |
| general part of criminal law | principles that apply to all crimes |
| special part of criminal law | defines the elements of specific crimes |
| common law crimes | crimes originating in the English common law |
| codified (criminal law) | put into writing the criminal law, defining crimes and spelling out punishments |
| model penal code | the code developed by the American Law Institute to guide reform in criminal law |
| analysis of criminal liability | how to analyze statutes and cases to answer the question “What behavior deserves criminal punishment?" |
| administrative crimes | violations of state and federal rules made by administrative agencies |
| federal system | 52 criminal codes, one for each of the 50 states, one for the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Criminal Code |
| rates of imprisonment | the numbers of prisoners per 100,000 people in the general population |
| punishment | intentionally inflicting pain or other unpleasant consequences on another person |
| criminal punishment | penalties meet 4 criteria: they have to inflict pain or other unpleasant consequences, prescribe a punishment in the same law that defines the crime, be administered intentionally, and the state has to administer them |
| retribution | punishment based on just deserts |
| prevention | punishing offenders to prevent crimes in the future |
| general deterrence | aims, by threat of punishment to deter criminal behavior in the general population |
| special deterrence | aims, by punishing already convicted offenders, to prevent them from committing any more crimes in the future |
| incapacitation | restrains convicted offenders from committing further crimes |
| rehabilitation | aims to prevent future crimes by changing individual offenders so they’ll want to play by the rules and won’t commit any more crimes in the future |
| hedonism | natural law that human beings seek pleasure and avoid pain |
| rationalism | natural law that individuals can, and ordinarily do, act to maximize pleasure and minimize pain |
| deterrence theory | rational human beings won’t commit crimes if they know that the pain of punishment outweighs the pleasure gained from committing crimes |
| principle of utility | permitting only the minimum amount of pain necessary to prevent the crime as punishment |
| medical model of criminal law | crime is a “disease,” and criminals are “sick” |
| determinism | forces beyond offenders’ control cause them to commit crimes |
| indeterminate sentencing law | sentences that made prison release dependent upon rehabilitation |
| fixed (determinate sentences) | the sentence depends on the criminal harm suffered by the victim, not the rehabilitation of the offender |
| presumption of innocence | the prosecution has the burden of proof when it comes to proving the criminal act and intent |
| burden of proof | the responsibility of proving the criminal act and intent |
| proof beyond a reasonable doubt | the highest standard of proof known to the law |
| bench trial | cases where defendants give up their right to a jury trial, prosecutors have to prove guilt to the trial judge |
| corpus delicti | latin for "body of crime" properly applies to the elements of criminal conduct and bad result crimes |
| affirmative defenses | defenses based on justification and excuse |
| burden of production | requirement that defendants have to start matters off by putting in some evidence in support of their justification or excuse |
| preponderance of evidence | more than 50 percent |
| discretionary decision making | judgments made by professionals, based on unwritten rules, their training, and their experience |
| "not guilty" verdict | government didn’t prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt |
| "guilty" verdict | the government proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt |
| judgment (criminal cases) | how the court disposes of the case |
| opinion (criminal cases) | explanation of how and why the court applied the law to the facts of the case |
| concurring opinion | pinions written in which justices agree with the conclusions of either the majority or the dissenting opinion, but they have different reasons for reaching the conclusion |
| plurality opinion | opinion that represents the reasoning of the greatest number (but less than a majority) of justices |
| case citation | the numbers, letters, and punctuation that follow the title of a case in the excerpts or in the bibliography at the end of the book |
| reasonable doubt | the proof that prevents one from being convinced of the defendant’s guilt, or the belief that there is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty |
| burden of persuasion | defendants have to prove their defenses by a preponderance of the evidence, defined as more than 50 percent |
| constitutional democracy | a democracy in which the majority can’t make a crime out of what the Constitution protects as a fundamental right |
| rule of law | the law is above everyone and it applies to everyone |
| ex post facto law | a law passed after the occurrence of the conduct constituting the crime |
| void-for-vagueness doctrine | the principle that statutes violate due process if they don’t clearly define crime and punishment in advance |
| void-for-overbreadth doctrine | the principle that a statute is unconstitutional if it includes in its definition of undesirable behavior conduct protected under the U.S. Constitution |
| fair notice | asks "would an ordinary, reasonable person know that what he was doing was criminal?" |
| equal protection of the laws | the 14th Amendment state agents and laws cannot make arbitrary, irrational distinctions between people. Differential of people are permitted, but this differential treatment must not be based on race, religion, or gender |
| expressive conduct | actions that communicate ideas and feelings |
| fundamental right to privacy | a right that bans all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life |
| second amendment | a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. U.S. Constitution, Amendment II |
| barbaric punishments | punishment considered no longer acceptable |
| cruel and unusual punishment | "barbaric” punishments and punishments that are disproportionate to the crime committed |
| principle of proportionality | a principle of law stating that the punishment must be proportional to the crime committed |
| three-strikes-and-you're-out laws | laws that are supposed to make sure that offenders who are convicted of a third felony get locked up for a very long time |
| mandatory minimum sentences | laws requiring judges to impose a non discretionary minimum amount of prison time that all offenders have to serve |
| sentencing guidelines | sentencing scheme in which a commission establishes a narrow range of penalties and judges are supposed to choose a specific sentence within that range |
| apprendi rule | other than the fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt |
| abuse-of-discretion standard | failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision making; and appellate court’s standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence |
| elements of a crime | he parts of a crime that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, such as actus reus, mens rea, concurrence, causation, and bad result |
| actus reus | the criminal act or the physical element in criminal liability |
| mens rea | the “state of mind” the prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; criminal intent from an evil mind; the mental element in crime, including purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence |
| attendant circumstances element | a circumstance connected to an act, an intent, and/or a result required to make an act criminal |
| concurrence | the requirement that actus reus must join with mens rea to produce criminal conduct or that conduct must cause a harmful result |
| conduct crimes | crimes requiring a criminal act triggered by criminal intent |
| criminal acts | the voluntary bodily movements of the crime |
| criminal conduct | the criminal act triggered by a mens rea |
| bad result crimes | serious crimes that include causing a criminal harm in addition to the conduct itself |
| manifest criminality | the requirement in law that intentions have to turn into criminal deeds to be punishable |
| status | who we are as opposed to what we do; a condition that’s not an action can’t substitute for action as an element in crime |
| one-voluntary-act-is-enough | conduct only has to include a single willing act |
| criminal omissions | two forms: mere failure to act or failure to intervene in order to prevent a serious harm |
| failure to report | not providing information when you’re legally required to |
| failure to intervene | not actively preventing or interrupting injuries and death to persons or damage and destruction of property |
| legal duty | liability only for duties imposed by contract, statute, or special relationships |
| "good samaritan" doctrine | doctrine that imposes a legal duty to render or summon aid for imperiled strangers |
| american bystander rule | there’s no legal duty to rescue or call for help to aid someone who’s in danger even if helping poses no risk whatsoever to the potential rescuer |
| legal fiction | treating as a fact something that’s not a fact if there’s a good reason for doing so |
| actual possession | physical possession; on the possessor’s person |
| constructive possession | legal possession or custody of an item or substance |
| knowing possession | awareness of physical possession |
| mere possession | physical possession |
| culpability | the idea that we can only punish people that we can blame, and we can only blame people that are responsible for what they do |
| cause in fact | the objective determination that the defendant’s act triggered a chain of events that ended as the harmful result |
| legal cause | the subjective judgment that it’s fair and just to blame the defendant for the bad result |
| motive | the reason why a defendant commits a crime |
| subjective fault | fault that requires a “bad mind” in the actor |
| objective fault | requires no purposeful or conscious “bad mind” in the actor; it sets a standard of what the “average person should have known” |
| strict liability | liability that requires neither subjective nor objective fault |
| general intent | intent to commit the actus reus—the act required in the definition of the crime |
| specific intent | the attitude represented by subjective fault, where there’s a “bad” mind or will that triggers the act; the intent to do something beyond the actus reus |
| general intent plus | “general intent” refers to the intent to commit the actus reus of the crime, and “plus” refers to some “special mental element” in addition to the intent to commit the criminal act |
| purpose | the specific intent to act and/or cause a criminal harm |
| knowledge | consciously acting or causing a result |
| recklessness | the conscious creation of substantial and unjustifiable risks |
| negligence | the unconscious creation of substantial and unjustifiable risks |
| principle of concurrence | some mental fault has to trigger the actus reus in criminal conduct crimes and the cause in bad-result crimes |
| causation | requirement that criminal conduct causes a harm defined in the criminal code |
| factual cause | conduct that, in fact, leads to a harmful result |
| but for cause | meaning that if it weren’t for an actor’s conduct, the result wouldn’t have occurred |
| proximate cause | the main cause of the result of criminal conduct |
| intervening cause | the cause that either interrupts a chain of events or substantially contributes to a result |
| proximate cause of death | a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the death would not have occurred |
| superseding cause | a cause which constitutes a break in the natural and continuous sequence between a proximate cause and the outcome |
| defense of excuse | a defense where the mistake prevents the formation of any fault-based mental attitude, namely purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence |
| failure-of-proof defense | mistake defense where defendants present some evidence that the mistake raises a reasonable doubt about the formation of a mental element required for criminal liability. |
| purposely | the most blameworthy mental state |
| justification defenses | defendants admit they were responsible for their acts but claim that, under the circumstances, what they did was right |
| excuse defenses | defendants admit what they did was wrong but claim that, under the circumstances, they weren’t responsible for what they did |
| perfect defenses | defenses in which defendants are acquitted if they’re successful |
| competency hearings | special hearings to determine if defendants who have used the insanity excuse defense are still insane |
| imperfect defense | when a defendant fails in the full defense but is found guilty of a lesser offense |
| mitigating circumstances | circumstances that convince fact finders that defendants don’t deserve the maximum penalty for the crime they’re convicted of |
| initial aggressor | someone who provokes an attack can’t then use force to defend herself against the attack she provoked |
| withdrawal exception | if initial aggressors completely withdraw from attacks they provoke, they can defend themselves against an attack by their initial victims |
| necessity | a defense that argues an imminent danger of attack was prevented |
| imminence requirement | an element of self-defense requiring the danger to be “right now!” |
| stand-your-ground rule | if you didn’t start a fight, you can stand your ground and kill to defend yourself without retreating from any place you have a right to be |
| retreat rule | you have to retreat from an attack if you reasonably believe that you’re in danger of death or serious bodily harm and backing off won’t unreasonably put you in danger of death or serious bodily harm |
| castle exception | when attacked in your home, you have no duty to retreat and can use deadly force to fend off an unprovoked attack, but only if you reasonably believe the attack threatens death or serious bodily injury |
| cohabitant exception | in the jurisdictions that follow the retreat rule, people who live in the same home don’t have to retreat |
| battered woman's syndrome | mental disorder that develops in victims of domestic violence as a result of serious, long-term abuse |
| curtilage | the area immediately surrounding the home |
| choice-of-evils defense | also called the general defense of necessity justifies the choice to commit a lesser crime to avoid the harm of a greater crime |
| defense of consent | the justification that competent adults voluntarily consented to crimes against themselves and knew what they were consenting to |
| voluntary consent | consent was the product of free will, not of force, threat of force, promise, or trickery |
| knowing consent | the person consenting understands what he or she consenting to; that he or she is not too young or insane to understand |
| authorized consent | the person consenting has the authority to give the consent |
| insanity | the legal term that refers to a mental disease or defect that impairs the reason and/or will to control actions |
| civil commitment | a noncriminal proceeding in which courts have the power to decide if defendants who were insane when they committed their crimes are still insane |
| reason | psychologists call it “cognition”; the capacity to tell right from wrong |
| will | psychologists call it “volition,” most of us call it “willpower”; in the insanity tests it refers to a defendant’s power to control their actions |
| right-wrong test | the defendant suffered a defect of reason caused by a disease of the mind, and, consequently, at the time of the act didn’t know what she was doing or that the act was wrong |
| mental disease | most courts define it as psychosis, mostly paranoia and schizophrenia |
| mental defect | refers to mental retardation or brain damage severe enough to make it impossible to know what you’re doing, or if you know, you don’t know that it’s wrong |
| irresistible impulse test | we can’t blame or deter people who, because of a mental disease or defect know, that what they’re doing is “wrong” but can’t bring their actions into line with their knowledge of right and wrong |
| product-of-mental-illness test | acts that are the “products” of mental disease or defect excuse criminal liability |
| substantial capacity test | a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law |
| diminished capacity | a failure-of-proof defense in which the defendant attempts to prove that the defendant, incapable of the requisite intent of the crime charged, is innocent of that crime but may well be guilty of a lesser one |
| diminished responsibility | a defense of excuse in which the defendant argues, "what I did was wrong, but under the circumstances, I’m less responsible." |
| waiver to adult criminal court | meaning the juvenile court gives up its jurisdiction over the case and turns it over to the adult criminal court |
| judicial waiver | when juvenile court judges use their discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court |
| defense of duress | when defendants use the excuse that they were forced to do what they did |
| involuntary intoxication | an excuse to criminal liability in all states; it includes cases in which defendants don’t know they’re taking intoxicants or know but are forced to take them |
| entrapment | excuse that argues government agents got people to commit crimes they wouldn’t otherwise commit |
| subjective test of entrapment | asks whether the intent to commit the crime originated with the defendant |
| objective test of entrapment | if the intent originates with the government and their actions would tempt an “ordinarily law-abiding” person to commit the crime, the court should dismiss the case |
| syndrome | a group of symptoms or signs typical of a disease, disturbance, or condition |
| premenstrual syndrome | excuse that PMS led to the defendant committing the criminal acts |
| post traumatic stress disorder defense | excuse that argues the defendant wasn’t responsible because of PTSD |
Created by:
mpcostello
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