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POLS241
Final Exam Prep
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Monarchic dictatorship | autocracy with executive power through family/kin - survive in office longer & more stable |
| Monarchic dictatorship country example | Quatar & Nepal |
| Military dictatorship | Autocracy with executives that rely on armed forces - Example was Thailand, Poland in '91 & Guinea - shorter reigns more likely to negotiate, have large budget and value discipline, leave behind competition democracies vs others |
| Civilian dictatorship | creates an institutional base of support typically through a party |
| Civilian dictatorship 2 types, give country example for each | Single party regimes – most common Communist USSR - mainatin party unity, splits power to avoid uprising, buy off rivals Personalistic regime – North Korea (Kim Jung Un) - supported by parties and militaries, but not developed fully- personality cults |
| What do we know about dictatorships in regime duration, and transitions to democracy? | Military to military is common for dictator transition (hard to become monarchies), Biggest threat to civilian dictatorships is economic problems Two biggest issues for dictators is power-sharing and control |
| Prisoners Dilemma | If you're in jail with someone, you will rat them out to save yourself for fear that they would do the same to you. - typically is the reason for a nuclear arms race |
| Public goods (characteristics and example) | Public goods are nonexcludable and nonrival (my access to it does not make it impossible for you to us) Example: National Parks |
| Free-rider problem (and solutions) | People benefiting from a situation without contributing anything to the collective action. - results in underprovision of the good and service Solution creating selective, varied rather than group incentives |
| Interest Groups | Organized groups of citizens who seek to ensure that the government enacts particular policies - 'group theory' makes organization easier |
| Common Pool Resources | Resource system used by multiple actors and is generally costly to exclude potential beneficiaries Examples = Fishing/hunting ground, grazing lands - fallows, Water/irrigation systems Excludable |
| Tragedy of the Commons | If you leave it up to the people, their private interests will leave it depleted - need strong government or privatization to solve Ostrom proved this wrong with mutual monitoring |
| Problem of commitment | ASK LETICIA Tomorrow |
| Problem of mutual monitoring | solution to tragedy of the commons, you cant guarantee everyone keeps an eye on one another all the time though |
| Arab Spring (role of social media) | example of the theory of the revolutionary cascade, the social media was able to spread information at very fast rates , plus military was in support of the protest, and leaflets proved military and internet have the biggest effects |
| When does China censor information? | They ban anything they think can lead to collective action in the real world- use massive firewalls and in person internet police |
| State-based conflict | at least one organized actor of the conflict is the government (conflict is at least 25 battle related deaths) |
| Non-state based conlict | Two organized actors are not states (Colombia revolution vs US Self-defense forces) - most world conflict is this |
| Civil War (example) | Internal conflict with at least 100 combat related deaths on each side Example: Congo |
| Opportunities for Civil war | Colonial legacies, poverty, Geography, international context, National Material Capabilities (military ability, energy consumption, demographic factors (urban pop size) |
| greivances | relative discrimination and ethnic dominance (50-90% majority) |
| greed | Money triggers war |
| Why is oil more prone to violence compared to other natural resources? | Oil money runs the country and is more profitable, leading citizens to believe they'd be better independently (don't need to rely on taxes so they fall for 'oil curse') |
| What does data link between oil and violence? | Oil-rich countries are twice as likely to descend into civil war than other. Produces jobs for only men, and creates more problems than solutions |
| Genocide (example) | Myanmar - 1 million have fled since 70s, very concentrated in population. Originally from Bangladesh, there was a military coup last year to eliminate them |
| Ethnicity/Ethnic group | People who have a common heritage based on religion, language territory or family |
| primordialism | Assumes that identities are something you're born with or emerge from deep psychological process in early childhood |
| constructivism | Assumes that political identity are malleable even if they often appear not – suggests that humans are evolving political process and not fixed in identity - modern belief |
| Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) | Probability that two randomly selected people in a country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group, most diverse=1, non-diverse= 0 |
| How can ethnic tensions be mitigated? (Hindu-Muslim example) | Babri mosque - hindu consider it to be birthplace of Rama Muslims built mosque in 16th century under Mughal emperor 1992 mosque was destroyed court cases and even settlements/rights to places (split evenly all three ways, although still tension heavy) |
| Association forms of engagement | business associations,professional organizations, reading clubs, film clubs, sports clubs, NGOs, trade unions, and party networks - sturdy with ethnic tensions |
| Everyday forms of engagement | neighbors, friends, markets, commuting - sturdy in villages not cities |
| What are consequences of ethnic diversity? | slower development, school retention, number of phones and increased rates of black market exchanges |
| According to Posner in Zambia and Malawi, why are the same ethnic groups political rivals in one country and not another? | In Malawi, there was much higher political cleavage which gave tensions salience - punishment for acting against their identity In Zambia, communities were too small to be an issue |
| Dictatorship game lessons learned | We have some benevolent dictators in our class! |
| Formalistic representation | institutional arrangements that precede and initiate representation Interest groups play a key role |
| Symbolic representation | the way a representative 'stands for' the represented Power to evoke feelings or attitudes |
| Descriptive representation | the extent to which the composition of the representatives accurately reflect the composition of those represented |
| Substantive representation | actions are taken on behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the represented |
| reserved seats | Quotas that reserve a percent of seats for women in elected bodies; they are governed by national constitutions or electoral laws |
| legislated candidate quotas | Certain percent of women candidates on the ballot |
| voluntary political party quotas | Quotas adopted by individual parties for their own candidate list usually governed by party rules |
| What country has the highest number of female legislators? What about US? | France 37.3% US has 28.4% |
| Do electoral quotas help increase female representation? Strengths and weaknesses | Yes. Strength - increases the amount of women on the ballot Weakness - it may only increase representation in theory or as token representation |
| Does descriptive representation lead to substantive representation? | Not necessarily, correlation does not equal causation. having a reflective congress does not necessarily mean action will be taken in the same way |
| How does having more women legislators influence policies? (Paxton and Hughes answer) | consensus-building, interact with a wider group of people Provide more public goods ,Clean roads, water, infrastructure, less corrupt , spend more on the family as well, tend to be more liberal change the discourse and perceptions |
| Corruption | 'public corruption is the misuse of public office for private gain - representing illicit use of willingness to pay as a decision making criterion |
| Grand corruption | acts committed at a high level of government |
| Petty corruption | everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public officials in interactions of citizens |
| Corruption Perception Index | The CPI ranks 180 countries and territories around the world by their perceived levels of public sector corruption. The results are given on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). |
| Perception-based corruption vs. experience-based | Perception- more developed countries are perceived as less corrupt. Incentive to underreport & lack of info by the uninvolved. Experience- Political preferences of experts bias perception databases, subjective measure lack global comparability & acc. |
| Clientelism (characteristics) | Dyadic relationship - between patron and client Contingency- MOST IMPT reciprocal in nature Hierarchy - higher status people use influence to provide benefits for votes (asymmetric) Iteration = most important Violation -debated |
| Federalism (example) | 2 or more overlapping political authority in the constitution for the same territory 27 countries are federalist USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Russia, Germany, and India |
| Decentralization | extent to which actual policymaking power lies with the central or local governments in a country (tax revenue= fiscal decentralization) |
| Impacts of decentralization on reducing corruption? | decentralization is linked to increased government accountability - brings government closer to the people w more information (and subnational governments can 'compete' with each other (beware of local capture though / Uganda) |
| One-sided conflict | use of armed force by organized actor (state or non-state) against civilians |
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