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Biodefense
Lecture 55
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Chemical agents | organic or inorganic compounds which have a toxic effect on living things |
| Biological agents | living organisms or viruses which have an adverse effect on living things |
| NBC weapons | nuclear, biological, or chemical. All can be used in deliberate terrorist attack, disadvantages: short lived, difficult storage and transport |
| Big bang nuclear weapons | atomic fission bomb (suitcase), conventional trauma plus short and long term radiation exposure |
| Little bang nuclear weapons | dirty bomb, conventional explosive used to disperse radioactive material, same types of casualties, but fewer and more localized |
| No bang nuclear weapons | non-explosive radiation release, may not be immediately noticed, no trauma, radiation exposure only |
| Nuclear weapons | all victims require decontamination, civil authorities first responders, explosive plus radiation exposure |
| Chemical weapons | may/may not be covert, vapor cloud may be present, odor may be present, symptoms in minutes to hours, faster than others, all but long term victims need decontamination |
| Biological weapons | more difficult to prepare, transport, and disperse, may have multiplication effect (transmitted from man to man, casualties exceed initial contacts), symptoms appear days to weeks after exposure, release is covert, hospital staff are first responders |
| Catgory A biological agents | highest risk, can be transmitted person to person or easily dissemintated, high mortality with major public health impact, panic and social disruption, need special preparedness |
| Category B Biological agents | moderately easy to disseminate, moderate morbidity and low mortality, need enhancement of CDC capability and surveillance |
| Category C biological weapons | emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination, available, may have ease of production and dissemination, potenital for high morbitity and mortality |
| Biosafety | applications of combinations of laboratory procedures and practice, laboratory facilities, and safety equipment when working with potentially infectious microorganisms |
| BSL-1 introduction | suitable for work involving well characterized agents not known to cause disease in healthy human adult and of minimal potenial hazard to laboratory personnel. Ex: bacillus subtilis, Naegleria gruberi, E. coli |
| BSL-2 introduction | suitable for work involving agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel and the environment. Ex: measles, samonella, toxoplasma, HBV (immunization or antibiotic available for all) |
| BSL-2 Key differences | emphasis on protection from blood borne pathogens, strict control of disposal of sharps, PPE: eye and hand protection |
| BSL-2 application | all primary samples from clinical materials may be handled under BSL-2 conditions, adequate for bloodborne pathogens |
| BSL-3 introduction | suitable for work with infectious agents which may cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of exposure by the inhalation route. Ex: TB, Coxiella burnetti |
| BSL-3 key differences | emphasis on protection from airborne pathogens, negative pressure rooms, double airtight doors, HEPA filter on exhaust, P-100 respiratory protection |
| BSL-4 introduction | suitable for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of aerosol transmitted lab infections and life threatening disease. Exposure by aerosol or with unknown risk of transmission, infection may be lethal. Ex: Ebola |
| BSL-4key differences | emphasis on maximum protection from airborne pathogens and pathogens with unknown transmission. Separate building or isolated zone, dedicated air supply and HEPA, entrance through change roomwith shower, full body air supply +pressure suits |
| Weaponization of natural infectious diseases | sophisticated to grow infectious agent without loss of virulence, enhance virulence, stabilize agent, interface with delivery |
| Natural agents usually: | are unstable outside their natural host/reservoir, require a vector, and require a high minimum infective dose |
| Dispersal | release at night (UV is lethal), release as dust or nebulized spray, difficult to remain clandestine, cannot use explosive dispersal, can be contaminant of food/water |
| US incidents | 1984: salmonella in salad bars in The Dalles, OR, 751 cases no deaths. 2001: anthrax, 5100 exposed, 22 cases, 5 deaths (all inhalational) |
| Clues of a biological attack | fever, malaise, chills, muscle and joint pain, lymphadenopathy, headache, respiratory symptoms |
| Dark winter simulation | simulated covert smallpox attack on 3 simultaneous locations, infection rate at 1:10 (each case passes it on to 10 people), incubation 7d, contagious after 3d |
| Dec 9 Dark winter simulation | 12 confirmed and 14 suspected cases in OK, suspected in GA and PA. 12 millison vaccines available in US, 60 million worldwide. Ring vaccination: healthcare/those close to infected persons first, work out from there |
| Dec 15 Dark winter simulation | 300 deaths, 2000 cases in 15 states. Spread to Canada, Mexico (those +UK asking for vaccines), national guard deployed, public places closed, healthcare system breaks down in affectd areas, martial law invoked |
| Dec 22 Dark winter simulation | 1000 deaths, 16000 cases, 28 states and 10 countries. Economy decreased, violence escalated, 14000 new cases in last 48hr, 5000 will die in next week. All vaccine used up |
| After Dec 22 Dark winter simulation | economy collapses, mass exodus, 2nd gen: 30000 cases 10000 deaths, 3rd gen: 300000 cases 100000 deaths, 4th gen: 3 mill cases 1 mill dead |
| Lessons learned from Dark Winter | attack is a major threat, nation is unprepared, information management is crucial |
| Blue advance simulation | smallpox released on cruise ship going to San Juan, 950 initial cases, hospital capacity exceeded, emergency assets depleted, fatality rate 30% |
| Problems dealing with BW attack | recognizing early events as being an attack, first cases may not appear in the same place (communication needed), healthcare systems lack surge capacity, civic and economic order soon break down, most problems are social/political |
| BW point sensors | PCR to amplify/grow suspect DNA, detection with fluorescent tagged Ag, commercial test strips (low to moderate sensitivity), Bcell reaction (no need to detect Ag) |
| Novel detection systems | Lab on a chip total analysis systems: isolate specific cells/viruses, amplify info, measure specific indicator, deliver quantitative result. Ex: dielectrophoresis |
Created by:
kamarsh
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