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psy307 evol ch9
ch. 9 p267-85
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| natural selection is selfish | one organism's design features outreproduce those of others |
| problem of altruism | an "altruistic" design feature aids the reproduction of other individuals, and causes the altruist to suffer a fitness cost |
| long evolutionary history of alstruism | hunter-gatherer cultures, social exchange in bats, reciprocal helping in humans, baboons, chimps |
| theory of reciprocal altruism | adaptations for providing benefits to nonrelatives can evolve as long as benefits delivery is reciprocated |
| those who get gains in trade (each party receives more than it's costs) | tend to outproduce those who act selfishly |
| reciprocal altruism (cooperation, reciprocation, social exchange) | cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit |
| problem of cheating | take benefits without responding in kind later |
| prisoner's delema | rational action for both is confess, but best outcome is cooperate |
| tit for tat give optimal outcome | when repeated many times |
| tit for tat | cooperate on fist move and reciprocate on every move thereafter (works well if no signal error) |
| strengths of tit for tat | never be first to defect, retaliate only after other defects, be forgiving |
| tit for tat consequences | enlarge the shadow of the future (meet often, commit), teach reciprocity (cooperating group thrives), insist on no more than equity, respond quickly to provocation, cultivate reciprocator reputation |
| vampire bats | reciprocally regurgitate blood |
| chimpanzee dominance depends on | alliances (reciprocal altruism) and female support |
| cheaters evolutionary advantage | gain benefits and avoid reciprocal costs |
| avoid being cheated (threat social contract theory) | individual recognition (face, walk), remember interactions (cheater?, accounting), value communication, model others' values (maximize benefit provided), cognitively represent costs and benefits |
| cheater-detection adaptations | solve social exchange problems (over abstract logic), orbitofrontal and amygdala damage reduces cost benefit analysis ability |
| cheater detection method depends on | one's perspective |
| cheaters (nonaltruists) may be better remembered when | rare, low status, primed by cheater remembrance, |
| altruist-detection task (if X helps, X seeks credit.)(1,3) | 1 X helps, 2 X does not help, 3 X does not seek credit, 4 X seeks credit |
| cheater-altruistic detection performances | not linked |
| altruists | detectable, display more genuine smiles |
| adaptations to facilitate cooperation | cheater detection (take benefits without paying costs), altruist detection (genuinely motivated) |
| indirect reciprocity (Theory) | altruistic acts are seen and reported to produce a reputation for altruism increasing benefits (kindness to strangers in need, especially when being observed) |
| costly signaling (Theory) | display altruism to signal they are excellent candidates for making good allies (gifts to charity, lavish dinners -> good condition with ample resources) |
| fitness benefits of costly signaling | preferentially chosen for cooperative relationships, increased cooperation in relationships, higher group status and reputation |
| public volunteering | produced more costly charity work |
| similar in altruistic value | tend to pair up |
| theories to explain evolutionary puzzle of ultruism | inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, costly signaling |
| insisting on immediately repaying | sign of lack of friendship |
| marriage immediate reciprocal exchange orientation | linked with marital dissatisfaction and expectation marriage will disolve |
| once benefits to delivering benefits to others has evolved | the less costly it is to deliver benefits to others, it becomes more beneficial to benefit others |
| banker's paradox | people who need money most are the poorest credit risk |
| evolution should favor psychological mechanisms that cause people to | desert you precisely when you most need help |
| potential helper evaluates | willingness to repay (cheater reputation?), will fortunes improve in future, best use of limited capacity to help |
| becoming irreplaceable | highlight uniqueness, recognize unique values, cultivate special skills, join groups assets appreciated, avoid groups assets common, drive off same asset rivals |
Created by:
james22222222
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