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Animal Behavior #2
Flash cards for the second exam
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| What is the prisoner's dilemma? | Example of reciprocity. Two people commit a crime and are interrogated separately -- should you cooperate or defect (rat them out)? |
| What's the best strategy for a traditional prisoner's dilemma? | Best strategy is to defect every time -- you will earn more "points" for yourself |
| If you know the other person, what's the best strategy for the prisoner's dilemma? | Tit-for-tat. "Do unto the other as he did to you last time" |
| What are the main characteristics of a tit-for-tat strategy? | "Do unto the other as he did to you last time." 1. Niceness - never defect first. 2. Swift retaliation when betrayed. 3. Forgiveness - go back to cooperating when your partner does. |
| What is reciprocity? | Type of social interaction, falls under the cooperation category. Provides a benefit to the recipient and a delayed benefit to the donor. Ex: prisoner's dilemma, vampire bats who share blood, human blood donation system |
| What is necessary to maintain the vampire bat's blood sharing system? (reciprocity example) | 1. Enough repeated pairwise interactions must occur to permit role exchanges and ensure net benefit to all donors. 2. Benefit of receiving aid must exceed cost of donating. 3. Donors must be able to recognize and not feed nonreciprocating assholes. |
| What is byproduct mutualism? | Type of social interaction, falls under the cooperation category. Provides a benefit to both the recipient and the donor. Ex: 2 guys trapped in a cage by a giant boulder, must cooperate to move the boulder and escape. |
| Differences between byproduct mutualism and reciprocity? | In byproduct mutualism, there is no temptation to cheat (you have no other options) and there are no worries about past behavior. It doesn't matter if you know them, hate them, or have never met them -- you have to cooperate to reach your goal. |
| Do animals pay attention to the payoff matrices? Can they tell the difference between a prisoner's dilemma (reciprocity) situation and a byproduct mutualism situation? | Yes -- ex: blue jays in skinner boxes, cooperate when they have no other options, but revert back to prisoner's dilemma as soon as the conditions change |
| Two types of group selection | 1. Within group (individual) selection-favors selfish individuals 2. Between group selection-favors cooperation if the group can work together to outcompete other groups Recall slave ants - when threat of slave-makers has passed, group stops cooperating |
| Who controls siblicide? | 3 hypotheses tested using blue-footed vs. nasca boobies: 1. Nestling-influence. 2. Parental-influence. 3. Joint-influence. Experiment: Switch parents and offspring, each change affects the results so it's the joint-influence hypothesis. |
| Two types of siblicide | Facultive: blue-footed boobies, only kill sibling when necessary (limited resources) Obligate: nasca boobies, always kill the sibling |
| Why have siblicide? | 2 Hypotheses: 1. Insurance-egg - extra egg is insurance for low hatch rate or low fertility. 2. Individual optimization hypothesis - some individuals are better suited for 1 vs. 2 egg clutches. Test by adding/removing eggs, supports insurance-egg |
| Altruism | + A behavior with a negative effect on the donor and a positive effect on the recipient + Helpful behavior that raises the recipient's direct fitness while lowering the donor's direct fitness |
| Hamilton's Rule | Altruism will develop if: (cost to altruist) < (benefit to recipient * Xr) r = coefficient of relatedness "I would gladly give my life for 2 children, 2 siblings, or 8 cousins." (All equivalent to 1, his life) |
| Inclusive Fitness | Direct fitness + indirect fitness = inclusive fitness |
| Direct fitness | Fitness through personal offspring |
| Indirect fitness | Fitness through relatives and their offspring |
| Kin Recognition - how do I know who's related to me? | Vocal recognition Chemical recognition Major histocompatibility complex (MHC) Rule of thumb: "If it's in my nest, it's mine." |
| Hamilton's Rule for Social Insects | Altruism will develop if... Cost to altruist (# offspring lost * r) < benefit to altruist (added # of offspring of recipient * r) |
| 3 Criteria for Eusociality | - Overlap of adult generations (adults stick around and help out) - Cooperative brood care - Reproductive castes (only queens reproduce) |
| Solitary | Shows none of the criteria for eusociality (no overlap of generations, no cooperative brood care, no reproductive castes) |
| Subsocial | Adults care for their own nymphs/larvae for a period of time |
| Communal | Members of the same generation use the same composite nest without cooperating in brood care |
| Quasisocial | Members of the same generation use the same composite nest and also cooperate in brood care (but no overlap of generations) |
| Semisocial | Members of the same generation use the same composite nest and also cooperate in brood care. Includes a worker caste that cares for the brood. |
| Haplodiploidy | Mother can choose whether or not to fertilize an egg - Females arise from a fertilized egg (haploid, workers) - Males arise from an unfertilized egg (diploid, drones) - Sisters have a little r of 75% (super sisters) |
| Does haplodiploidy explain why so many Hymenoptera are eusocial? | No -- it's important, but needs to be combined with complex nest structure |
| Inbreeding model | Naked mole rats and termites - Queens are kings are very inbred, but not related - Share ~100% of their genes with sisters/brothers - Everyone is super related so sisters/brothers help each other and help the mom/queen make more brothers and sisters |
| Reproductive Skew Theory | Mathematical approach to understanding how reproduction is partitioned among members of social groups - Negotiate a social contract to see who gets to reproduce - Can be used with any animals, just need multiple cooperating females |
| What does reproductive skew theory take into account? | Ecological factors: how difficult is it to start your own nest and raise your young alone? Social factors: like dominance hierarchies, etc. Genetic factors: like little r (coefficient of relatedness) |
| What do the reproductive skew theory numbers mean? | High skew = one individual does most of the reproducing Low skew = reproduction is more or less equal |
| Two transactional models of reproductive skew | Concession model: Dominant breeders control reproduction and group membership, allocate reproduction to subordinates as a staying incentive Restraint model: Subordinates control reproduction and take the largest proportion that the dominant will tolerate |
| Concession model of reproductive skew | Transactional model Dominant rules reproduction/group membership, offers staying incentive to subordinate (opposite of restraint model) Pi + rKi > Pj + rKj equation considers the subordinate's fitness |
| Restraint model of reproductive skew | Transactional model Subordinate rules reproduction, takes as much as possible before being evicted (opposite of concession model) Pi + rKi > Pj + rKj equation considers the dominant's fitness |
| Reproductive skew version of Hamilton's rule | Pi + rKi > Pj + rKj Each side is the inclusive fitness for a specific strategy. The inclusive fitness of one strategy must be greater than the alternative P = personal reproduction, K = other individual's reproduction, i/j = 2 different strategies |
| Sex Ratios | - Usually 50/50 because of self-correcting systems - Critical sex ratio is at puberty, not birth |
| Fisher's theory of equal investment | Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) Assumptions: 1. M + F are equally costly, so 50/50 is best strategy. 2. M + F have unequal costs, invest equally in both sexes (now cheaper sex is overproduced) |
| Hamilton's local mate competition theory | Used to describe unequal sex ratios Ex: Nasonia Wasps lay eggs inside fly pupae, upon birth M mate with F. 8% M, 92 % F. If you're the 2nd F, what do you do? Lay few eggs - make them all male, increase competition. Lay lots of eggs- use same ratio |
| Local resource competition theory | Used to describe unusual sex ratios Ex: Galagos - daughters hang around and compete with mom for food (very costly), males disperse quickly. Males are overproduced since they're less costly. |
| Maternal condition theory | Used to describe unusual sex ratios Ex: Red deer - alpha males get most mates. Alpha females' (good condition) best strategy is to produce an alpha male. Beta females' (poor condition) best strategy is to produce a female |
| Charnov-bull model | Used to describe temperature preferences for alligator sex. Males like hotter, females like colder temps The alligators make the sex whose reproductive success is greater in each temperature |
| Sex Ratio distorters | Ex: Wolbachia bacteria that infects insects. In butterflies - kills the male eggs, spares the females because it's passed down thru eggs. It causes sex-role reversal In pillbugs, feminizes males by killing endocrine gland that makes males |
| Sequential Hermaphrodites | Animals that can change sex |
| Protogynous hermaphrodite | Female first, male second Why? If alpha male is killed, a large adult female can switch sex to replace him (to be large enough, you must be older) |
| Protandrous hermaphrodite | Males first, females second Why? Sperm are small/cheap, even tiny males can produce lots of sperm. Eggs are large/costly, so you need to be bigger/older before you switch sex to female |
| Human sociobiology | The study of human social behavior from a Darwinian perspective AKA - evolutionary psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and human behavioral ecology |
| Optimal foraging theory | Economic analysis of costs and benefits associated with foraging behavior Efficient foragers will minimize costs and maximize benefits |
| 3 basic questions of optimal foraging | What to eat? When is enough enough? How do we handle the food once we've caught it? |
| When is enough enough? | Solve with diminishing returns gain curve. Maximize the rate of energy gain (# worms) / (travel time + search time) Shorter travel time = smaller load In humans: think of grocery shopping |
| Marginal value theorem | Based on diminishing returns gain curve Goal is to maximize # of calories obtained per unit of time (time includes travel, search, and handling time) Low time = low calories, more frequent trips High time = high calories, less trips |
| Bumblebees and risk | Bees are risk averse - they pick the "sure thing" flowers instead of "boom or bust" flowers. Probably due to learning from a reward system, why go back to a flower that gave you 0 nutrients?? |
| Search image | A mental image of the target, increases the rate of collection BUT! Multiple targets confuses the animal, they can't form a search image. This selects for polymorphism in prey (more variations block search image, harder for predator to find prey) |
| Why is foraging sometimes NOT optimal? | Predators, parasites, etc. Ex: parasitic flies and leaf cutting ants, flies like big headed ants so big headed ants only come out at night (colony ends up being inefficient during the day, but loses less dudes) |
| r | "Little r" r = (# ways of sharing genes)(.5)^(L) L = # generational links Coefficient of relatedness Ranges from 0.0 (not related) - 1.0 (super related, like twins or inbreeding model in termites/naked mole rats) |
| k | Variable representing group benefit in reproductive skew theory (standardized reproductive output of the group) Ranges from 1.0 (no group benefit, same as being alone) - 2.0 (group is 2x better than alone) |
| x | Variable representing ecological constraints in reproductive skew theory Ranges from 0 (high constraints) - 1 (low constraints On concession/restraint graphs, x is the inverse of ecological constraints |
| Worker policing (in social insects) | If the queen mates multiple times, sisters are more related to their brothers than their nephews (sister's sons) Workers police/kill nephews (sister's sons) and leave queen-laid eggs (brothers) alone |
| How did dowries develop? | Common in monogamous relationships, esp. in poor countries Bride's fam gives $ to groom's fam Develop partly because families are so poor they cannot help a male compete in a polygynous society, but they can help the female (who is more likely to mate) |
| Brideswealth | Husband's family gives $ to wife's fam as a nuptial gift Common in polygynous cultures Wealth inherited by sons, not daughters (want to increase chances of mating more) |
| What must be true in order to maintain the vampire bat blood sharing system? | - Enough repeated pair-wise interactions to ensure a net benefit to all donors - Benefit of receiving aid must outweigh the cost - Donors must be able to recognize and not feed assholes |
| How would you test siblicide hypotheses on a phylogeny? | Independent contrast method Look for branch points Look at high vs. low fertility and siblicide incidence Can't do it in real life :( Not enough siblicide |
| What does Emlen's evolutionary theory of family take into account? | Behavior (like reproductive skew theory) Ecology (like ecological constraint theory) Genetics (like inclusive fitness theory) |
Created by:
dellabiology
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