Help
Options
Didn't know it?
click below
click below
Knew it?
click below
click below
Don't Know
Remaining cards (0)
Know
retry
shuffle
restart
0:00
Embed Code - If you would like this activity on your web page, copy the script below and paste it into your web page.
Normal Size Small Size show me how
Normal Size Small Size show me how
Psych
Exam #2
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Konorski’s Visual Recognition Taxonomy | Nine subsystems based on size, type of object, position |
| Farah | Faces/Words/Objects |
| Face recognition is... | holistic |
| Word recognition is... | decompositional |
| Object recognition is... | BOTH. shares holistic & decompositional strategies |
| Prosopagnosia | can't recognize faces |
| Agnosia | can't recognize objects |
| Alexia | can't recognize words |
| THE EYE | know it |
| apperceptive agnosia | see objects as fragmented rather than integrated wholes |
| associative agnosia | see fine, but can't link to existing knowledge - can't recognize what you're seeing |
| "Where" system | dorsal (occipitoPARIETAL) pathway |
| "What" system | ventral (occipitoTEMPORAL) pathway |
| Pattern recognition | how incoming raw data --a “pattern”--is matched to information in memory related to that stimulus |
| template matching | holistic match to stored representation |
| cognitive economy | the need to manage one’s mental resources |
| feature analysis | stimuli is broken down into components (the first thing we process) |
| primitives | the components of stimuli,or the “building blocks” of complex objects |
| feature detectors | individual neurons in the primary visual cortex are sensitive to lines at a given angle in a particular part of the visual field |
| form agnosia | maintains: acuity, color, motion.No: shape recognition, matching stimuli, integrating stimuli, copying forms. severe damage to the primary occipital cortex or the lateral occipital complex in the ventral can't discriminate/copy basic shapes "peppery mas |
| integrative agnosia | difficulty recognizing objects, but purely in visual domain. Can define or recognize objects if presented in verbal, auditory, haptic domains. can't see the big picture see the long neck of a bird but cannot say that its a flamingo |
| semantic agnosia | information about objects is missing |
| semantic access agnosia | maintains information about objects but cannot access it via visual information. (disconnect problem) |
| transformational agnosia | Patients have trouble identifying things from unusual angles. Motion blindness. Can’t see changes in spacial aspects of objects. |
| Object Recognition-by-Components | uses geometric ions |
| geons | geometric forms/ions. Found by breaking the object into its parts at the vertices |
| vertex/vertices | the intersection of two geons, allow us to dvide the object into geons. |
| Brain Area V1 | primary visual cortex |
| V2 | relays visual signals to other areas |
| V3 | form & motion |
| V4 | form & color |
| V5 | motion |
| Top-down processing | Using expectations and previous knowledge to predict/process |
| Word Superiority Effect | States that individual letters in a sequence of letters are more easily recognized if it’s part of a word when it is presented for only a fraction of a second. (example: given YAWN and YRET. the W will be more easily recognized than the E) |
| Masking | Pattern of random random lines was presented to inhibit further repetition. |
| Context effects in recognition | influences memory upon recognition (proofreaders error, chunking) |
| Proofreader’s error | connectionist model predicts missing info may be filled in b/c of t-d proc. read a misspelled word enough info may be present to activate le word-our system provides enough activation to its component letters to trick us into thinking its spelled right |
| Phonemic restoration effect | tendency for people to hallucinate a phoneme replaced by a non-speech sound in a word |
| Spreading activation | method for searching associative, neural and semantic networks. Excitatory connections from one level to adjacent levels. |
| bigrams | pairs of letters |
| Repetition/Semantic priming | Reaction time for primed stimulus=faster. For example, if test includes the word “nurse” the word “doctor” is faster responded to |
| Thresholds of activation | Higher frequency= lower threshold of activation. Thresholds of activation are the amount of stimulus needed to activate a node |
| Attention | Concentration of mental effort on sensory or mental events |
| Dichotic listening tasks | Listening to two different audio stimuli through different speakers. (different stimulus in each speaker/channel) |
| Selective attention | pay attention to one message and ignore other |
| Divided attention | monitor two messages simultaneously |
| shadowing | listening for and then repeating info |
| Early selection models | Filters before any high level processing; Still perceives, just not processing. Filter is AFTER sensory and before pattern recognition. Broadbent Treisman |
| Broadbent’s filter model | Early selection model: bottleneck after sensory register |
| Treisman’s attenuation model | Attention is like “volume” and will turn down “volume” on unattended tasks as opposed to completely tuning them out. |
| attenuator | Analyses incoming information for physical characteristics, language and meaning. Attended messages pass through the attenuator at “full strength”, unattended messages pass through the attenuator with “reduced strength” |
| Late Selection model | All information is both received and processed. Bottleneck occurs at “pattern recognition”. After information is processed, pertinence decides which information goes to working memory, the rest is discarded. |
| Pertinence Model | (Terisman’s) Select what to pay attention to after high level processing; Pertinence (Relevance) to stimuli determines what is to be remembered/responded to |
| Capacity models of attention | States that there are not “bottlenecks”, but must allocate attentional resources. More stimulus/attention tasks= lower performance. We have a limited capacity of attentional resources. |
| Feature integration | different kinds of attention are responsible for binding different features into consicously experienced wholes. |
| illusory conjunctions | when overloaded, people confuse mixture of traits |
| Spotlight analogy | take information about dimension and integrate it at a single location (Treisman & Gelade) |
| Hemispatial (or unilateral) neglect | ignores left half of space due to right hemisphere damage |
| Biased Competition theory | Of attention: “RVF (right visusal field) “wins”. patients have difficulty disengaging from RVF to process LVF. Patients also exhibit “sticky” attention once they have attended to an object (barbell experiment) |
| Temporal/Parietal junction | If damaged, can create HN |
| Dorsal Simultagnosia | recognizes only one object in an array of objects |
| Parietal lobe | spatial |
| Prefrontal cortex | decision making |
| Stroop task | interference in the reaction time of a task ex: red blue orange green |
| Spatial, frequency, temporal processing | According to Posner & Snyder, “innate automatic process” |
| Task interference | When one task interferes with another (both effortful and automatic) |
| Change Blindness | failure to detect objects that change or disappear in an array |
| Inattentional blindness | not being able to see things in plain sight |
| Representational failure | When you do not incode stimulus (example: Person holding a chart in one scene, then not in the next. Person being tested does not recognize person was ever holding chart) |
| Comparison failure | Initially incode information but then does not make comparison if information changes. (Example, chart shown in first scene then not in second. Does not notice chart is missing, however DOES know that the person originally had a chart) |
| Mental imagery | A particular kind of conscious occurrence that often makes it seem as if we are experiencing a perceptual object or sound, but without the object or sound being “out there”. |
| Quasi-picture view: | Mental images are representations of visual stimuli (pictures not sentences). Basically that mental imagery is like seeing with “minds eye” |
| Functional Equivalence: | Although visual imagery is not identical to visual perception, it is “functionally equivolent” or works in the same way. |
| Spatial equivalence: | When picturing an object, the spatial relation stays the same. For example; picture your house, then mentally step backward from the house. The house should get smaller. |
| Implicit encoding | information that was not deliberately remembered but can still be able to recall (Ex: California is on the West Coast) |
| Perceptual equivalence | Mental image = realistic picture; has same shape, size, and physical characteristics |
| Transformational equivalence | Mentally manipulate mental images in same fashion as pictures/objects/scene |
| Structural equivalence | integrity of shape and details of object maintained + spatial relations (EX: German Shepard’s ears are pointed and on top of the head) |
| Mental rotation | Larger angles of rotation -> longer Response |
| Image scanning | time to scan image linearly related to distance between objects |
| Neurological equivalence: | In both seeing and conjuring a mental image, the same part of the brain are activated (proved through PET scans) |
| Intramodal interference : | Seeing something and visualising something will interfere with each other if they are both using the same part of the brain (same modes) |
| Conceptual-Propositional Theory | Verbal and visual knowledge are stored in abstract conceptual propositions. No tie to any specific sensory modality |
| Indeterminacy | Pylyshyn’s critisism of Quasi-picture theory. States that pictures lose determinancy when pictured mentally, so mental images cannot be like pictures. Example: picture a tiger, how many stripes? |
Created by:
nothingbutdust
Popular Psychology sets