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ethics
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Final oral | |
| Answer 1 – Isaiah Berlin: Positive and Negative Freedom and Their Weaknesses | |
| I will first explain what is freedom in general. Then I will explain what positive and negative freedom is. After that I will show their main problems and also mention how later thinkers like Charles Taylor and Philip Pettit reacted to Berlin. | |
| Freedom is about how much control I have over my own life, we can ask questions like who decides what I can do, what can I do without other people stopping me, how big is the space in my life where I can choose for myself? | |
| Isaiah Berlin, a british philosopher and political thinker, talks about two main ideas of freedom. | |
| Isaiah Berlin explains freedom by dividing it into two big ideas: negative freedom and positive freedom. The easiest way to understand them is to imagine a normal person living in a city and thinking about how much control they have over their own life. N | |
| Positive freedom is a different way of thinking about what it means to be free. It is not just about other people leaving you alone; it is about who controls your life from the inside. Positive freedom asks: “Am I the real author of my life? Am I in charg | |
| Positive freedom also has a political meaning. It says that being free is not only about your private life, but also about taking part in the life of your community. When you vote, join discussions, attend protests, or participate in political decisions, | |
| Now let’s talk about the problems. | |
| Now I want to talk about the problems that Isaiah Berlin sees in both kinds of freedom. I will start with negative freedom. To understand the problem, imagine that I live in a country with a “kind” dictator. This dictator does not interfere with my privat | |
| The second problem appears with positive freedom. Positive freedom sounds inspiring because it talks about self-mastery—about becoming the author of your own life. But there is a danger hidden inside this idea. Someone else might say, “I know what your tr | |
| After Berlin, other philosophers tried to respond to these problems. Charles Taylor said that Berlin’s picture of negative freedom is too simple. For Taylor, freedom is not only about how many choices we have, but also about which choices matter most. Som | |
| Philip Pettit offers another idea called freedom as non-domination. He says that simply asking “Does someone interfere with me right now?” Is not enough. Someone can be unfree even if nobody is interfering at the moment, if another person has uncontrolled | |
| Answer 2 - What are the relevant factors we need to consider when approaching the problem of controlling guns, for lafollette? What are the two policy solutions he suggests, and why does he suggest them? | |
| Now I will talk about Hugh lafollette and his view on gun control. Lafollette does not start with one big yes/no question like: “Should we control guns or not?” Instead, he says that in applied ethics we should also ask many smaller, more concrete questio | |
| The first question is: is owning a gun a fundamental right or a derivative right? A fundamental right is something we have just because we are persons – for example, many people think the right to life or the right to basic freedom are fundamental. A deri | |
| So the right to own a gun is not about the gun itself. | |
| It is about protecting the deeper interest: the interest in self-defence. | |
| Because of that: Tom does not need a gun to survive as a human being.He does need safety — that is a basic interest. | |
| Owning a gun is just one possible way to support that interest. | |
| This makes it a derivative right. | |
| The second question is: how important are guns, and for how many people? In some societies, guns are very common, and they are part of the culture, national identity, or ideas of safety. Many families have them, and people feel strongly about them. In oth | |
| The third question is: how possible is it to restrict gun ownership? Even if strong gun control sounds good in theory, it might be very hard to do in practice. If guns are already everywhere and there is a strong gun culture, then a strict ban might be al | |
| The fourth question is: how harmful are guns? Lafollette points out that guns are “inherently” harmful in the sense that they are designed to hurt or kill. But we must also look at how harmful they are in reality, in actual numbers. Do guns cause more dea | |
| When we put these four factors together, lafollette says we cannot simply shout “ban all guns now!” And be done. Gun ownership, for him, is a derivative right, not a fundamental one, but it is still important to many people, and total bans might not work | |
| Because of this, lafollette suggests two main policy ideas. The first idea is to increase the legal responsibility and penalties for gun owners when their guns harm other people. If your gun is used to injure or kill someone, and this happens because you | |
| The second idea is to require gun owners to buy insurance to cover the possible harms caused by their guns. This is similar to car insurance. If owning a gun adds risk to society, that risk has a financial cost. Insurance means that gun owners, not innoce | |
| Lafollette likes these two solutions because they match his four factors. They do not completely ban guns, so they still respect the fact that some people value them and that the right is derivative, not zero. At the same time, they directly focus on the | |
| Answer 3: Why does Judith Jarvis Thomson write that the fetus is a person from conception? Does she really believe it? What is the point of her analogy of the unconscious violinist? | |
| Today I want to talk about Judith Jarvis Thomson’s argument on abortion, and especially explain why she begins by saying something surprising: that the fetus is a person from conception. I will also explain whether she actually believes this, and why she | |
| In the abortion debate, people often focus on one main question: “Is the fetus a person from conception?” This debate usually goes in circles, because each side defines “personhood” differently, and there is no agreement about what exactly makes someone a | |
| Thomson sees this problem, and she does not want to get trapped in it. She actually does not believe that the fetus is a person from conception, because she thinks personhood requires more than just having human cells — it requires features like conscious | |
| Now, to make her point clear, she uses the famous analogy of the unconscious violinist. This analogy works because it puts us in a situation where we can imagine what it feels like to have our body used without our consent. The story goes like this: you w | |
| Thomson asks: Are you morally required to stay connected? Most people say no, because even though the violinist has a right to life, he does not have a right to use your body without your permission. It might be kind of you to help him, but it is not some | |
| Thomson uses this intuition to challenge the classic anti-abortion argument. The anti-abortion argument says abortion is wrong because the fetus has a right to life. But Thomson shows that having a right to life does NOT mean having a right to use someone | |
| 1. The right to life | |
| 2. The right to use another person’s body | |
| These are not the same thing. The violinist has a right to life, but he does not have a right to your kidneys. And you are not acting unjustly if you unplug yourself, because you never agreed to support him with your body. | |
| Thomson then applies this reasoning to abortimother’s life is in danger, she argues that abortion is morally allowed because this is a situation of self-defense. If continuing the pregnancy will kill the mother, she has the right to protect her own life, | |
| In cases of rape, the analogy becomes even clearer. The woman did not consent to becoming pregnant, just like you did not consent to being connected to the violinist. Forcing her to continue the pregnancy would be like forcing you to stay attached to the | |
| When the pregnancy is not the result of rape and the mother’s life is not at risk, Thomson’s answer becomes more nuanced. She says abortion might sometimes be morally unkind, but not necessarily unjust. She makes a distinction between injustice and simple | |
| Her main message becomes clearer now: even if the fetus is treated as a person from conception, the right to life does not give it the automatic right to use the mother’s body. This is the heart of her argument. She maintains the assumption “the fetus is | |
| Answer 4 – Hooker’s Rule Utilitarianism and Types of Euthanasia | |
| Now I will turn to euthanasia and Brad Hooker. | |
| Now I am going to talk about Brad Hooker and his view on euthanasia. To understand his position, I first need to explain the moral theory he uses, which is called rule utilitarianism. This theory is a special version of utilitarianism. Classical utilitari | |
| So Hooker changes the focus. Instead of asking, “Is this single action good right now?”, he asks, “What rules should we follow to make society better in the long run?” A rule, according to Hooker, is morally good if everyone following that rule would brin | |
| Six types of euthanasia | |
| Hooker explains that there are six different types of euthanasia. He believes these differences matter a lot, becauseeuthanasia is not one simple idea — there are many forms, and each raises different moral concerns. | |
| The first difference is about the patient’s will: | |
| • Voluntary euthanasia: the patient wants to die and clearly asks for help to end their life. | |
| • Non-voluntary euthanasia: the patient cannot make or express a choice — for example, someone in a coma, a very small baby, or a person with a severe mental disability. | |
| • Involuntary euthanasia: the patient does not want to die, but other people end their life anyway. | |
| The second difference is about the method: | |
| • Active euthanasia: someone takes a direct action to end the patient’s life, such as giving a lethal injection. | |
| • Passive euthanasia: someone allows the patient to die naturally by stopping or not starting treatment, for example turning off a life-support machine or not giving more medicine. | |
| When we combine these two dimensions, we get six types: | |
| 1. Active voluntary | |
| 2. Passive voluntary | |
| 3. Active non-voluntary | |
| 4. Passive non-voluntary | |
| 5. Active involuntary | |
| 6. Passive involuntary | |
| ⭐ 1. Active voluntary euthanasia | |
| • Patient WANTS to die | |
| • Doctor actively causes death (e.g., injection) | |
| Example: Terminal cancer patient asks for a lethal injection. | |
| ⭐ 2. Passive voluntary euthanasia | |
| • Patient WANTS to die | |
| • Doctor stops treatment and lets death happen | |
| Example: Patient asks to turn off the life-support machine. | |
| ⭐ 3. Active non-voluntary euthanasia | |
| • Patient cannot choose (coma, baby, severe disability) | |
| • Doctor actively causes death | |
| Example: Giving a lethal injection to someone in irreversible coma who left no living will. | |
| ⭐ 4. Passive non-voluntary euthanasia | |
| • Patient cannot choose | |
| • Doctor lets death happen by stopping treatment | |
| Example: Not restarting a life-support machine for a baby with severe brain damage. | |
| ⭐ 5. Active involuntary euthanasia | |
| • Patient does NOT want euthanasia | |
| • Someone kills them anyway | |
| Example: Patient says “Do NOT kill me,” but a doctor gives a lethal injection. | |
| ❗This is always morally wrong for Hooker. | |
| ⭐ 6. Passive involuntary euthanasia | |
| • Patient does NOT want euthanasia | |
| • Doctor withdraws treatment against their will | |
| Example: Patient wants to continue treatment, but doctor stops it. | |
| ❗Also always morally wrong. | |
| Hooker uses these categories because they help us see that not all cases of euthanasia are morally the same. Some give strong respect to autonomy, while others violate it completely. | |
| Benefits and dangers of euthanasia | |
| Hooker says euthanasia can have real benefits. One benefit is that it can end terrible suffering quickly. This is important, because some medical conditions cause extreme pain that cannot be reduced by medicine. Another benefit is that it can reduce emoti | |
| But Hooker also sees serious dangers. Euthanasia can be abused, because vulnerable people might feel pressure from family or doctors to “not be a burden.” There can also be mistakes, because doctors cannot always be perfectly sure about diagnoses or recov | |
| Why involuntary euthanasia is never acceptable | |
| Hooker is especially worried about involuntary euthanasia — cases where the patient says “I do not want to die,” but others end their life anyway. He says this is morally unacceptable for several reasons. | |
| First, it destroys autonomy, because it ignores the patient’s clear wishes. | |
| Second, it creates fear, because people might worry that doctors will not respect their decisions. | |
| Third, it damages trust, because patients might avoid hospitals if they believe doctors could kill them against their will. | |
| These consequences would make society much worse, not better, so Hooker says no rule should ever allow involuntary euthanasia. It is always morally wrong. | |
| Voluntary euthanasia: possibly acceptable with strict rules | |
| Voluntary euthanasia is different, because the patient has asked for it. Hooker sees strong benefits here: it reduces suffering, respects autonomy, and can save medical resources. But it is also risky, because some patients may feel pressure or may reques | |
| For this reason, Hooker says voluntary euthanasia can be morally acceptable only under very strict rules, such as: | |
| • Repeated and clear consent | |
| • Proof that the patient is mentally capable | |
| • Psychological evaluation to check for depression | |
| • A second medical opinion | |
| • A waiting period to prevent rushed decisions | |
| These rules are important, because they protect the patient and reduce the chance of mistakes or abuse. | |
| Non-voluntary euthanasia: much more difficult | |
| Non-voluntary euthanasia is when the patient cannot speak or choose. Hooker says this is the most difficult case, becausewe do not know what the patient would want. It could be morally acceptable in some rare situations, but only with great caution. | |
| Hooker suggests the idea of a living will as a helpful tool. A living will is a document a person writes when they are healthy, explaining what they want if they later cannot decide. This helps a lot, because it turns a non-voluntary decision into a “volu | |
| Without a living will, non-voluntary euthanasia is very hard to justify, because the risk of choosing wrongly is extremely high. | |
| Answer 5 – Singer on Equality and Speciesism in “All Animals Are Equal” | |
| Now I want to explain Peter Singer’s idea of equality in his essay “All Animals Are Equal.” Singer thinks that many people understand equality in the wrong way, and this mistake affects not only how we treat humans but also how we treat animals. To show t | |
| This “de facto” view says that all people are equal because they share some factual ability. For example, some people say humans are equal because we are all intelligent, or rational, or able to speak language, or able to make moral decisions. But Singer | |
| Singer gives another reason why the “de facto” idea is dangerous. Imagine scientists discover that one group or one race of humans is, on average, more intelligent than others. If we base equality on intelligence, then we would have to say that this group | |
| So Singer rejects the “de facto” view entirely. Instead, he says equality is not a fact — it is a moral principle. Equality is something we choose to believe in, not because everyone is the same, but because it is the right way to treat others. He says eq | |
| Now Singer asks: what gives a being “interests”? | |
| He says the basic requirement is the capacity to suffer or to feel pleasure. If a being can feel pain, then it has an interest in not suffering. If it can feel pleasure, then it has an interest in experiencing good things. Animals can clearly suffer — the | |
| This has big consequences. For example, when we think about eating meat from factory farms, we cannot ignore the intense suffering of animals. If their suffering is huge, and our benefit is small (like the pleasure of cheap meat), then we are not treating | |
| Singer also criticizes many philosophers who try to defend human rights by saying, “Humans are rational, so they have rights, but animals do not.” He says this is inconsistent, because some animals are actually more intelligent or more aware than some hum | |
| His answer is that we are practicing speciesism. | |
| Speciesism is discrimination based only on species — treating beings differently simply because they are not members of our own species. It is similar to racism, where people judge others based only on race. Racism gives more weight to the interests of on | |
| Singer thinks this is morally wrong, because it ignores real suffering. Animals may feel pain as strongly as we do, and sometimes even more strongly. Yet we often act as if their pain does not matter at all. For Singer, this is not rational or fair. | |
| It is important to say that Singer is not arguing that animals should have the same rights as humans. A pig does not need the right to vote or the right to education. Rights should match the kind of being and what that being needs. What animals do need is | |
| He believes that we should not use animals in ways that cause huge suffering for very small human benefits, such as cheap meat, painful scientific experiments for cosmetics, or entertainment like circuses. These practices ignore animal interests, because | |
| Answer 6 – Singer on Climate Change: Three Principles and Individual Responsibility | |
| Now I want to explain Peter Singer’s ideas about climate change. Singer says that climate change is a very special moral problem, and it is harder for us to feel responsible for it than for many other issues. If we see a child drowning right in front of u | |
| Singer offers three principles to guide fair distribution of responsibilities. | |
| 1. Historical responsibility | |
| Singer’s first principle is historical responsibility. | |
| This says that countries that emitted more greenhouse gases in the past should pay more today. Rich, industrialized countries — such as the United States, the UK, Germany, and others — began using fossil fuels much earlier and in much larger amounts. They | |
| This is sometimes called the “polluter pays” principle — | |
| because the people who cause more damage should help repair it. | |
| 2. Equal shares | |
| The second principle is equal shares. | |
| Singer says that every person on Earth should have an equal right to use the atmosphere’s limited ability to absorb CO₂. This means the atmosphere should not belong only to rich countries. If we divided emission permits equally per person, rich countries | |
| So equal shares means: | |
| • Every human gets the same “emission space,” | |
| • And countries with high emissions per person must reduce more or pay others. | |
| This principle focuses on fairness between individuals, not between states. | |
| 3. Luxury vs. Subsistence emissions | |
| The third principle is the difference between luxury emissions and subsistence emissions. | |
| Subsistence emissions are emissions from basic needs — for example: | |
| • Cooking food, | |
| • Heating your house, | |
| • Travelling to work in a poor country. | |
| Luxury emissions are emissions from comfort and pleasure — for example: | |
| • Flying often for vacations, | |
| • Driving large suvs, | |
| • Owning a very high-consumption lifestyle. | |
| Singer says it is more fair to ask people to reduce luxury emissions rather than subsistence emissions, | |
| because basic human needs should come first. | |
| Poor countries should not have their essential needs restricted so that rich countries can continue luxury habits. | |
| Combining the three principles | |
| Singer explains that these three principles can work together. For example: | |
| • A rich country with high historical emissions, | |
| • High current luxury emissions, | |
| • And high ability to pay, | |
| should do the most to cut emissions and pay climate costs. | |
| Meanwhile, a poor country with very low historical emissions and mostly subsistence emissions should be allowed more room to grow and meet basic needs. | |
| What about individual responsibility? | |
| After explaining state responsibilities, Singer turns to the question: | |
| What should individuals do? | |
| Many people say, “Climate change is the government’s problem, not mine.” | |
| But Singer disagrees. He gives at least two strong moral reasons why individuals also have duties. | |
| 1. Consequentialist reason: my actions still add harm | |
| Singer says that every extra bit of CO₂ adds to the total problem, even if the amount is small. If I choose to drive when I could walk, or fly when I could take a train, or eat a very high-emission diet when I could choose a lower-emission option, I am ad | |
| He compares this to seeing a piece of broken glass on a playground. | |
| Even if the chance of a child stepping on it is small, I should still pick it up — | |
| because it is easy for me and it reduces risk for others. | |
| So, if it is not too hard for me to reduce my emissions, I should do it. | |
| 2. Deontological reason: not wanting to be complicit | |
| Singer also gives a second reason based on justice. | |
| Even if my individual emissions are small, I am still taking part in a harmful system that hurts real people, especially: | |
| • People in poor countries, | |
| • Future generations, | |
| • And those most vulnerable to climate disasters. | |
| Singer says that if I care about justice, I should avoid being a part of an unjust system when I have better choices. In simple words: | |
| I should not want “dirty hands” from contributing to serious harm. | |
| Extra benefits of reducing our own emissions | |
| Singer also mentions that reducing personal emissions has good side effects: | |
| • It can influence friends and family. | |
| • It can change social norms over time. | |
| • It can pressure politicians, because when many individuals change, the political cost of climate action becomes smaller. | |
| • And it can give us a sense of moral integrity — our actions match our values. | |
| So individual change is meaningful, even in a huge global problem. | |
| Singer’s main message | |
| Singer concludes that climate change is a moral issue at both the state level and the personal level. | |
| Governments must follow fair principles, | |
| but individuals are not innocent if they continue high emissions for luxury reasons. | |
| He wants us to ask not only, “What should states do?” | |
| But also, “What can I do to reduce my harm?” | |
| Even if climate change is a big structural problem, it is made worse every day by many individual choices. | |
| So individuals do have moral responsibility — especially when reducing emissions is not too difficult. | |
| Answer 7 – Singer on Our Duty to Help the Absolute Poor, Narveson and Hardin | |
| Now I will explain Peter Singer’s argument in his text “Rich and Poor.” After that, I will explain the objections made by Narveson and Hardin, and finally how Singer answers both of them. | |
| Singer starts by defining what he means by absolute poverty. Absolute poverty is a condition where people do not have the basic things needed to survive or to live even a minimally decent (slušný) life. This includes food, clean drinking water, basic medi | |
| Singer’s main argument is built around his famous example of the child in the pond (rybník). He asks us to imagine that we are walking past a shallow pond and we see a small child drowning. The water is not deep, so we could easily jump in and save the ch | |
| From this story, Singer builds a general moral principle: If we have the power to stop something very bad from happening, without giving up something equally important, then we ought to do it. In other words, if we can prevent suffering or death by giving | |
| Singer then asks: is failing to help the absolute poor similar to committing murder? He says it is not exactly the same, because murder is a direct action, but not helping is still a very serious moral wrong. It is not harmless. It is not neutral. People | |
| Narveson’s objection: No duty to help | |
| Now I will explain Narveson’s objection. Narveson uses a theory of rights. He believes in negative rights, which means we have a duty not to harm others, but we do not have a duty to help them. Under this view, if I kill someone, I violate their rights. B | |
| Singer answers Narveson with two arguments. | |
| First argument: Singer says that the idea of only negative rights is too simple. Sometimes not helping someone can be almost as bad as harming them. Imagine a child is about to be hit by a car, and I could save the child easily by pulling them out of the | |
| Second argument: Singer says that rich countries are not innocent bystanders when it comes to global poverty. They are often partly responsible for poverty, because of unfair trade systems, colonial history, political interference in poor countries, explo | |
| So Singer thinks Narveson’s view fails both because it ignores real positive duties and because it ignores the role rich countries play in creating poverty. | |
| Hardin’s objection: The lifeboat | |
| Now I will explain Hardin’s objection. Hardin uses the lifeboat analogy. He imagines rich countries as people in a lifeboat with limited space and resources. Poor countries are people swimming in the water, asking for help. If we pull too many people into | |
| Singer’s reply to Hardin | |
| Singer answers Hardin by talking about demographic transition, which is a well-known idea in population studies. It says that when countries become more developed — when children have a higher chance of surviving, when people have education, when women ha | |
| So Singer says Hardin is mistaken. Aid, when used wisely, can reduce poverty and reduce future population pressure. It does not have to sink the lifeboat. Instead, it can make more lifeboats and more stability for everyone. | |
| Singer’s final conclusion | |
| So Singer’s final position is this: | |
| • We have a moral duty to help the absolute poor, not just a nice optional choice. | |
| • Narveson is wrong, because we sometimes clearly have positive duties, and rich societies are partly responsible for global poverty. | |
| • Hardin is wrong, because evidence shows that development reduces birth rates, so helping the poor can actually make population problems better, not worse. | |
| Therefore, for Singer, refusing to help the absolute poor is a serious moral wrong, especially when helping them requires us to give up only luxuries, not anything essential. | |
| Answer 8 – Civil Disobedience Proper and Otherwise, and Their Justification | |
| Now I will explain Peter Singer’s ideas about civil disobedience. Civil disobedience means breaking the law on purpose and in public to protest against something that is wrong or unfair. It is not a secret crime. People who use civil disobedience want soc | |
| Singer begins by saying that law is normally very important. Laws help us live together peacefully. They stop violence and give us a way to solve disagreements. However, sometimes a law protects something that is actually unjust. In such cases, following | |
| To understand when civil disobedience can be justified, Singer divides it into two types: civil disobedience proper and civil disobedience otherwise. | |
| Civil Disobedience Proper | |
| Civil disobedience proper happens within a democratic society and tries to make democracy better. Protesters are not trying to destroy the system. They respect democracy, but they think the government or the public has stopped paying attention to an impor | |
| A famous example is the civil rights movement in the United States. Black Americans sat at “whites-only” lunch counters. This was illegal at the time, but they were peaceful and respectful. Their goal was to show that segregation was unfair. A modern exam | |
| Singer thinks civil disobedience proper is easier to justify because it supports democracy. It brings attention to problems, encourages conversation, and asks people to think again about moral issues. It is non-violent, open, and temporary. It does not tr | |
| Civil Disobedience Otherwise | |
| Civil disobedience otherwise is much harder to justify. This type happens when people break the law to fight against a decision made fairly by the majority in a democratic system. In this situation, the protesters are not only asking for discussion. They | |
| They may truly believe the majority is wrong. The law may be harmful or unfair. But their actions go against the rules of democracy, where every citizen has one vote and the majority decides. Because of this, civil disobedience otherwise can look like dis | |
| Singer says that this type is not always wrong, but the conditions for justifying it are very strict. It can only be justified in rare and extreme cases, for example: | |
| • When the majority violates the basic rights of a minority | |
| • When the democratic process is corrupt or not working properly | |
| • When the system is so unfair that normal democratic actions no longer help | |
| In these situations, breaking the law may still be morally necessary. But Singer warns that if everyone used civil disobedience whenever they disagreed with a law, democracy would collapse. We would lose the peaceful way we make collective decisions. So t | |
| An example of civil disobedience otherwise is a group that loses a free and fair referendum. Instead of accepting the result, they destroy voting machines or threaten election workers. This is not trying to fix democracy; it is trying to override it. It i | |
| Singer on Violence | |
| Singer also talks about political violence. He says violence is almost impossible to justify. Violence harms innocent people, creates fear, and often grows out of control. It is unpredictable, and the results are usually very bad. For these reasons, Singe | |
| Conclusion | |
| To conclude, Singer thinks that civil disobedience proper is usually easier to justify because it respects democracy and tries to make it better. It is open, peaceful, and aims to correct injustice. | |
| Civil disobedience otherwise is much harder to justify because it goes against a clear democratic decision. It may still be right in very rare cases, especially when basic rights are violated or when the democratic system is not working fairly. But the co | |
| Singer’s main message is that breaking the law can sometimes be moral — but only when it is done openly, non-violently, respectfully, and with the goal of correcting injustice, not destroying democracy. | |
| Answer 9 – Just War Theory, Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, and Steven Lee on Iraq | |
| Now I will explain just war theory in very simple English, and then I will explain how Steven Lee uses it to judge the Second Iraq War of 2003. | |
| Just war theory is a moral idea about war. It asks two big questions. First: When is it right to start a war? Second: How must we behave during war if we want to stay moral? This theory tries to sit in the middle. It is not like pacifism, which says war i | |
| We divide these rules into two parts: jus ad bellum, which is about starting a war, and jus in bello, which is about how to fight once the war has begun. | |
| Jus ad Bellum (When is it right to start a war?) | |
| Jus ad bellum gives conditions we must check before we go to war. | |
| First, there must be a legitimate authority. This means that only a real government can start a war. A private group cannot do it, because that would create chaos. | |
| Second, there must be a just cause. This means there must be a very serious reason, like defending your country from an attack or protecting innocent people from mass killing. This rule exists because war brings huge harm, so the reason must be extremely | |
| Third, there must be right intention. Even if you say you have a just cause, your real goal must match that cause. You cannot pretend you are protecting people while really trying to gain land, oil, or power. This rule exists because war must be done for | |
| Fourth, war must be a last resort. This means you must try peaceful options first — such as talking, negotiation, sanctions, or inspections. We need this rule because war brings death, and we should only choose war if nothing else works. | |
| Fifth, there must be a reasonable chance of success. If you know the war will fail, then starting it only creates pointless suffering. So this rule protects people from being harmed for no reason. | |
| Finally, there must be proportionality. The good results of the war must be bigger than the expected harm. If a war will cause huge destruction and only bring small benefits, then it is not moral. | |
| Jus in Bello (How must we behave in war?) | |
| Jus in bello focuses on behavior during the war. | |
| One key rule is discrimination. Soldiers must do everything they can to avoid hurting civilians. Civilians are not part of the fighting. They did not choose to be in the war. This rule exists because harming innocent people is always wrong. | |
| Another rule is proportional use of force. Even when fighting, the amount of violence used must be limited. You cannot destroy a whole village just to kill one enemy soldier. This rule exists because some harm may be necessary in war, but too much harm is | |
| There is also a rule of humane treatment. This means we must treat wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians with basic respect. They must not be tortured or abused. This rule exists because, even in war, we must remember that people remain human | |
| Steven Lee Uses These Rules to Judge the Iraq War | |
| Now I will explain how Steven Lee uses just war theory to look at the Iraq War of 2003. Lee says the Iraq War did not meet several of the main jus ad bellum rules, and because of that, it was not a just war. | |
| First, he questions the just cause. The U.S. government said Iraq had dangerous weapons. But this was not a real and immediate danger. There was no clear attack happening. It was a “preventive” war — a war against something that mighthappen in the future. | |
| Second, he says the war failed the proportionality test. The possible benefits were uncertain, because there was no strong proof that Iraq had dangerous weapons. But the possible harms were huge: many civilian deaths, destruction of cities, political chao | |
| Third, Lee says the war did not meet the last resort rule. Peaceful methods were still working. United Nations inspectors were still doing their jobs. Diplomatic pressure was still possible. This means war was not the last choice. It came too early. | |
| Because these important rules were not respected — just cause, proportionality, and last resort — Lee believes the Iraq War was not morally justified, even if it was legal. | |
| Lee also rejects arguments from people who defended the war. Some said that “rogue states” require new rules. Lee says this is dangerous because it weakens just war theory. Others said the war was humanitarian. Lee says this was not the real intention. Ot | |
| Conclusion | |
| So, in the end, just war theory gives us moral rules for when we may go to war and how we must fight. And when Steven Lee applies these rules to the 2003 Iraq War, he concludes that the war did not meet the required conditions. Because of this, he says th | |
| Answer 10 – Singer: Why Should We Act Morally? Comparison with Socrates | |
| Now I will talk about Peter Singer’s idea of why we should act morally, and then I will compare his view with the view of Socrates. | |
| Singer begins with a simple but important question: even if I know what is right, why should I care enough to do it? | |
| Many moral theories tell us what is right and wrong, but they do not always explain why a normal person should feel motivated to behave morally. | |
| Singer looks at different answers from the history of philosophy. | |
| Some philosophers, like Kant, say we should act morally simply because it is our duty, and because reason tells us to do so. | |
| Religious views say we should be moral because God commands it. | |
| Classical philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle say we should be moral because being virtuous makes us truly happy, and being immoral makes us unhappy. | |
| Singer does not fully accept any of these traditional answers. He does not believe we need a mysterious “Form of the Good” like Plato did. He does not think we should follow morality only for the sake of duty, like Kant says. And he does not base morality | |
| Singer says that morality probably began as a kind of social tool. Humans needed to cooperate to survive, so moral rules helped us work together, trust each other, and avoid chaos. But he says this is only the beginning of the story. | |
| Singer wants to explain why today, a modern person should still care about morality. | |
| He says that human beings need meaning, purpose, and connection in their lives. We are not satisfied if we only chase comfort, pleasure, or private goals. If we live only for ourselves, we may get nice moments, but our life may feel empty or shallow. Sing | |
| Singer thinks that acting morally helps us live a more meaningful and fulfilling life. | |
| When we act morally, we stop asking only “What do I want right now?” And we also ask, “What is best from a point of view that considers everyone’s interests?” | |
| This makes our life bigger than our own small problems. We become part of something larger — helping reduce suffering, fighting injustice, aiding the poor, protecting animals, protecting the environment, and somehow making the world better. | |
| Because of this, Singer believes that moral action often gives us a deep sense of meaning, satisfaction, and self-respect. Maybe not in every single moment, because sometimes doing the right thing is hard, but over the course of a whole life, it makes our | |
| Singer does not agree with the idea that we should act morally even if it brings us only misery. He thinks this would make no sense. Instead, he believes that living ethically is, in general, also good for us. It helps us feel connected, purposeful, and p | |
| Now I will compare Singer’s view with Socrates. | |
| Singer agrees with Socrates in one important way: both say that a good life and a moral life are connected. Socrates believed that a person who is unjust may have pleasure or power, but deep down their soul is in conflict, and therefore they cannot be tru | |
| Singer is similar, because he also believes that being moral gives life meaning, and meaning is part of being happy. A selfish life is usually not a deeply happy life. | |
| But Singer is also different from Socrates in three important ways. | |
| First, the connection between morality and happiness is weaker for Singer. Socrates says the only truly happy life is a moral life. Singer does not say this. He says ethical life is one important way to find meaning, but maybe not the only way for every h | |
| Second, Socrates and Plato base their ideas on something metaphysical, like the state of the soul and the Form of the Good. Singer does not talk about souls or metaphysical truths. He talks about psychological well-being, purpose, and connection in the ev | |
| Third, Kant grounded moral motivation in the belief in God and immortality, because he thought virtue and happiness must match in the afterlife. Singer does not use God or the afterlife as motivation. He thinks morality is rewarding here and now, because | |
| So Singer’s answer to the question “Why should we act morally?” Is this: | |
| We should act morally because it gives meaning to our lives and helps us live as beings who can care about more than just themselves. It helps us feel connected, purposeful, and proud of the kind of person we are. This idea is similar to Socrates’ idea th | |