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Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299
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Williams v Milotin [1957] HCA 83; 97 CLR 465
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Torts Cases
| Case | Principle |
|---|---|
| Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 | Affirms the ‘highway rule’ — that in an action in trespass to the person having occurred on the highway, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove either intention or negligence. |
| Williams v Milotin [1957] HCA 83; 97 CLR 465 | Affirms negligent trespass in Australian law. Negligent trespass carries the same burden of proof as trespass/intentional tort — ie the plaintiff must prove the facts/directness of the act, and the defendant must prove lack of fault. |
| Smith v Stone (1647) 82 ER 533 | Trespass must be by voluntary action. |
| Hutchins v Maughan [1947] VLR 131; [1947] ALR 201 | The relationship between the injury suffered and the act must be sufficiently direct. |
| Scott v Shepherd (The Squib Case) [1773] 96 Eng. Rep. 525 | Intermediate actions may not negate the immediacy of an act if those actions are taken in the 'agony of the moment'. |
| McNamara v Duncan (1979) 45 FLR 152 | In a sporting context, actions outside the rules of the game are not subject to implied consent. |
| Morris v Marsden (1952) 1 ALL ER 925 | Motive is unimportant in satisfying an action in trespass. |
| Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 | An unintentional action can become intentional. |
| Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295 | In determining damages for defamation, social media's amplification of the 'grapevine effect' may be taken into consideration. |
| Hopper v Reeve (1817) 7 Taunt. 698 | Pulling a chair out from beneath a person is sufficiently direct to constitute battery. |
| Ljubic v Armellin [2009] ACTSC 21 | Consent is assessed objectively. |
| Rixon v Star City [2001] NSWCA 265 | Contact falling within everyday acceptable standards does not constitute battery. |
| Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] UKHL 14 | A proprietary interest is required in order to sue in private nuisance. |
| Myer Stores & Ors v Soo (1991) 2 VR 597 | Liability for false imprisonment may arise from having provided the location of or maintaining an interest in the imprisonment. |
| Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447 | False imprisonment may be by means of psychological coercion. The place of restraint need not be fixed. |
| Hart v Heron [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80–201 (NSWSC) | False imprisonment does not require knowledge of restraint in the plaintiff at the time. |
| Ruddock v Taylor [2003] NSWCA 262 | Motive is not an element of false imprisonment. |
| Flewster v Royale (1808) 1 Camp 187 | Third parties may be liable for false imprisonment where there is no intermediate discretionary act negating directness. |
| March v E & MH Stramare Pyt Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 | The but-for test cannot be an exclusive test for causation, and must be supplemented by a 'common sense' approach to the facts of the case. |
| Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614 | A duty of care can be owed to a trespasser to land where the risk to the trespasser is reasonably foreseeable. |
| Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231 | In an action of trespass, the plaintiff must prove a trespassory act attributable to the defendant. |
| McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199 | In trespass, the onus is on the defendant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the trespassory act occurred without the defendant's fault. |
| Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742 | For false imprisonment to be proved, restraint must have been total. |
| Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (1906) 4 CLR 379 | A person's liberty may be temporarily surrendered under contractual arrangement. |
| Dickinson v Waters Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 593 | False imprisonment must follow directly upon the defendant's act. |
| Sayers v Harlow UDC [1958] 1 WLR 623 | Where it follows indirectly from the defendant's act, an imprisonment must cause actual damage in order to support an action for negligence or on the case for intentional, indirect infliction of damage. |
| Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441 | In assault, the requirement of immediacy attaches to the apprehension of contact, not to fear of contact. |
| Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 | Threats of future harm may constitute assault where the plaintiff is at the mercy of the defendant. |
| Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWLR 451 | Threats made over the phone may constitute assault depending on surrounding circumstances. |
| R v Ireland [1997] QB 114 | Silence may be sufficiently threatening to constitute assault. |
| Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police v Hepburn [2002] EWCA Civ 1841 | It may constitute assault where a person is obstructed in such a way as to suggest use of force if they continue. |
| New South Wales v Ibbett [2006] HCA 57 | Employers may be vicariously liable for exemplary and aggravated damages. |
| Austin v Dowling (1870) LR 5 CP 534 | An intermediate discretionary act between the defendant and a third party restraining the plaintiff will break the directness required for vicarious liability in false imprisonment. |
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Torts