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Nat Exam #1
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Hale - Main claim | Ethnicity works like social radar: identity categories help people reduce uncertainty and understand social opportunities, constraints, allies, and threats. |
| Hale - Mechanism | Uncertainty and complexity → categorization → expectations about others → group-oriented behavior. |
| Hale - Evidence | Minimal-group research shows even arbitrary categories can generate ingroup behavior without deep cultural history. |
| Hale - Contrast | Neither primordialism nor constructivism is sufficient alone; ethnicity can be both durable and situational. |
| Wimmer - Main claim | Do not treat ethnic groups as self-evident cultural units; study how boundaries between groups are created and maintained. |
| Wimmer - Mechanism | Institutions, power, and social networks shape ethnic boundary making. |
| Wimmer - Evidence | Barth shows ethnic boundaries can persist even when cultural differences are small or changing. |
| Wimmer - Contrast | Herderian thinking starts with coherent peoples and cultures; the Barthian approach starts with boundaries. |
| Wimmer - Herderian view | A people is a coherent community with shared culture, language, solidarity, identity, and historical destiny. |
| Wimmer - Barthian view | Ethnicity is defined by the marking and maintenance of boundaries, not by perfectly distinct cultural content. |
| Bartlett - Main claim | Medieval ethnicity was substantially cultural and socially marked rather than determined simply by biological descent. |
| Bartlett - Mechanism | Language, customs, law, dress, and other markers help create recognizable group distinctions. |
| Bartlett - Evidence | Multilingual frontiers and assimilation show that linguistic and ethnic boundaries do not perfectly coincide. |
| Bartlett - Contrast | Language can define an ethnic cleavage, but one language does not automatically equal one ethnic group. |
| Leach - Main claim | Shan and Kachin are not neat natural ethnic categories; language, religion, culture, territory, and politics overlap. |
| Leach - Mechanism | Social and political circumstances can change identification, and people may adopt the culture and status of another category. |
| Leach - Evidence | A Kachin can effectively become Shan, with adoption of Buddhism being an important part of the transition. |
| Leach - Contrast | Rejects the assumption that race, language, culture, and political identity necessarily identify the same group. |
| Posner - Main claim | A cultural cleavage becomes politically salient when the groups it defines are useful for political coalition building. |
| Posner - Mechanism | Relative group size → coalition usefulness → elite mobilization → political salience. |
| Posner - Evidence | Chewa and Tumbuka are politically divided in Malawi but generally allied within broader categories in Zambia. |
| Posner - Malawi | Chewa and Tumbuka are large enough separately to form useful national political coalitions, making their cleavage salient. |
| Posner - Zambia | Chewa and Tumbuka are too small separately to be useful national coalitions, so their differences are less politically salient. |
| Posner - Contrast | Culture alone cannot explain the difference because essentially the same cultural cleavage exists on both sides of the border. |
| Robinson - Main claim | More ethnically visible individuals are more likely to support an ethnic party because they have more at stake in ethnic politics. |
| Robinson - Mechanism | Visibility → easier ethnic targeting → greater expected benefits or costs → stronger incentive to support the ethnic party. |
| Robinson - Evidence | Among Malawi's Lhomwe, greater ethnic visibility strongly predicts support for the DPP. |
| Robinson - Visibility measure | Names, language ability, ethnic typicality, and frequency of being ethnically misidentified. |
| Robinson - Contrast | The effect is not simply stronger ethnic attachment; visibility changes how easily other people can treat someone ethnically. |
| Wamble - Main claim | Black Democratic Party loyalty is maintained partly through an in-group social norm, not simply ideology or policy preferences. |
| Wamble - Mechanism | In-group interaction → Democratic norm becomes salient → expected social rewards or sanctions → conformity. |
| Wamble - Evidence | Black respondents were more likely to identify as Democrats when interviewed by a Black interviewer. |
| Wamble - Strongest evidence | The interviewer effect was especially important among Black conservatives facing ideological cross-pressure. |
| Wamble - Contrast | The argument goes beyond explanations based mainly on ideology or linked fate. |
| Brass - Main claim | Communal riots are produced through political and social processes rather than automatically erupting from ancient communal hatred. |
| Brass - Mechanism | Triggering incident → communal interpretation → mobilization → attack → counterattack → escalation. |
| Brass - Evidence | Kala Bachcha's 1994 murder in Kanpur did not produce violence comparable to 1992 because the escalation chain was interrupted. |
| Brass - Why 1994 did not escalate | Limited retaliation, quick state intervention, constrained funeral mobilization, weak martyr appeal, and memories of earlier riot costs. |
| Brass - Institutionalized riot system | Recurring networks of politicians, activists, criminals, police, officials, media, and crowds that can produce or prevent communal violence. |
| Brass - Contrast | Rejects the idea that communal tension automatically or spontaneously produces riots. |
| CWM - Main claim | Ethnic rebellion is best explained by groups' relationship to state power rather than simply by ethnic diversity. |
| CWM - Mechanism | Political exclusion or recent loss of power → grievance and mobilization → higher rebellion risk. |
| CWM - Group size | Larger groups have greater mobilizational capacity and are therefore more capable of rebellion. |
| CWM - Prior conflict | Past conflict creates revenge narratives, organizations, experience, and accepted repertoires that make renewed violence easier. |
| CWM - Evidence | EPR data show excluded ethnic groups rebel more often than groups represented in central power. |
| CWM - Contrast | Country-level ethnic fractionalization is a poor substitute for measuring who actually has access to state power. |
| Lewis - Main claim | Ethnicity may explain whether rebellions survive and expand better than whether they initially form. |
| Lewis - Mechanism | Small clandestine group forms → ethnicity or local homogeneity can aid recruitment and survival → viable rebellion enters standard datasets. |
| Lewis - Evidence | In Uganda, more than half of the rebel groups that formed after 1986 are missing from standard datasets because they failed early. |
| Lewis - Ethnic homogeneity finding | Rebel groups forming in more ethnically homogeneous areas were more likely to become viable challengers. |
| Lewis - Selection bias | Datasets containing mostly surviving rebellions can make ethnicity appear to cause rebellion onset when it may mainly aid survival. |
| Lewis - Contrast with CWM | Lewis argues that CWM may partly confuse the causes of rebellion initiation with the causes of rebel viability. |
| Straus 2001 - Main claim | Researchers must define genocide clearly before explaining its causes because different definitions create different case sets. |
| Straus 2001 - Mechanism | Definition → case selection → comparison → causal inference. |
| Straus 2001 - Definitional disputes | Definitions vary over intent, methods of destruction, perpetrators, and which groups can be targets. |
| Straus 2001 - Why the concept is contested | Genocide carries empirical, moral, legal, and political meanings at the same time. |
| Straus 2001 - Contrast | The lesson is not that genocide cannot be defined; it is that causal research requires conceptual precision. |
| Straus 2012 - Main claim | To explain mass violence, study cases where escalation was plausible but did not occur, not only cases where it did. |
| Straus 2012 - Mechanism | Escalation pressures compete with forces of restraint and the balance shapes the trajectory of violence. |
| Straus 2012 - Evidence | Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire both faced dangerous conditions, but stronger restraint helped Côte d'Ivoire avoid genocide. |
| Straus 2012 - Micro restraint | Individual moral objections, cooperation, relationships, or self-interest that discourage participation in violence. |
| Straus 2012 - Meso restraint | Intergroup institutions, repeated interaction, commerce, networks, and norms that sustain cooperation. |
| Straus 2012 - Macro restraint | Political, economic, ideological, or international incentives that make mass violence costly or unattractive. |
| Straus 2012 - Contrast | Risk factors alone cannot explain genocide because many societies with those factors do not escalate to mass killing. |
| Kalyvas - Main claim | Do not infer the motives behind civil-war violence directly from the war's master cleavage. |
| Kalyvas - Mechanism | Local rivalry + supralocal armed actor → alliance → joint production of violence. |
| Kalyvas - Master cleavage | The overarching political, ethnic, religious, ideological, or class division used to describe the war. |
| Kalyvas - Local cleavage | A local feud, land dispute, family rivalry, political struggle, or personal grudge that may only loosely relate to the larger war. |
| Kalyvas - Center-periphery disjunction | National leaders and local actors may participate in the same war while pursuing very different goals. |
| Kalyvas - Alliance exchange | Central actors provide coercive muscle; local actors provide information, recruits, resources, support, and local control. |
| Kalyvas - Civilian agency | Civilians can manipulate armies or rebels to attack local enemies rather than merely being passive victims or elite puppets. |
| Kalyvas - Contrast | Rejects both purely political group-enmity explanations and purely random anarchic private-violence explanations. |
| Kalyvas - Evidence pattern | Across many wars, apparently political or ethnic violence also reflects feuds, revenge, land disputes, jealousy, and local competition. |
| Primordialism | Emphasizes the durability and emotional force of ethnic attachments rooted in history, culture, kinship, language, or religion. |
| Constructivism | Ethnic identities and boundaries are produced and reshaped by institutions, politics, history, and social interaction. |
| Political salience | The extent to which an ethnic distinction actually shapes political behavior, alliances, voting, or conflict. |
| Ethnic visibility | How easily others can infer a person's ethnicity from markers such as name, language, accent, dress, or appearance. |
| Linked fate | The belief that what happens to one's group affects one's own life or prospects. |
| Selection bias | Observed cases are systematically unrepresentative of the full population of cases. |
| Negative case | A case where the outcome did not occur even though it was genuinely plausible. |
| Restraint | Forces that encourage moderation, non-escalation, or de-escalation of violence. |
| Master cleavage vs local cleavage | Master cleavage describes the large war; local cleavage describes smaller conflicts that may operate beneath it. |
| Joint production of violence | Violence generated through cooperation between local and supralocal actors who may pursue different goals. |
| Which author is associated with social radar? | Hale. |
| Which author is associated with boundary making? | Wimmer. |
| Which author argues language can mark ethnicity without perfectly defining it? | Bartlett. |
| Which author uses Shan and Kachin to show ethnic categories are fluid and overlapping? | Leach. |
| Which author links relative group size to political salience? | Posner. |
| Which author argues ethnic visibility increases ethnic-party support? | Robinson. |
| Which reading treats party loyalty as an in-group social norm? | Wamble and colleagues. |
| Which author argues riots must be socially and politically produced? | Brass. |
| Which authors link political exclusion from state power to ethnic rebellion? | Cederman, Wimmer, and Min. |
| Which author distinguishes rebellion formation from rebel viability? | Lewis. |
| Which Straus reading focuses on defining genocide before explaining it? | Straus 2001. |
| Which Straus reading focuses on restraint and negative cases? | Straus 2012. |
| Which author argues civil-war violence is jointly produced by local and supralocal actors? | Kalyvas. |
| CWM vs Lewis | CWM links exclusion to rebellion; Lewis warns surviving rebellions may hide different causes of initial formation. |
| Brass vs Kalyvas | Both reject automatic group-hatred explanations; Brass emphasizes riot escalation while Kalyvas emphasizes local-supralocal alliances. |
| Straus 2001 vs Straus 2012 | 2001 asks how genocide should be defined; 2012 asks why some high-risk situations do not escalate to mass violence. |
| Posner vs Robinson | Posner explains which group cleavages become politically useful; Robinson explains which individuals have more at stake once ethnicity is visible. |
| Wimmer vs Posner | Wimmer explains how boundaries are constructed; Posner explains when an existing cultural boundary becomes politically salient. |
| Robinson vs Wamble | Robinson emphasizes external ethnic targeting; Wamble emphasizes internal group norms and social sanctions. |
| Kalyvas vs simple ethnic-war explanation | An ethnic master cleavage does not prove that each act of violence was motivated by ethnicity. |
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