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comparitivepolitics1
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Populism | every country has a group of people claiming to represent 'thepeople' ... ultimately leads to polarization. |
| comparative politics | comparing domestic policies, elections, party systems, exec/legislature relations etc. |
| which categories fall in both comparative politics and ir | revolution, economic policy, eco policy |
| political ideology | set of ideals, values, and beliefs used in politicized interest to change public policy |
| characteristics of conservatism | trad society; agriculture, religion, hierarchy. freedom comes from accepting role in hierarchy... medieval England |
| characteristics of liberalism | modernity, came after enlightenment/protestant revolution, Individualism, rationality and freedom. institutions made by individuals 4 self interest. free exchange+competition; John local |
| characteristics of socialism | critique of liberalism; believes that private property is bad because it is a limited resource/ fundamentally unjust/ chief institute of oppression. wage labor privveladges, property rights of capital owners. equality+wealth redistribution |
| features of burkes conservatism, | 1. man is religious, 2. existing institutions r good/wise 3. man is reason and emotion. 4. community>individual, 5.fixing issues/adressing them only makes them worse. |
| huntington veiws on conservatism | not aristocratic ideology defined by reaction to liberalism but rather defineed by the system it confronts. based on defending institutions |
| what did conservatives and socialists have in common during the 19th century | believed that welfare net would deradicalize workers and that the welfare state is designed to preserve capitalism. |
| nobless oblige | much is given means much shall be required. similar to feudalism. socialist criticism of redistribution instead of change. |
| characteristics of modern ideology | reduced global inquality mixed with higher internal inequalities led to a liberal economic order and intl trade as a necessary evil, (thatcher Reagan etc) shifty away from postwar welfare Keynesians. more social divide+identity politics + reactionaries |
| free market conservative | conservatives don't want to preserve current system; they want to go back |
| tautology | has to be true by definition |
| science | all knowledge is temporary, science is a method, not a collection of facts. have to be bounded and specific. |
| contractarian views of the state, | the state emerges to help individuals in cases where decentralized cooperation is likely to be difficult. VOLUNTARY AND CONSENSUAL. social contract/state has a duty to protect its citizens. |
| predatory view of the state | believes that the state is an unintentional byproduct of individuals seeking power. it is not voluntary by the citizens. institutions created bc they help individuals. |
| state? | a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory via mark weber |
| nation vs state | nation:common identity, can be with in state or across states. eg Kurds are a stateless nation. states:no common identity needed |
| who are the philosophers associated with social contract. | Thomas hobbes, John locke, Rosseau |
| what is the state f nature as assumed by social contract | everyman vs everyman. the weak can overpower the strong with trickery/allyship, need a common power to keep them in order |
| why do states go to war according to the state of nature | when two sides desire the same thing that they cannot both enjoy. there choices depend on what they believe each other will do. in order to prevent this they need a force which they can be in awe of. |
| social contract | give up some natural rights for civil rights; protection form soveirgn means they can't do whatever they want but neither can other people. |
| what two things must be true for social contract to work? | tax cannot be too high, punshiment must be as much to keep people from stealing |
| what is the jeffersonian view of social contract? | right to life liberty and pursuit of happiness, conditional relationship with the state. EG taxation problem bc view that they have a right to things |
| hobbeism view of social contract | ok to reduce civil liberties. to a larger extent for the greater good. eg during pandemic. hobbes lived through the English civil war/the thirty years war---> he has a larger want for protection |
| how does predatory view see the state come to be | institutions naturally come to be, militia bureaucracy tax etc bc it helps state to keep power. no assumption of duty |
| market for protection | some ppl have advantage in violence--->military etc/ org that trades security for revenue. some demand tribute from citizens for protection from itself. can just be a gang that monopolized on the ability to protect |
| economies of scale in protection | cost per unit drops as more of it is produced. if you are protecting more people, it is cheaper per person. |
| when does the state fail>? | when the nominal size of the state exceeds the economy of scale of protection otherwise imposed by conditions. |
| why do they say that the state by nature gives states by definition the opportunity to be predatory | 1) power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolute 2)hard to see the real goals of a state/individual until someone has the resources to do it. |
| how to prevent absolute authority from emerging in a state | 1)war costs money, negotiated conflict=scale of conflict/violence limited. b)repetitive interactions w future cooperation in mind. social norms help yje process. |
| what is meant by a stationary bandit | they continue to rob u but are limited in tax/what they take because they want you to continue being a resource for them. if they take all ur money, u won't be able to work the land and make more eg. |
| narrow corridor | balancing act bt state and individuals where order is maintained and there also is liberty. |
| constrained balance state and society | non state actors, elite or masses constrain the state from predatory excess. state myst be reliant on civilians. |
| quasi voluntary compliance. | citizens get something in return for tax, means the state spends less money, citizens invest and innovate. |
| absent state | govt does not appear in every day life; almost an anarchic system; eg Somalia or India(?) |
| unconstrained | society has little to no power compared to the state; eg Colombia or china |
| constrtained | equal balance bt the society and the state-- Sweden |
| evaluating premises and conclusion | if u can accept the premises u should be able to accept the conclusion for it to be valid. if u accept premises and reject conclusion it is invalid |
| necessary vs sufficient | necessary is required for the outcome but doesn't guarantee it. sufficient gaiurentees outcome on its own but other paths could exist |
| evl | exit voice loyalty. how people in a state respond to negative change from the govt. choice based on expected response, and what each option is worth. |
| exit | accept the change, alter behavior instead.d moving states, switching business etc,. exit is rarely free and is non confrontational. |
| voice | reject change try to get the reversal of the act, protest, lobby organize etc., can be individual or collective. pros can reverse change+adresses it directly cons: costs vary widely by regime, success is not guaranteed. |
| loyalty | accept change don't alter behavior. default option when exit and voice are too costly or unavailable. agreement or resignation. pros is no risk, cons is doesn't fix problems and symbolizes tolerance. |
| what does leverage require for civilians | credible exit threat and that the government is dependent on its citizens. |
| fragile state index | continuum that shows whether a state is failing or not. uses cohesion, economy, politics, society. reports annually. sustainable, stable, warning, alert |
| eg why states fail | high poverty---incnetive fro rebellion/cheap recruitment to militia. high fiscal debt--no revenue--no p[ubliuc service loss of agency and ability of policy0---lack of law order and more human rights violations |
| prisoners dilema. | driving force of the state of nature/tragedy of commons. the best choice for you/rational choice is always to defect. |
| how does hobby say the social contract fixes the pd in domestic policy | bc they are in awe of the power, steal no longer becomes the dominant strategy. |
| how did early democracy work | rulers felt obliged to seek consent of governed. typically had a council/did not govern alone. Greece etc. worked well one small scale societies/hunter gatherings. councils could constrain ruler, IF they dependent on those w EX. |
| two methods for money in early democracy | if they were in propitious conditions---centerakuzes state w ability to predate on society. OR less propietoud----reign in predators nature/ask for consent |
| how does modern democracy work? | reps of the ppl are reg choosen ion competitive. elections under Uni SU. representative democracy. bigger population sizes and complexity. incumbent MUST be open to the idea of loss. |
| differences bt early dem and modern dem | suffrage more universal . distance bt reps and public is larger---centralized political power. |
| why did it shift from early dem to modern dem | grad decline during 13-14 cent that let local constitutions control over reps. 2 set of parliamentary supremacy over the monarch. glorious rev of 1688 |
| why did ed-md happen in us | 1)no bearocract in the us is they couldn't control population. 2)more land than labor, |
| democracy | rulers held accountable un public realm via citizens acting indirectly through the computational loop of their elected reps |
| ensamble | 1)methods of gain office 2) characteristics of actors used to gain access 3) rules followed when making publicly binding decisions. SHOULD BE INSTITUTIONALIZED typically through constitution. |
| public realm | liberal-narrow public realm socialist--extended realm via regulation, subsidization dn collective ownership, basically private sector vs public sector here |
| citizens | able to vote; not suvjects |
| electoralism | the false belief that just holding elections is democracy even if they r bad faith. |
| coperation; | actors must voluntarily make collective desicions via parties associations etc. ENCOURAGE DELIBERATION TO FIND AND ADRESS PUBLIC NEED |
| democratic needs | 1control over policy via elected officials 2elected fairly and frequently 3next to all adults can vote 4run for office 5citizen right to opinion 6right to alt info 7right to independent orgs/parties DAHL |
| schmiter kari democratic needs | elected officials are able to exercise constitutional powers with out overriding. 9polity is self governing and able to act independently. |
| democratic bargain | set of goals that command widespread consensual on rules---contingent consent. a bounded uncertainty |
| indicates but not necesities | 1)consensus 2)univ participation 3)access to view all equally 4)responsiveness of ruler 5)majority rule 6)parliamentary sovereignty 7)party govt not necessary 8)pluralism 9)federalism /levels of local autonomy 10)preridentialism 11)checks and balances. |
| diff types of govt | rule by one w common interest=monarchy 1ri=tyranny fewCI=aristocracy fRI=oligarchy manyCI=polity mRI=democracy. |
| two types of regime classification | 1)procedural0classift vase on in terms of institutions/proceedures. 2)substantive classifying based on outcome. |
| modernization theory | all societies pass through the same stages of economic deco and under devoid countries just in earlier part of process. linear process |
| underdeveloped vs developed | ud=agrarian devo=smaller agri, more industry/service, political change coincides with economic growth. typically ud viewed as dictatorships devoted is democracy. |
| two conditions for economy to promote democracy. | ruler dependent on ppl and exit options high enough that rulers need consent. |
| relationship bt income and democracy | gap higher democracy higher. belief that it happens bc of devs of middle class. |
| why don't resource dependent countries become dems | resource curse; no insentive to gain consent bc wealth comes from the ground and increases urge to stay in office. |
| aid optimists vs pessimists | believe it spurs democratic efforts pessimists think it has negative effects making more dependent on donations than citizens. |
| credible commitment problem | hard to say that a ruler will actually return any tax /money. solved via enforcers, repeat interactions and institutions that alter balance of power. |
| lipsit thesis | dictatorship not sustainable in mature Econ. richer leads to education, more power to civilians in relation to leader. societies completer, need cooperation and dict loses power. consent of govt need. |
| survival theory | alt to modernization. democratization is random, devoid does not cause democracy but sustains it. no democracy collapesed w gdp higher than 6085. a)dem means standards of living and typically autocracy on the other hand is winner takes all |
| survival theory explanation | if rich, doesn't make sense to gamble on not being in inner circle in autonomy--go to democracy., if already poor, autacracy is not that bad. |
| demand side explanations resource curxe | revenue helps to lower taxes, demand from public for representation lower, if demand exists govt doesn't need to respond bc they have money anyway |
| supply side explanation resource curse | can buy military support, preempt and cooperate w opposition groups, |
| when r resources not bad | if country already has dem institutions when they find resource and if pop oversight prevents govt from bad spending. NORWAY actual problem is extent of dependency on resource for revenue |
| foreign aid curse issues | usually attached with conditions for dem that do not need to be followed. reduces dependency on citizens. harms welfare,doesnt usually go to the ppl. |
| primodialist view of culture | always been the same and is objective/inhereted. prior to politoics/shapes politics. democracy is not compatible w all cultures |
| constructivist view on culture | something invented, argues culture is malleable and not a barrier to democracy |
| civic culture | every version of only ___ could produce a democracy .. 1) parachicul trad politics like in Africa, 2)subject, central authoritarian like ussr 3)civic only compatible w dem |
| trad values | religion family, deference to authority, natl pride, gradual change, |
| secular rational | dgaf abt trad values basically |
| survival culture | ethnocentric, low interpersonal trust, strictt norms, value security |
| self expression culture | equality, eco protection, civic liberties etc |
| trad/survivalist | dictatorship |
| secular rational.self expression | democracy |
| cultural modernization theory | Econ devo---change in cultural values. poor authoritarian to rich and democratic. industrialization is trad--secrational post industrial is survival---self expression |
| state dominated economics. | need mobile capital for exit option, state driven demo ties ppl to the state. growth then can increase support to regime. dev ,ore likely to promote dem in a diversified economy with.a private sector |
| state capacity | ability to monitor or enforce control over ppl. high capacity is china. even with diversified Econ and private sector the state needs this capacity, they only have to bargain if forced into it, MULTIPLIER |
| who do alt income sources benefit | politicians. harm individuals. |
| issues w primodialist approach | specificality, different definitions of culture and not falsifiable |
| three types of polo culture via Lamond and verb | parochial:no knowledge or interest in politics, subject; obey but participate little see themselves a subjects, participant/civic, understand and take part. only one kind compatible w democracy |
| issue with surveys | mass support for dem helps to deligitmize dictatorship, BUT surveys have diff biases and social desirability bias can cause false evidence |
| clash of civilizations Huntington | future of global conflict will be cultural not ideological or economic. civilizations ar the new faultiness, primarily based on religion.. argues culture cannot change as there would not be permanent conflict if they could. |
| why does Huntington argue western ideas do not resonate | i9nstistance antagonizes other civilizations. values of individualism, equality, secularism etc. |
| why is argument bt religion bad | bc it only works if a religion has a universalized doctrine, which does not exist, usually only take observations of single moments or movements in time. basically they cherry pick/use inductivism after the fact observations. |
| why is the islam against democracy talk ebad | has reasons in religious texts/foundations that are pro democratic. have consultant echoes, community consensus, reinterpretation of texts with time, and cake public welfare, |
| waves 1 | 1820-1926 long wave, roots in French Revolution. reverse wave tell 1933. |
| short wave 2 | 1943-1963, victory of allies didn't stay Ems for longe, revererse waves |
| third wave ??? | 1974-? starts at end of Portugals dictatorship, hard to find end point, more authoirtarian but also have Arab spring and stuff. |
| bottom up transition | social movements, east Europe, aran spring, matters of collective action suppression eg Hong Kong and tiennamen square. |
| collective action problem | PD means always in best interest to defect. |
| tipping points | don't know what others are thinking and don't wanna make first move. |
| public good | non exclusionary and non rival,---- free rider problem |
| tipping models | when individuals decide to publicly decide ob regime, |
| private vs public perception | inside attitude vs what you say to others, issues bc of social desirability bias. revealing opposition is dangerous +leads to preference falsification. hard o predict |
| revolutionary threshold | when u will join movement. low-protest regardless of others high-protest w some others high-regime supporters, unwilling, do it to bandwagon. small shift in thresholds cause big change and the revolutionary cascade, |
| implication of tripping models. | nobody knows when iur on the brink of revolution, a lot needs to go right for it to work |
| top down models | change via the controlled opening political space. adding parties elections etc. goal is not democratization but rather to bring apposition to the authoritarian inst. when works strengthens regime eg Bahrain Belarus |
| why is top down a game | bc it could work and gain power or u have to give in after bing bested by own system Pinochet eg. |
| PROCEDIURAL VS SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH | .procedural is how your supposed to do it in theory, substantive uis how it works in practice. |
| can you prove a theory definitively? | no, science is constantly changing throughout time. it is never 100%. |
| constructivist view | argues that culture can change with political and economic circumstances. |
| example of top down transition | pinochet/Chile during the 1980s, added democratization through certain reforms but could not win the election. |
| what is the common word in standard definitions of the state | use of coercion/force. |
| how does oil money help to keep in power | low tax, military bought, and buys off the opposition |
| trad is to ____ and survival to _____ | sec rat and self expression. |
| which view believes the state formed without the consent of the citizens | predatory view of the state. |
| which dataset treats democracy as a yes no | democracy dictatorship ADD CARDS FOR THE DIFF DATASETS> |
| what change gives citizens more power as the population develops economically | more educated and urban population |
| what gives the states more ability to hold power over state | mobile assets ----- more viable exit options |
| what is associated with a strong civic culture | interpersonal trust, political efficiacy, and preference for gradual change. |
| which culture likes deference to authority | subjective culture |
| why is china a good example of state capacity | bc they have power, while also collecting tax and having a large private sector |
| CULTURAL MODERNIZATION THEORy | INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IS DEM FIRST THEN CULTURE, VALUES BASED CULTURE FIRST THEN DEMOCRACY |
| what theory views democrotization as completely random | survival theory |
Created by:
cautionarytale