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C. Politics Quiz 2
Post midterm - quiz 2
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Collective action (Bottom up transitions) | When two or more individuals work together to accomplish some mutually desirable goal. Often refers to grass roots political movements |
| Zapista Uprising | Collective action in Mexico. Win indigenious rights and help end authoritarianism in Mexico |
| Gorbachev inititives | Glasnost and Perstroika |
| Public good | A good that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous |
| Free rider problem | People often take advantage of publci goods without contributing |
| Five theories of collective action | Economic depravation, political opportunity, ethnic diversity, resource mobilization, and game theory |
| Economic depravation theory of collective action | Collective action happens when people are poor, oppressed, or unhappy |
| Political opportunity theory of collective action | When the state lessens oppression and contestation for power increases, there are more opportunities for collective action. |
| Ethnic diversity theory of collective action | Ethnically diverse communities have more difficulty providing public goods and engaging in collective action |
| Resource mobilization theory of collective action | For collective action to occur, movements need organizational resources: money, organizers, publicists, and ideological support. |
| Game theory | Use simple mathematical games to stand in for complex social phenom and highlight essential decision-making structures. |
| Second order collective action problem | A failure to monitor and punish free riders because it is too costly |
| Common free rider solution | Monitoring and sanctioning |
| Three theoretical arguments about democracy and growth | Property rights story, Meltzer-Richards model, consumption vs. investment |
| Property rights story | Argues that democracy promotes growth because it protects property rights |
| Problem with the property rights story | Dictatorships also protect property rights and democracy is not inherently equal to rule of law |
| Meltzer-Richards Model | In democracies, the poor have more of a voice and will push for higher taxes which will dissuade the rich from investing as much hurting the overall economy |
| Problem with the Meltzer-Richards Model | Assumes poor people have a lot of power. Most rich democracies are doing well. |
| Consumption vs. Investment argument | Democracies encourage consumption more than investment which hurts long term growth. |
| Three types of democracies | Presidential, parliamentary, and mixed |
| Presidential democracy | People directly elect the head of the government and they can not be dismissed by legislature |
| Parliamentary democracy | A system in which the government depends on a legislative majority to exist |
| Vote of no confidence | If the current government cannot secure a majority vote in the legislature it must resign from office |
| Constructive vote of no confidence | Replacement must be decided already |
| Mixed democracy | Has a president and a prime minister. President can not be removed and the accountability of the PM varies. |
| Ministerial responsibility | Ministers are personally responsible for their ministry |
| Investiture vote | A formal vote before a government can take office |
| The formateur | The person designated to form the government. Typically, the head of the party with a majority of seats. |
| Office seeking politicians | Primarily motivated by the benefits of holding office |
| Least minimal winning coalition | The smallest possible coalition that gets the win |
| Gamson’s law | Cabinet seats are distributed proportionately to coalition contribution |
| Minority government | When the party coalition that forms the government does not equal a legislative majority. |
| Corporatist system | Specific interest groups (labor, business, agriculture) have formal seats at the policy table |
| Committee system | Committees drive key policy not the government |
| Surplus majority government | Governments that include more parties than are necessary for a majority |
| Why do surplus majority governments form? | Tragedies or desperation that require high efficiency |
| Exogenous election timing | Elections happen on a fixed schedule |
| Endogenous election timing | Elections do not happen on a fixed schedule |
| Why do governments collapse | Technical and discretionary reasons |
| Technical reasons for a government collapse | Scheduled events like elections and |
| Discretionary reasons for a government collapse | Non scheduled events like votes of no confidence |
| Three theories for why endogenous elections happen | Political surfing theory, political business cycle theory, and private information theory |
| Political surfing theory | Governments call elections when the economy is in a high point |
| Politcal business cycle theory | Government intentionally creates short term economic growth through unsustainable policies then rolls back those polices post election. |
| Private information theory | Government knows before the people that economic growth is going to slow in the coming years |
| Presidential democracy | Democracies in which the president is the head of state and the political chief executive |
| Presidential decrees | Orders from the president with the force of law |
| What happens when a presidential democracy has weak presdidential decrees | A minority president will have to form coalitions to get laws passed |
| Mixed democracy | Systems that have elements of both presidential and parliamentary systems |
Created by:
IsaacL30