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SOC 310 Final Exam
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Jane Addams Accomplishments | Hull House, on FBI's most dangerous list, won a Nobel Peace Prize |
| Hull House | offered help (education, social support and cultural programs) to poor and immigrant working class people; helped lead early efforts for social reform and immigrants rights |
| Jane Addams philosophical approach to science | pragmatism-experiments, see what actually works through trial and error; must live with people to truly understand them and cannot help without proximity |
| democratic social ethics | democracy is not just voting but people living together with equality, cooperation, and mutual respect in everyday life |
| Why there are no women sociologists in the canon | DISCRIMINATION, despite having made significant contributions to sociology |
| Du Bois Key Concepts | colour-line, the veil, double consciousness, talented tenth |
| colour-line | visible racial differences that shape how society is organized and how people are treated |
| the veil | the feeling of separation due to race (internal experience) |
| souble-consciousness | looking at oneself through the lens of the dominant group (Whites) Whites have no racial consciousness |
| talented tenth | Help 10% of the population to lift the other 90% |
| Mead's level of analysis | interactional |
| How are humans different form animals?-Mead's view | ability to take oneself as an object, can choose how we respond, capacity to communicate symbolically (through language) |
| I | self as subject, spontaneous and creative aspects, the person actively looking into the mirror |
| Me | self as object, embodies internalized expectations, the person or reflection you see in the mirror |
| double dialogue of the self | who you are versus your interpretation |
| Mead definition of pragmatism | truth is what works |
| mead role of science in human evolution | science is the evolutionary process grown self-conscious, trial and error in science is faster than the process of natural selection |
| Mead Stages of Human Development | Pre-play, play, game, generalized other |
| pre-play | meaningless, imitative, just a ball |
| play | particular other, my mom or dad, young kids all chasing a soccer ball |
| game | all moms and dads, taking specific positions on the field, playing a role |
| generalized other | humans in general, more to sports than winning |
| Parson's systems perspective | society is a set of interdependent systems and subsystems which bring stability/order and cohesion through consensus, changes in one part of system lead to changes in another, can be momentary shocks to system but equilibrium soon restored |
| parson's subsystems | cultural, social, personality, behavioral organism |
| cultural system | values, symbols |
| social system | interactions, roles |
| personality system | individual motives |
| behavioral organism | biological needs |
| Unit Act | basic building block for social behavior; all action involves actor, goal, situation, norms, motivation |
| actor | person/group taking action |
| goal | desired outcome |
| situation | context and means |
| norms | rules guiding behavior |
| motivation | energy for action |
| pattern variables | pairs of choices that individuals face when acting in social situations |
| manifest function | what is intended and recognized |
| latent function | unintended consequences (often not recognized) |
| deviance typology | explains how people respond when there is a misalignment between goals and means |
| Conformity | accept cultural goals, accept institutionalized means |
| ritualism | reject cultural goals, accept institutionalized means |
| innovation | accept cultural goals, reject institutionalized means |
| retreatism | reject cultural goals, reject institutionalized means |
| rebellion | new goals, new means |
| middle-range theory | middle ground between mere description and abstract theories (hard to apply) |
| self-fulfilling prophecy | if people believe something will happen, they act in ways that make it happen |
| difference between exchange and rational choice theory | exchange theory is application of rational choice to interactions/relationships, emphasizes that relationships will continue if perceived profit continues, if what you get>what you give=profit; can also continue if mutually beneficial rewards=costs |
| exchange rewards | material vs nonmaterial; extrinsic vs intrinsic |
| material vs nonmaterial | focuses on the form of the reward |
| extrinsic vs intrinsic | focuses on the source of the reward, from the outside or generated internally |
| imbalanced exchanges | if people have a monopoly one party can't reciprocate a benefit, instead they must offer deference or compliance. over time imbalanced exchanges are institutionalized into stable power structure |
| Homan's behaviorist propositions | stimulus, success, value, deprivation-satiation, frustration-aggression |
| the stimulus proposition | if previous occurrence of particular stimulus has been occasion on which individual action was rewarded, the more similar the current stimulus to past one, more likely person is to repeat the action |
| the success proposition | the more often an action is followed by a reward, the more likely a person will repeat the behavior |
| the value proposition | the more valuable a particular reward is to a person, the more often he will perform a behavior so rewarded |
| the deprivation-satiation proposition | the more often in the recent past an individual has received a particular reward, the less valuable any further unit of that reward becomes |
| the frustration-aggression proposition | if a person's action receives a punishment he did not expect or if the person does not receive the reward he did expect, he will become angry and more likely to exhibit aggressive behavior, results of which will become more valuable to him |
| critical theory differences from Marx | ideas still matter versus money shapes society; problem is deeper than exploitation-people are controlled through how they think; domination can exist in any system versus fixing capitalism will fix society |
| culture industry | commodification and mass production of culture under capitalism, serves to manipulate and pacify society and reinforce the status quo |
| irrationality of reason | rationality brings domination not freedom-everything including humans become objects to be controlled; empirical sciences miss what is truly human and preserve status quo, science/rationality lead to new kind of barbarism |
| Can reason be good? (habermas) | bad-in terms of technical/instrumental rationality; good in terms of democratic deliberation in the public sphere |
| communicative action | the democratic and rational dialogue oriented towards mutual understanding, like with family/friends, taking point of view of the other, truly a two-way conversation |
| instrumental action | only pursue own goals |
| strategic action | manipulate others/take into account |
| public sphere | network for communicating information and points of view |
| lifeworld | everyday life, normal human relationships and shared meanings |
| system | state/market, formal rules, efficiency and institutions |
| colonization | growing sense of control over all aspects of life |
| Patricia Hill Collins main ideas | matrix of domination, intersectionality, standpoint epistemology |
| matrix of domination | can be both an oppressor and oppressed at the same time |
| intersectionality | how different parts of an identity work together and social categories are interwoven, can be measured statistically by using interaction effects |
| standpoint epistemology | what one knows is affected by the position one has in society |
| Blumer's three premises | we act on meanings not reality, meanings are learned socially, in the interpretive process meanings can change |
| Becker's labeling theory | a key factor in the development of deviants is the negative label imposed on the person-turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy where calling someone a criminal will make them a criminal |
| Thomas Theorem | if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences |
| front stage | when/where the performance takes place; impression management is key |
| setting | physical environment/scene |
| appearance | how one dresses (tells the season, their status, etc) |
| manner | cues which tell us the interaction role a person will play (their disposition-angry and mean or cheerful and friendly) |
| backstage | when/where the performance is prepared (we can relax and drop our front) |
| character | the role we play, a social product, not an inherent trait |
| performer | the individual behind the role, manages the performance |
| feeling rules | shared social conventions that determine how we should properly feel in given situations |
| emotion work | efforts to alter or manage feelings one is experiencing |
| cognitive emotion work | attempt to change images or ideas in an attempt to change the associated feelings |
| bodily emotion work | trying to alter the physical effects of an emotion |
| expressive emotion work | alter the public display of an emotional state |
| emotional labor | emotion work sold for a wage |
| commodification of feelings | can lead to feelings of alienation, often gendered |
| phenomenology | tries to understand reality as we directly experience it, unmediated by language; gained through bracketing or putting our preconceived notions aside |
| parts of social construction of reality | externalization, objectivation, internalization |
| externalization | humans create the social world through actions |
| objectivation | the social world becomes experienced as objective reality |
| internalization | we internalize the social world through socialization |
| ethnomethodology (garfinkel) | study of the methods people use to create social order |
| breaching experiements | disrupting social norms to reveal taken-for-granted rules |
| psychological altruism (Levinas) | sometimes people help out of reasons of genuine concern rather than personal gain. assumes not that we are supposed to be altruistic but that we are |
| power of weakness | feel obligated to help someone because they are vulnerable not because someone tells you to. the face and eyes show vulnerability-->harder to ignore their suffering, creates immediate sense of moral responsibility |
| 4 cases where sociology did not predict the future | 1960s/70s upheaval-revolt led by privileged yourth, rise of east asia-successful non-Western capitalist modernity, global religious resurgence-secularization theory largely wrong outside of Europe, collapse of soviet union-couldn't grasp socialism's fail |
| 4 reasons for sociology's failures | parochialism, triviality, rationalism, ideology |
| parochialism | sociology often generalizes from the Western perspective |
| triviality | focus on narrow, methodologically safe topics; avoidance of big questions while trying to mimic the natural sciences |
| rationalism | assumes social actors are rational, ignoring the non-rational realm, the rationality of the sociologist is confused with the rationality of the social world |
| ideology | abandonment of objectivity for partisan advocacy, unable to analyze phenomena tied to one's own commitments |
| Epistemology SHOULD be a means to an end for ontology | methods exist to help us understand what exists, not distort it |
| Ontology SHOULD NOT be a means to an end for ethics | our understanding of what exists should not be shaped by what we want ethically (bias) |
| Smith's arguments | don't reduce humans/social world to one paradigm/theory, reality comes first, science is not neutral/value-free, universities too specialized, empiricism ignores the invisible |
| Mead | individual nonrational |
| simmel | individual nonrational |
| Durkheim | collective nonrational |
| Du Bois | collective nonrational |
| Weber | collective rational |
| Gilman | collective rational |
| Marx | collective rational |
| Phenomenology (alfred shutz) | individual nonrational |
| Symbolic Interactionism (Hortschild) | individual nonrational |
| Exchange theory (Homans) | individual rational |
| structural functionalism (parsons) | collective nonrational |
| critical theory (adorno) | collective rational |
| world-systems theory (Wallerstein) | collective rational |
| society as conflict | Marx |
| society as organism | Durkheim |
| society as machine/web of meanings | Weber |
| Society as web | Simmel, web of interactions |
| society as conversation | Mead/symbolic interactionism |
| society as system | Parsons/structural functionalism |
| society as market | rational-choice |
| society as ideology | critical theory |
| society as performance | Goffman/dramaturgy |
| society as experience | phenomenology |