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PHL451 Q4
PHL451 Kaplan and Heck
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| 1. What is a pure indexical? give an example. | These are indexicals which are assigned their referents automatically according to the linguistic rules. ex. "I". |
| 2. What is a Kaplanian demonstrative? give an example. | These are indexicals which require a completing demonstration or some other intention on the part of the speaker. Ex. "this". |
| 3. How does Kaplan motivate the character / content distinction. | Take a sentence like "I am here now", this is simultaneously "deep and universally true" and contingent. The modal operator can be given wider or narrower scope resulting in distinct outcomes where either I must have been here, or I could not have been. |
| 4. What is character? | a function of the linguistic rules governing its components. It combines with contexts to give a content. |
| 5. What is content? | the proposition expressed given its context of usage. It's truth is assessed against its context. |
| 6. How does the content/character distinction resolve problems in Frege? | The deep and universal truth of an indexical sentence like "I am here" is given by the character, which is a logical truth that always holds. But the associated contents vary.. |
| 7. What is Kaplan's conjecture? | Contents map to the semantic content of an expression, character is the cognitive significance of an expression. |
| 8. What is Kaplan's 2D account of explanation? | The explanatory element important for action and behavior is the cognitive significance of an expression. "What is said", the semantic contents, are how the expression links up with the world. One is perspectival. |
| 9. How does Kaplan fix the circumstances of evaluation? | The tense, modal, and location operators fix the charachter relative to a particular world model <w, t, p, i>, world, time, place, individual. We then get a proposition - contents - out of that. |
| 10. What is the character of a type pure indexical | These take the world as an input, and follow a token reflexive rule to determine the world, time, place or individual relavant to the context. |
| 11. What is the character of a type demonstrative | Given a completing demonstration, the rule will combine with the context to produce a content. |
| 12. What is Direct reference? | A singular term is directly referential iff its contribution to the proposition expressed by a sentence containing it is its referent. |
| 13. What was Kaplan's goal vis a vis Russell? | Frege rejected Dr, Russell held that terms an only be DR iff the speaker was acquittanced with the object. Since we are only directly acquittanced with sense datum, only sense talk can be DR. Kaplan wants to avoid this weird epistemic issue. |
| 14. When is a token expression of a DR type? | iff its content is the object it stands for given its context of utterance |
| 15. When is a type expression DR? | iff its character is such that its tokens have the objects they stand for in their contexts of utterance as their contents, |
| 16. What is the point of Dthat? | Dthat is an 'operator' at the level of character which turns the expression from a description into a directly referential term, ie. it makes the contribution into the contextually appropriate content. |
| 17. What is the operator interpretation of Dthat? | the content of 'Dthat [the F]' as uttered in a context, C, is the content of the description ‘the satisfier of 'the F in C’. |
| 18. What is the demonstrative interpretation of Dthat? | the content of 'Dthat [the F]' as uttered in C is the object which satisfies 'the F' in C. |
| 19. Give an example of how Dthat works | "The last great philosopher of antiquity might not have been a philosopher" = it is possible that Aristotle might not have been a philosopher. |
| 20. What are the three kinds of rigidity? | Obstinate rigidity = the character + context pick out the same object relative to every circumstance of evaluation. De Jure rigidity = rigidity by stipulation. De Facto rigidity = the expression happens to always pick out the same object. |
| 21. What is Kaplan's position on the rigidity of his system? | Kaplan takes his system to vindicate a view of rigidity stronger than de jure rigidity. Kaplan achieves de jure rigidity in the operator reading of Dthat. Kaplan wants the demonstrative read which creates DR terms, not just de re rigidity. |
| 22. How is Frege's puzzle a problem for DR theorists? | Dr theorists want demonstratives to be Dr. BUT if we have no intermediary level for sense, we get Frege's puzzle. This and that can both be a, but I can reject one while accepting the other. |
| 23. What is Kaplan's solution to Frege's puzzle? | Co-reffering DR singular terms can differ in their cognitive significance, ie. their characters. While still sharing a content. |
| 24. How does Kaplan approach the referential attributive distinction? | Our usage of expressions depends on intention. We intend to conform to linguistic conventions. Attributive case we intend to use the conventions set by the Tod. Referential case we intend to introduce a new DR'd object. The uses differ in character. |
| 25. What is the problem of cognitive dynamics? | Under what character must his auditor believe Lauben’s I- thought in order for Lauben’s communication to have been successful? In some cases the speaker and hearer must coincide in both context and content. But in other cases they are not required to. Why |
| 26. What is the Kaplan-Perry theory of communication? | Communication is the transmission of extensional contents. To understand en expression is to understand what the speaker reffered to. |
| 27. What is Heck's 'Problem of Content' | Consider that I use V to mean H and for you V=P. You tell me "V is a planet", which is true. But what you mean is "P is a plant" and I have understood "H is a planet". All of these statements are true as H=P. But it is just lucky that they all are. |
| 28. What is Heck's Moderate Fregean View? | Both speaker and hearer attach some significance to the expresion uttered. H understood S iff H is justified in taking their cognitive signifance to stand in the appropriate relationship with S's. This includes but is not limited to truth conditions. |
| 29. What is Evan's Position on Communication? / What is the Transmission of knowledge criterion? | Evans interprets Frege as needing a transmission of knowledge criterion. To properly communicate one must have gained knowledge given the right circumstances. |
| 30. What is Dickie and Rattan's Equivilance Class form of moderate Fregeanism? | Speakers communicate iff they attach the same sense to an expression. Sense understood as a class of equivilant cognitive signifiances. |
| 31. What is Evan's Position on Communication? / How does he explain the communication of non-descriptive reffering expressions. | Further, knowledge of a non-descriptive reffering expression (like an indexical) involves thinking a 'information-based' thought. Demonstratives require perceptual information. "Past tense dem... requires memory based information. |