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PHIL Ethics: Exam 1R
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Metaethics | Study of what morality is, whether moral facts exist, and what moral language means. |
| Normative ethics | Study of what actions are right or wrong and what we ought to do. |
| Morality | A system of principles governing right and wrong behavior. |
| Morals | Specific beliefs or rules about right and wrong held by individuals or societies. |
| Moral norms | Social rules about acceptable behavior. |
| Moral principles | General rules that guide moral reasoning (e.g., don’t harm others). |
| Objective property | A feature that exists independently of anyone’s opinions. |
| Scale model | A simplified representation used to understand morality (e.g., weighing harms and benefits). |
| Moral pie | Idea that moral value is limited and must be distributed. |
| Irreducibility | The claim that moral properties cannot be reduced to non-moral facts. |
| The spinach test | Asks whether morality is just a matter of taste (like liking spinach). |
| The phenomenology test | Examines how moral judgments feel (objective vs preference-based). |
| The counterfactual test | Asks whether moral truths would hold even if no one believed them. |
| The problem of disagreement | Widespread moral disagreement challenges moral objectivity. |
| Grounding morality | Explaining what moral truths are based on. |
| Moral knowledge | How we know moral truths. |
| Bivalent ethics | Actions are either right or wrong (no middle ground). |
| Trivalent ethics | Actions can be right, wrong, or morally neutral. |
| Utilitarianism | The right action maximizes overall happiness or well-being. |
| Hedonism | Only pleasure has intrinsic value. |
| Preferentism | What matters morally is satisfying preferences. |
| Consequentialism | Rightness depends only on outcomes. |
| Impartialism | Everyone’s interests count equally. |
| Trolley case | Diverting a trolley to kill one instead of five tests utilitarian reasoning. |
| Footbridge case | Pushing someone to stop the trolley tests harm vs intention. |
| Loop variant | Killing one indirectly saves five; tests intention vs means. |
| Organ harvesting | Killing one healthy person to save five challenges utilitarianism. |
| Framing case | Punishing an innocent person to prevent riots. |
| Promising case | Breaking a promise for better consequences. |
| Electrical accident case | Causing harm as a side effect vs as a means. |
| Cookie case | Minor harm vs greater good example. |
| Equality case | Whether equality itself has moral value. |
| Experience machine | (Robert Nozick) thought experiment questioning whether pleasure is all that matters. |
| Problem of partiality | Whether we may favor loved ones over strangers. |
| Rule utilitarianism | Follow rules that generally maximize happiness. |
| Deontology | Morality based on duties and rules, not consequences. |
| Absolutism | Some actions are always wrong. |
| Moderatism | Rules can be overridden in extreme cases. |
| Categorical Imperative (V1) | Act only on maxims you could will to be universal laws. |
| Categorical Imperative (V2) | Treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means. |
| Fungible | Interchangeable; replaceable without loss. |
| Alien threat case | Sacrifice one to save many from aliens. |
| Miracle hair case | Killing one to produce benefit for many. |
| Cargo ship case | Choosing who to save under constraints. |
| Doctrine of Double Effect | Causing harm as a side effect may be permissible if not intended. |
| Claim rights | Rights that impose duties on others. |
| Permission rights | Freedom to act without interference. |
| Absolute rights | Cannot be overridden. |
| Prima facie rights | Can be overridden by stronger rights. |
| Positive rights | Right to receive something. |
| Negative rights | Right not to be interfered with. |
| General duties | Duties owed to everyone. |
| Special duties | Duties from relationships (family, contracts). |
| Duty of beneficence | Help others. |
| Duty of non-maleficence | Do not harm. |
| Duty of fidelity | Keep promises. |
| Duty of justice | Be fair. |
| Duty of gratitude | Repay kindness. |
| Duty of compensation | Repair harm you cause. |
| Duty of self-improvement | Develop your abilities. |
| Problem of arbitrary cutoffs | Difficulty determining exact moral thresholds. |
| Aggregation problem | Whether many small harms outweigh one large harm. |
| State of nature | Life without government. |
| Social contract theory | Morality arises from agreements among rational agents. |
| Prisoner’s dilemma | Cooperation vs self-interest problem. |
| Dominance reasoning | Choosing the strategy that’s best regardless of others’ choices. |
| Advantages | Explains cooperation, fairness. |
| Disadvantages | May exclude vulnerable groups. |
| Thomson’s thesis | Even if the fetus has a right to life, abortion can be permissible. |
| Standard pro-life argument | Fetus is a person; killing persons is wrong; abortion is wrong. |
| Thomson’s central claim | Right to life ≠ right to use someone’s body. |
| Violinist case | Forced bodily support thought experiment. |
| Swelling baby case | Self-defense analogy. |
| People seeds case | Risk and responsibility analogy. |
| Good Samaritan | Not required to make large sacrifices. |
| Indecent actions | Morally bad but not unjust. |
| Wilma and Pebbles case | Choosing worse child when better possible. |
| Objections to Thomson | Responsibility, killing vs letting die. |
| Marquis’s thesis | Abortion is wrong because it deprives a fetus of a valuable future. |
| Future Like Ours (FLO) | What makes killing wrong is loss of future goods. |
| Main argument | Fetuses have FLO; killing them deprives that; abortion wrong. |
| Reprogramming objection | Artificially creating future value. |
| I wasn’t a fetus objection | Identity concerns. |
| Philanthropic argument | We should not create life to spare suffering. |
| Harm argument | Coming into existence always harms. |
| Consent argument | You can’t get consent to be born. |
| Asymmetry argument | Absence of pain is good; absence of pleasure not bad. |
| Three islands case | Comparing existence vs non-existence. |
| Objections | Life can be worth living; asymmetry challenged. |
| Tacit consent | Implied agreement through actions. |
| Hypothetical consent | What someone would agree to under ideal conditions. |
| Environmental argument | Procreation worsens climate harm. |
| Objections | Individual impact small; duty to procreate questioned. |
| Pessimistic hypothesis | Life is worse than we think. |
| Meteor shower case | Small harm can be justified by greater good (challenge to anti-natalism). |
| Justification worry | Can you justify causing harm for benefit? |
| Outweighing worry | Do benefits truly outweigh harms of existence? |
Created by:
Charlie E