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PHL351
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| What makes two expressions co-referential? According to Frege. | The words are interchangeable preserving the truth value of the sentence. |
| What makes two expressions differ in sense? According to Frege. | their patterns of rational use. |
| What are the three levels of characterization of linguistic expressions? According to Frege. | - an expression is a concrete written or spoken sign - an expression (a concrete sign) expresses a sense - an expression’s sense determines (is a way of being presented with) its reference. |
| What is the reference of a name? According to Frege. | An object |
| What is the reference of a sentence? According to Frege. | A Truth Value |
| What is a thought? According to Frege. | The mode of presentation of a truth value. Or the sense of a sentence. |
| What is the reference of a predicate? According to Frege. | A function |
| What is the reference of a quantifier? According to Frege. | A second order concept / a concept of concepts |
| What is the intuitive class of singular terms? According to Frege. | Contribution to determining what it is for a sentence containing them to be true is to introduce an object for the rest of the sentence to say something about. (i) are not quantifiers, and (ii) are not question words. |
| What is a concept According to Frege. | A function whose value for every argument is a truth value. |
| What is Frege’s argument for the claim that a sentence expresses a thought | 1. Sentences express thoughts 2. the substitution of expressions which share reference changes the thought 3. the change is not at the level of reference 4. the thought must lie at the level of sense |
| What is Frege’s argument for the claim that a sentence refers to a truth value | 1. commitment to truth is commitment to reference of the constituents 2. There are sentences which express a thought but do not refer 3. The question of a sentence’s constituent expressions referring is 1 5. A sentence’s reference is its truth value. |
| When does hearer Y to understand speaker X’s use of expression e. According to Frege. | When Y grasps the sense that X attaches to the e |
| Why is Frege's view of communication a problem for indexicals like 'i'? | many indexicals refer distinctly to both hearer and speaker, "I am hurt" is true for the speaker but not the hearer as the sense picks out different people. |
| What is Frege's solution to the problem created by indexicals in communication? | To say they're incommunicable. |
| What is Grice's solution to the problem created by indexicals in communication? | The saturation of the indexicals is part of the recovery of the total meaning of a communicated sentence. Along with the determination of the truth value and syntactic structure. |
| Why is Frege's view of communication a problem for proper names? | For a speaker and a hearer the description associated with a proper name may differ, and in may be the one and only description associated with that name, which means a thought is not conferred on the hearer which matches the speaker's. |
| What are the paradoxes of material implication? | Rows on the truth table that give results for material conditionals seem arbitrary as no secondary connection is required other than truth. |
| What is Grice's solution to the paradoxes of material implication? | Conditionals carry the indirectness condition, however this condition is cancellable. A disjunction of p and q, and a negation are logically 'stronger' than p > q, so by the maxim of quality there must be further information, ie. the indirectness. |
| What is the indirectness condition? | That p provides a good reason for q, that p explains q, that q is derivable from p. |
| What is the major problem for the Gricean story? | These results arise only at the level of conversational assertion, not belief. |
| What is Lewis' definition of counterfactuals. | Variably strict conditional where the antecedent varies the accessibility relation. ‘A L-> C’ is true at w iff C is true in every A-world that is as similar to w as the most similar A-world. |
| How does Lewis define the similarity relation? | Through the smallest possible departure from the events which characterize the history of @, necessary to secure the truth of the antecedent. AND obeying the actual laws of nature. |
| According to the causal inheritance picture, if S is a speaker removed from the initial ‘baptism’ in which name NN is assigned its bearer, S’s use of NN refers to o under what conditions? | i) S inherited the practice of using NN from S*; ii) S*’s uses of NN refer to o; and iii)S’s intention in picking up the use of the name was to go on using it as it was already being used by S* |
| Under what conditions does Evans regard the Kripke picture as failing? | When there is a "devient causal chain", where the speakers intentions are good but the reference of the name shifts over time - ie; Madagascar |
| What is Evans main proposal concerning proper names | the relationship between the referenced object and your use of a proper name, must have something to do with your beliefs. But these beliefs cannot be descriptions, they have to be the dominant causal source of your use of a name. |
| Why can the causal source of the beliefs justifying the use of a name be nothing like the associated descriptions of that name? According to Evans. | Some object is the causal source of a belief saying "NN is F" if the belief stands in relation to the object such that knowledge the object is F is made avaliable. |
| What is Evans' view of deference? | In non deferential cases, the reference fixing is based on the dominant causal source, in deferential cases it is descriptivist. |
| Define Use and Mention | Mentioning a term is to have a term to say something about the expression itself. Using a term is to employ the semantic content of that term to express something. |
| What is te Frege Point? | In complex expressions, like conditionals, we want each constituent expression to share their meaning with simple expressions of the same form, while being unasserted by the conditional. |
| What is Geach's argument against subjectivism? | Geach argues that expressivists need to provide a reason why terms in embded and unembded contexts differ in their assertional force, according to subjectivists they look the same. Subjectivism abandons the view that it performs a different action. |
| What si the Frege-Geach challenge to expressivism? | Expressivists need an account of how s contributes to the meanings of complex sentences in which it occurs as an embedded constituent and how it contributes the same unembded. |
| What is Expressivism? | The view that the contribution of expressions is to put forward a non representational state of mind. Sentences will be explained in these terms. |
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