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Nagel
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Outline Nagel's views on our current scientific theories of the mind-body problem. | Our current scientific theories of the mind-body problem are not adequate enough to explain consciousness. Current theories ignore consciousness or get it wrong, as ppl try to group what is “incomprehensible” into smth “familiar” and “well understood.” |
| What is a reduction theory? | Any theory that takes what we don’t understand and reduces it to physical terms (e.g. Smart's thesis - trying to explain consciousness in physical terms) |
| The subjective character of experience | An organism has conscious experience means, hence there is something that it is like to be that organism. This is called the subjective character of experience. Any organism with conscious mental states has the subjective character of experience. |
| What can we not describe the subjective character of experience as, and why? | Functionalist states (functional terms or purely functional purpose) or intentionalist states (our thoughts/our response to an input) as they can also be ascribed to robots, and the subjective character of experience is just too unique. |
| Nagel on behaviourist and functionalist characteristics | Nagel states that the subjective character of experience could have behaviourist and functionalist characteristics, but that’s not all it is. |
| Why can't we create physicalist theories yet, according to Nagel? | We can’t even attempt to create physicalist theories unless we find out what this subjective character of experience is. Once we find what the subjective character of experience is, only then can we create these theories with respect to it. |
| Reductionist theories are "falsely posed" P1 | Any reductionist theory has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. In the case of mind and body, reductionist theories reduce mental states. Each organism with mental states has a “subjective character of experience”. |
| Reductionist theories are "falsely posed" P2 | Reductionist theories are logically compatible with the absence of this subjective character of experience, or consciousness. Reductionist theories can also not be extended to include consciousness. Therefore, reductionist theories are “falsely posed” |
| Pour-soi | subjective |
| En-soi | objective |
| Outline Nagel's views regarding objectivity/subjectivity in the mind-body problem. | Nagel states that we need to decrease the amount of objectivity we use to look at the mind-body problem, and add at least some subjectivity. By doing this, we can get to the middle ground of the problem that is the subjective character of experience. |
| Why does Nagel use the bat example? | Bats present a range of physical and sensory apparatuses that are so different to ours we cannot conceive what it is like to be a bat, making it more challenging for us to understand their subjective character of experience. |
| Why doesn't Nagel use other animals such as wasps or flies? | Because it is harder to know whether the experience of consciousness exists in things that get smaller. In terms of genes, organisms that are less closely related to us tend to be smaller than us. |
| Why is imagination inadequate in explaining what it is like to be a bat? | It would only tell me what it is like for me to be a bat. I want to know what it's like for a bat to be a bat. Imagination restricts me to the resources of my own mind, and these resources aren’t enough for me to know what it is like to be a bat. |
| What if we could adapt our neuro-physiological structure to resemble a bat? | Even if I looked and behaved like a bat, I still wouldn’t know what it is like to be a bat, as I can’t imagine what a bat version of myself is like. Nothing in our present makeup allows us to even imagine what that would be like. |
| "We can’t form more than a schematic conception of what it is like" | Nagel says that we may ascribe general types of experience to an animal’s structure and behaviour, but we cannot know what it is like for those animals to have those experiences. |
| Example: person deaf and blind from birth | The subjective character of experience of a person deaf and blind from birth isn’t accessible to me, nor is mine to them. However, this doesn’t prevent us from believing that the other exists, and that we each have a subjective character. |
| Example: martians | Although we do not currently have the language to accommodate for Martian or bat phenomenology, we shouldn’t dismiss the idea that Martians and bats have detailed experiences that are fully comparable with ours. |
| Why should we not dismiss ideas entirely just because we cannot conceive of them? | Whilst some things are really difficult for us to accept, “to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance." |
| What is logical positivism and why does Nagel reject it? | Logical positivism is a way of looking at the world which consists of only what is said. Nagel rejects this, as there are some things that exist which cannot be said or comprehended in human language. |
| The objective character of experience | Nagel claims that there is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: when one person can know or say what the quality of another's experience is. |
| Example: martian scientist and lightning | A Martian scientist w/ no understanding of visual perception can still understand lightning as a physical phenomenon. Lightning has an objective character that isn’t exhausted by its visual appearance which can be investigated by a Martian without vision. |
| What does Nagel believe objectivity can be seen as? (Martian Scientist example cont.) | Nagel believes that objectivity can be seen as a direction in which our understanding can travel. In understanding a phenomenon like lightning, we have to go as far away as we can from a strictly human viewpoint. |
| Nagel's semantic argument | When we are told that X is Y, we know how it's supposed to be true. This depends on a conceptual or theoretical background and is not conveyed by the “is” alone. For example, when I say 2 x 3 = 6, this is within my conceptual background to understand. |
| Nagel's views on the idea that sensations are brain processes (stemming from semantic argument) | The idea that sensations are brain processes is challenging to comprehend, thus it is beyond my conceptual scheme as although we essentially have a rough idea of how they are the same, there is still a level of mysticism around it. |
| Conceptual schemes | Our network of what we can conceive of., along with ideas that are accessible to human mind. |
| The caterpillar analogy | Caterpillar locked in safe by someone who has no idea abt insect metamorphosis. Person opens safe and sees butterfly inside. If person knows the safe was closed , could believe caterpillar is now a butterfly w/o knowing how the change occurred. |
| How does the caterpillar analogy parallel with Descartes' wax example? | We cannot say that our senses made the connection between either the melted and unmelted wax, or the caterpillar and butterfly. In both examples, it was instead the mind that made the connection. |
| What does Nagel propose in his conclusion? | Nagel proposes that we need to move toward some objective phenomenology. This shouldn’t be dependent on empathy or imagination, but should make the objective character of experience accessible to people who do not have those experiences themselves. |
| Example for Nagel's concluding proposal: blind person comprehending experience of visual perception | As an example, Nagel says he needs to actually make a blind person comprehend what the experience of visual perception is like, and that I shouldn’t rely on statements such as “red is like the sound of a trumpet” because this isn’t accurate enough. |
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