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UP 6650
Planning and Development Law
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| What was McMoran v. Fitzgerald (1895) about? | 1890's Michigan Supreme Court: Nuisance Suit in St. Clair County. Industrial sited near home, homeowner won suit for injunction against business. |
| Clements v. McCabe (1920) | In Michigan, the power to enact a zoning ordinance is not implicit in "home rule" authority or in a grant of the police power; it must be expressly enabled |
| Nectow v. Cambridge (1928) | Case indicated Zoning is not unlimited and that a Zoning Ordinance is required to promote the public health, safety and welfare. In this instance Ct found rezoning was illegal taking due to destruction of all value of property. |
| Euclid v. Ambler (1929) | Determined when a zoning ordinance was constitutionally valid. Zoning is constitutionally valid when it bears a substantial relation to police powers (health, safety and welfare) |
| What does IRAC stand for? | Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion |
| What establishes vested right? | Usually the issuance of a permit. In Michigan a physical improvement needs to be made to property (such as a sign) |
| What is a regulatory taking? | The destruction of all value of a property through regulatory restrictions or regulations that rendering property useless. Useless means not making a profit. |
| What is standing? | In land use cases it is someone with a real property interest that has been harmed. |
| What is substantive due process? | generally regards whether the govt action (ie zoning regulations) overreaches its constitutional authority. |
| What is procedural due process? | Given notice and the right to be heard. For zoning, specified in enabling acts. |
| How long can a moratorium be? | 6 months w/ 6 month renewal or 1 year with 1 year renewal. |
| Under the open meetings act in a general way what items are able to be discussed in closed session? | Items that if discussed in public are harmful to the public, such as discussing, property acquisition, pending litigation, |
| Can potential litigation be discussed in a closed session? | No only specific pending litigation. |
| Attorney can draft memorandum on item and present and discuss in closed session, TRUE or FALSE | True |
| What is non-estoppel? | Expression of an opinion that binds the municipality. |
| How much of a reason is needed for a court to uphold a zoning decision if it is challenged on substantive due process? | Sciltilla of a reason |
| Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Co. | Coming to a nuisance. Plaintiff built a house/grocery store next to coke oven which was there first. Court did not grant injunctive relief because plaintiff could not expect neighbor to cease operations after the fact. |
| Spur Industries, Inc v. Del E. Webb Development Co. | Development company sought to build next to a feed lot, filed nuisance case, feedlot required to move, but development company had to pay for it. Issue is coming to a nuisance. More people = favorable outcome. |
| Boomer V. Atlantic Cement Co. | Cement company nuisance case, found that value of Cement Operation outweighed the consequences of injunction. Injunction vacated upon payment of present and future economic loss of property. |
| Ziervogel v. Washington County Board of Adjustment. | Looked at variance approval standards, struck down "no reasonable use" standard for dimensional variances. |
| Kelo v. City of New London (2005) | Allowed the transfer of property acquired via eminent domain to private landowners for economic development purposes. Fit definition of public use as specified in 5th amend. to US Constitution. |
| Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit (1981) | Initially allowed the transfer of property acquired via eminent domain to private landowners for economic development purposes. Overturned by Hathcock. |
| County of Wayne v. Hathcock (2004) | In Michigan, case overturned Poletown v. Detroit and stated that to use eminent domain to transfer property in Michigan from a private party to another private party for economic development reasons is not a public use and thus unconstitutional. |
| Pennsylvania Coal Co.v. Mahon | subsurface rights to a property could not be taken for the public without just compensation. |
| Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | A permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests it may serve. |
| Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission | Passage of Act barred owner from building on their property. Court viewed it as a taking. |
| Nollan v. California Coastal Commission | Requiring Nollan to dedicate a public access easement as a condition of permit approval is a taking. |
| Dolan v. Tigard | an impermissible taking of property occurs when a city requires a landowner to convey property to the city in order to get a permit to redevelop property. Essential nexus between state interest and permit interest. |
| First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles | When govt commits a taking, revoking the regulation does not eliminate the need for the govt to pay compensation. |
| Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, Inc. | Moratorium issue, Temporary Moratoriums do not remove all economic value from property. |
| Crown Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Romulus, Michigan | Due process issue, Romulus did not provide proper notice or give owner proper hearing. |
| Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel. | A developing municipality must, by its land use regulations, make realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all categories of people who may desire to live there. |
| City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. | Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest . Renton did not view 1,000 foot restriction as content-based. |
| Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, Christ Center, Christian Covenant Outreach Church v. City of Chicago | land use regulation makes religious exercise effectively impractical, financial implications do not cause substantial burden on religious exercise. |
| Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego | Consistent with 1st amendment to limit billboards for commercial signs, but limiting non-commercial messages is unconstitutional. |
| Lighthouse Community Church of God v. Southfield (2005) | Three step application of RLUIPA, Court found that cities parking restrictions for churches were in violation of RLUIPA. |
| Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York | defined factors to consider for taking to occur: 1: economic impact (investment backed expectations), 2: Character of govt action (ie physical occupation) |
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